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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Article
VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(l) and 78-2-
2(3Xe)(i), and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (URAP).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Where Appellants seek to have Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4.li declared
unconstitutional, yet no plan under that statute is in effect, is the appeal on
constitutional issues moot?
Standard ofReview:2 Mootness is a question ofjurisdiction, which may be
raised at any time, and which this Court may address as a question of law. See
Rule 37(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, this issue is a general
question of law. Furthermore, this Court may grant relief from an order of the
Public Service Commission only if the Appellants have been substantially preju
diced. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4).
2. Is Section 54-4-4.1(1), vesting authority in the Public Service Commis
sion to adopt, by rule or order,
any method of rate regulation consistent with this title, including a
method whereby revenues or earnings of a public utility above a
specified level are equitably shared between the public utility and its
customers,
a. an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power;
i Hereinafter, statutory references will be to Utah Code Ann. unless
otherwise noted.
2 Appellants failed to state the standard of review and supporting authority
for any of the issues they raised, as required by Rule 24(a)(5), URAP.
b. an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power; or
c. an unconstitutional denial of due process?
Standard of Review: These are general questions of law to be reviewed
under the correction-of-error standard. Savage Industries v. Tax Comm'n. 811
P.2d 664, 666-67 (Utah 1991); Utah Dent, of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).
3. Does a public utility's power to reject a revenue sharing plan under
Section 54-4-4.1(2) constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative or
judicial power, or a denial of due process to a third party?
Standard of Review: These are general questions of law to be reviewed
under the correction-of-error standard. Savage Industries v. Tax Comm'n. 811
P.2d 664, 666-67 (Utah 1991); Utah Dent, of Admin. Serv, v. Public Serv. Comm'n.
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).
4. Are Appellants entitled to attorney's fees and/or costs, where they are
not provided for by statute or contract?
Standard of Review: Since this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it
is a question of law for this Court to determine.3
5. Did Appellants properly marshall the evidence relating to the Public
Service Commission's adoption of a 12.2 %rate of return, and if so, was the Public
Service Commission's adoption of a 12.2 % rate of return supported by substantial
3 In Section VII, infra, U S WEST points out that Appellants' request for
attorney's fees, among other things, is an inappropriate attempt to invoke this
Court's original jurisdiction and that Appellants have not presented a factual
basis for attorney's fees.
evidence?
Standard of Review. The question whether Appellants properly marshalled
the evidence is a question of law for this Court. First Natl Bank v. Countv Bd. of
Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). The review of the Commission's rate of
return finding is to be made under the substantial evidence test, under which it
will be sustained if "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv..
supra, 658 P.2d at 608.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes, which are set forth
fully in Addendum A to this Brief, are determinative of the issues in this case:
Constitutional Provisions: Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 7; Art. V, Sec. 1; Art.
VI, Sec. 1; Art. VIII, Sec. 1, and Art. XII, Sec. 20.
Statutes: Sections 54-3-1, 54-3-7, 54-4-1, 54-4-4, 54-4-4.1, 54-7-12, 63-46b-10,
and 63-46b-16(4).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While most of Appellants' Statement of the Case is correct, there are some
errors and omissions.
Appellants assert that the filing for an earnings sharing plan by Respon-
dent U S WEST Communications, Inc. (hereinafter WU S WEST")4 was part of a
U S WEST general rate case. (App. Brief at 4). That is simply untrue. U S
WEST'S filing in the case (Case No. 90-049-03) was for the express purpose of
seeking approval of a sharing plan. (R. 3739-60). U S WEST did not initiate a
general rate case. It was the subsequent filing by the Division of Public Utilities
(hereafter "Division") of a petition to investigate U S WEST's earnings (Case No. 90-
049-06) that generated the general rate proceeding. (R. 4241-60). The two separate
proceedings were then consolidated for hearing. (R. 3875-82).
Appellants' Statement leaves out large portions of the procedural history of
the case, including descriptions of the comprehensive testimony filed with regard
to U S WEST's and the Division's proposed sharing plans. However, the Commis
sion's June 19, 1990 Report and Order sets forth a detailed procedural history (R.
5384-88). A copy of the Report and Order is attached as Addendum B. The order
also describes in some detail the evidence presented by the parties (R. 5462-69,
Addendum B). Rather than repeat that information here, Respondents refer the
Court to the Commission's Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of the Facts is not a review of the facts presented
below. While it is 45 pages long, references to the record are minimal.s In fact,
4 Respondent U S WEST Communications, Inc. should be distinguished
from its parent, U S WEST, Inc., which is not a party to this case.
5 While Appellants make reference to the transcript and to other items in
the record, they fail to cite the record in compliance with the requirements of Rule
24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
most of the 45 pages is dedicated to assertions and analysis that have nothing to do
with the factual record below. For example:
1. Appellants assert that they were not treated fairly in the
manner in which Section 54-4-4.1 was enacted by the Utah Legislature.
(App. Brief at 11-12). Yet they cite nothing in the record to support their
assertion and make no claim that the statute was not legally enacted.
2. Appellants relate their subjective conclusions about sharing
plans in general, their perception that the statute lacks appropriate
standards, and their subjective assessment of U S WEST's motivation in
seeking an incentive plan. (Id. at 14-15). Yet none of the Appellants
testified in the hearing nor did they present any expert testimony.
3. Appellants make unsupported assertions as to the market
share of gas, electric and telephone utilities in Utah, all without benefit of
citations to the record. (Id, at 15-16).
4. Appellants relate a variety of alleged procedural problems (Id.
at 17-19), none of which serve as the basis for any of the substantive issues
raised by Appellants on appeal. The only purpose for their recitations is to
prejudice the case.
5. Appellants present a lengthy argument as to their view of the
legal and economic underpinnings to utility regulation. (Id. at 20-40). In
these twenty pages there are only two footnotes citing to the record.6
6 Appellants' legal and economic analysis in their fact section serves as the
fundamental premise to their constitutional argument. Respondents address
these issues in Section III, infra.
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6. Appellants present a lengthy discussion of why, in their view,
sharing plans are not valid (Id. at 40-50).
Appellants' limited references to the record below are not made for the purpose of
presenting a balanced view of the comprehensive testimony presented on incen
tive regulation/sharing plans,? but are obviously presented in an effort to prove a
proposition that is no longer at issue in this case: whether sharing plans are good
or bad. It is not at issue because the U S WEST and Division plans were rejected
by the Commission (R. 5477, Addendum B), and U S WEST opted out of the
Commission's plan. (R. 5692-93). Since no party in this case asserts that a
sharing plan is in effect, the general merit of sharing plans is not an issue that
this Court must determine. Thus, the only purpose of Appellants' demonization
of sharing plans is to inject irrelevant and prejudicial information into the case so
that the Court will be moved to accept Appellants' facial challenge to the constitu
tionality of Section 54-4-4.1.
A. Incentive Regulation/Sharing Plans. Thus, although Appellants'
diatribe against sharing plans is technically irrelevant, it is nevertheless impor
tant for the Court to gain a greater understanding of sharing plans, based on the
record below. Extensive testimony on sharing plans was presented by witnesses
for U S WEST, the Division and the Committee of Consumer Services (Commit
tee). The primary witnesses presented by U S WEST were Robert C. Fuehr (R.
7781-7801), Utah Vice President, Kirk R. Nelson (R. 7803-7981), Assistant Vice
7 The terms "incentive regulation" and "sharing plans" are synonymous
and are used interchangeably in this Brief.
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President, Dr. William H. Davidson (R. 7982-8099), Associate Professor of Man
agement at the University of Southern California, and Phillip S. Selander (R. 8100-
8225), Director-Network Facilities Engineering. The general position of U S WEST
was that a properly constructed sharing plan would create positive benefits to the
utility, its customers and to the state in general. The Division presented the
testimony of five of its staff members: Dr. George Compton (R. 7072-7159), Thomas
F. Peel (R. 6745-6884), Larry F. Fuller (R. 6924-92), Earl Brown (R. 6887-6923) and
Ingo Henningsen (R. 6993-7019). The Division, while less ebullient about sharing
plans than U S WEST, concluded that a plan could be constructed that could
result in lower rates for customers over traditional regulation and felt that a plan
that could be reviewed within 3 years was worth the experiment. The Committee
presented the testimony of two outside consultants: William W. Dunkel (R. 6082-
6561) and Michael L. Arndt (R. 6060-81). The Committee witnesses were generally
opposed to sharing plans, preferring traditional rate of return regulation.
Appellants presented no testimony.
Earnings sharing plans represent a recent trend in the regulation of
telephone utilities in the United States. While no two plans are identical, there
are two features that are common to most plans:
1. Some form ofrate freeze on essential services for a specified period of
time (usually 3 to 5 years). Thus, in most plans the utility gives up its
right to initiate a rate case for the term of the plan. (R. 7987, 8000)
2. Some form of retroactive sharing of profits above a predetermined
level. Thus, an inherent part of any plan includes the utility's
consent to some form of retroactive refunds to customers. (R. 7816-
8307)
In addition to those items, plans often include service standards, service im
provement requirements, infrastructure upgrades, and other features designed to
protect ratepayers and to provide incentive to the utility to be more efficient,
service conscious, and responsive to customer desires for new services.
U S WEST's witnesses presented several reasons why an appropriately
structured incentive regulation plan was in the public interest:
• Incentive regulation focuses on beneficially harnessing profits
rather than limiting them, thus producing incentives that traditional
regulation is not equipped to provide. (R. 7808-09, 7815, 7987-89).
• Incentive regulation explicitly uses market forces (rather than
regulatory mandates) to guide the deployment of new technology invest
ments, while continuing to sustain universal service. (R. 7834, 7878-82).
• Incentive regulation encourages beneficial behaviors and the
achievement of regulatory goals in ways that traditional regulation
cannot.8 (R. 7809-10, 7813-17, 7819-21, 7984-90, 8002-8010). Specifically, under
traditional regulation U S WEST does not benefit from significant im
provements in efficiencies and marketing success since, through the rate
process, advances in these areas ultimately are flowed back 100% to
8 Many other jurisdictions have moved away from traditional regulation in
recent years. In the last few years, three states have adopted a form of deregula
tion, six have adopted rate caps, and 18 have adopted incentive regulation (R
7866). S
8
ratepayers. (R. 8037-47, 8083-89).
. Incentive regulation would enable Utah to compete more effectively
with other states in attracting new telecommunications investments and
services. This will occur sooner and in greater quantity than without
improved regulation. (R. 7808-12, 7815, 8031-33, 8036). It also provides
financial benefits that recognize increased risks for both customers and U S
WEST associated with new technologies and greater competition (both
among states and among companies). (R. 7815). It will therefore enhance
economic development in Utah. (R. 7787-93, 7796-99, 7838, 7987-89, 7991-92,
7998-8001,8008-10).
• Incentive regulation allows customers to share financially in
improvements triggered by the added incentives, in addition to the benefits
that will be derived from new services. (R. 7838).
• Incentive regulation encourages quality service, efficient
operations, prudent capital investments, new services and revenue growth
without rate increases. (R. 7808-14).
• Incentive regulation protects customers from rate increases in an
environment in which rate reductions cannot be expected to continue, while
providing extensive modernizations. (R. 7295, 7297-99, 7301-02, 7809, 7823).
While the Division characterized incentive regulation as an experiment (R.
6748), it recognized that there is always room for improvement in the manage
ment process and that it would be difficult to know the benefits of incentive
regulation unless it is actually tried. (R. 6752). Potential benefits include "addi-
tional sharable earnings benefitting both the ratepayer and shareholder along
with the more rapid deployment of new technology" and the reduction of regula
tory costs by eliminating contested rate cases. (R. 6753-55). It also provides
opportunities for refunds relating to prior periods, provides incentive to create and
market new services, and expedites the replacement of older technologies. (R.
6755). In addition to this qualitative testimony, Dr. Compton of the Division
presented a study in support of the Division's plan that quantitatively estimated
regulatory lag and other factors so that a plan could be developed that would
assure that ratepayers benefit from it. (R. 7073-7148).
The Committee opposed the concept of incentive regulation, making three
basic assertions: (1) the continuous lowering of rates is the norm in the telecom
munications industry - thus, incentive regulation is unnecessary (R. 6090-91); (2)
incentive regulation creates a disincentive for investment, while traditional
regulation promotes investment (R. 6142, 6150-59); and (3) utility employees
already have adequate incentives under traditional regulation (R. 6248).
In its Order, the Commission agreed with some of the propositions asserted
by the parties and disagreed with others (R. 5470-78), ultimately rejecting the
specific plans offered by U S WEST and the Division (R. 5477) and adopting a plan
of its own. Although rates were frozen and the Commission plan was designed to
last five years, the Commission reserved the power to "terminate the plan at any
time if it is convinced that the public interest justifies termination." (R. 5478-79).
It also contained provisions requiring the retroactive sharing of profits above
certain levels (R. 5479).
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While there was a voluminous record dealing with the claimed merits and
asserted problems with incentive regulation, one of the underlying premises of
Appellants' so-called fact statement is an inference that the plans presented by
U S WEST and the Division, as well as the plan adopted by the Commission,
represent drastic and reckless departures from the mainstream. Appellants, for
example, spend considerable energy in pointing out that incentive regulation is
not beneficial to the public and that the Commission should not have adopted any
kind of plan. The fact of the matter, however, is that sharing plans have been
adopted in many different state jurisdictions and that virtually every plan adopted
provides the utility with far greater opportunity for earning than would the
Commission plan.
At various points in the proceeding, parties presented updates as to the
status of sharing plans in other jurisdictions.9 The final exhibit presented was
U S WEST Exhibit 10R.4 (R. 8307, Addendum C), which summarized major
elements of plans approved in 16 jurisdictions. A review of that exhibit demon
strates that the plans proposed by U S WEST and the Division were well within the
mainstream of plans adopted elsewhere and that the plan adopted by the Com
mission, while containing elements similar to those other plans, is more restric
tive to the utility than other plans. The Commission plan would have allowed U S
9 The Division witness Thomas Peel presented a summary of plans in other
states. (R. 6876-84).
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WEST to earn a maximum return on equity of 14%.10 The authorized return on
equity established by the Commission was 12.2%. By contrast, for the plans in the
other 16 jurisdictions, the average authorized return was 13.13% and the point at
which sharing commenced was 13.94%, only .06% below the absolute maximum
earnings that U S WEST could achieve under the Commission plan. (R. 8307,
Addendum C). Thus, Appellants' inference that the incentive plans proposed
below were a major departure (to the detriment of ratepayers) from the main
stream simply is not supported by the evidence.
B. Rate of Return. Appellants assert that the Commission's finding of a
12.2% return on equity is not supported by substantial evidence. In responding to
that claim, in Section VIII, infra, Respondents review portions of the evidence
presented that support that finding. Since that evidence is reviewed in Section
VIII, it will not be repeated here.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. WTiatever the Court decides in this case, no sharing plan is in effect
or will go into effect. Therefore, with the exception of the rate of return issue, all
issues raised by Appellants in their appeal are moot. This Court has adopted a
io The Commission plan (R. 5479, Addendum B) worked this way:
Up to 12.2%
12.2 to 13.2%
13.2 to 14.2%
14.2 to 17.0%
over 17%
Maximum Company Earnings
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Ratenaver Share Companv Total Companv
0 all 12.2
80% 20% .2
60% 40% .4
50% 50% 1.4
all
-ni
0 0,0
14.0%
strong policy of avoiding decisions on constitutional issues unless essential to
decide a case. Under this doctrine, the challenger must demonstrate that he or
she is being adversely affected by the statute. Since Appellants cannot make such
a demonstration regarding Section 54-4-4.1, their constitutional claims are moot.
Further, this Court has adopted a strong policy against rendering advisory
opinions, which is precisely what Appellants are seeking. Finally, the facts of
this case do not bring it within the only exception to the mootness doctrine adopted
by this Court.
2. When a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the burden
rests heavily on the party making the challenge. That burden is particularly
heavy when the statute being challenged deals with economic matters. This
Court presumes statues to be valid; when faced with two different interpretations
of a statute, the Court will choose the interpretation that validates the statute.
3. Neither the Constitution nor the Public Utility Code requires cost of
service regulation as the only method that can be utilized by the Commission in
establishing "just and reasonable" rates. The Public Utility Code only requires
that rates be "just and reasonable," but does not define for the Commission how it
should reach "just and reasonable" rates. Instead, the statutes set forth broad
policy statements to guide the Commission in setting rates. Section 54-4-4.1(1)
merely codifies for the Commission that it is free to adopt any method or formula
of rate regulation consistent with Title 54. The courts have held that it is the final
impact of the rate order that determines if the action of the Commission is
constitutional. As long as the rates are not confiscatory and procedural due
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process has been followed, constitutional requirements have been met. The
Commission is free to adopt other methods or formulas to achieve "just and
reasonable" rates and courts will not interfere with their choice. The Commis
sion establishes rates; rate of return is only one of the elements that goes into the
formula for setting rates. Those rates remain in effect until new rates are set by
the Commission. If the rates produce revenue that results in a return lower than
what was authorized by the Commission, the utility cannot make up the differ
ence retroactively. Likewise, if the utility earns more than the rate of return
authorized by the Commission, the utility keeps the difference until new rates are
established. Therefore, rates that have been found "just and reasonable" by the
Commission do not become "unjust and unreasonable" automatically when
earnings are either above or below the return authorized by the Commission in
the utility's last rate case.
4. (a) Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah
Constitution by unconstitutionally delegating legislative powers to the Commis
sion. Rate making is clearly the type of function that can be delegated to an
administrative agency such as the Commission. Courts have held that the broad
standards contained in the Public Utility Code are sufficient to guide the Commis
sion in establishing rates. In addition, sufficient procedural safeguards are
contained in the Public Utility Code and the Administrative Procedures Act to
ensure that due process is met.
(b) Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate Article V, Section 1 of the Utah
Constitution by delegating powers to the Courts to select a different method of rate
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regulation than that chosen by the Commission. In reviewing orders of the
Commission, Courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the Commis
sion. The Court has never had nor ever asserted the power to establish a rate
regulation different from the Commission and thus no authority to establish rates
has been delegated to the Courts.
(c) Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution. Adequate standards are included within the Public Utility Code to
comply with due process. In addition, sufficient procedural safeguards are
included within the Public Utility Code and the Administrative Procedures Act in
order to satisfy due process. Finally, Section 54-4-4.1 is not so vague as to run
counter to due process.
(d) Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate state antitrust policies, including
Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution. In fact, state antitrust policies
envision that regulation of public utilities does not generally fall under state
antitrust statutes.
5. Subsection 2 of Section 54-4-4.1, which allows a public utility to elect
not to proceed with a revenue sharing plan (i.e. requires utility consent to a
Commission-adopted revenue sharing plan) is neither an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, nor a deprivation of Appellants' due process
rights. There is no improper delegation, because the statute merely recognizes
the common law and constitutionally-based rule against retroactive rate making,
under which a utility could prohibit "revenue sharing" regardless of the existence
of Subsection 2. Furthermore, the grant of a consent power to a private party is
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generally valid where it requires consent to waive a restriction, such as in the
statute in question. The granting of a veto power to pubic utilities over revenue
sharing plans, while other parties have no such power, does not violate due
process principles, because the public utility is in a unique position in a rate
proceeding, since only its earned revenue is at risk, and no other party has the
right or incentive to invoke the rule against retroactive rate making.
6. The Court need not rule on the severability issue since no party
claims that a sharing plan can go into effect in this case. Nevertheless, in the
event the Court addresses the severability issue, since Subsection 1 is broader
than Subsection 2, the possible invalidation of Subsection 2 should not invalidate
Subsection 1.
7. Appellant's request for costs and attorney's fees was raised for the
first time on appeal. Neither of the two theories upon which Appellants base their
request -the "substantial benefits" rule or the "private attorney general" doctrine-
has been adopted by this Court; rather this Court follows the general rule that
attorney's fees are awarded only where allowed by statute or contract. Even if the
Court were to adopt the substantial benefits test, Appellants' claim clearly fails to
meet the test. The private attorney general doctrine has been rejected by the
United States Supreme Court and by the majority of state courts that have
addressed it on the ground that the doctrine is an impermissible judicial entry
into the province of the legislative branch. Nevertheless, even if the Court were to
adopt the private attorney general doctrine, Appellants' claim does not meet the
test. Finally, Appellants' attorney's fees claim is procedurally and factually
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flawed and, if granted, would violate U S WEST's due process rights.
8. Appellants have the burden of establishing that the Commission's
finding of a 12.2% return on equity was not based on substantial evidence.
Furthermore, it is Appellants' duty to marshall the evidence supporting the
finding, otherwise the finding is accepted as conclusive. Appellants failed to
marshall the evidence. In any event, it is clear from the record that the finding is
based on substantial evidence.
AUGUMENT
I. APPELLANTS' APPEAL RELATING TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 54-4-4.1 AND ATTORNEYS' FEES IS MOOT.
A. There is no earnings sharing nlan in effect.
The inescapable and uncontested fact is that no alternative method of
regulation under Section 54-4-4.1 presently exists or can exist for U S WEST in
Utah, unless and until one is adopted in a future proceeding before the Commis
sion. U S WEST and the Division proposed plans that were rejected by the
Commission. (R. 5477, Addendum B). Instead, the Commission adopted a plan of
its own (R. 5478-80), which U S WEST rejected under Section 54-4-4.1(2) (R. 5692-
93). Thus, Appellants' goal, which is that traditional regulation remain in effect,
continues to be fully achieved. No party is challenging that result on appeal, n
Thus, although Appellants seek to challenge the constitutionality of Section 54-4-
n While U S WEST, in its Petition for Rehearing, asked the Commission
to reconsider its decision on the earnings sharing plan and adopt a plan more in
line with the one it proposed, U S WEST has not appealed the Commission's
decision not to do so. Likewise, the Division has not appealed the denial of its
plan.
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4.1, a determination of that issue would not affect the current means by which U S
WEST is regulated.
B. A declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1 would not
affect the status quo, because the current rate order was issued
under traditional cost-of-service ratemaking procedures.
On the one hand, Appellants attack U S WEST's exercise of the statutory
right to opt out of a sharing plan, claiming the existence of such a right is
unconstitutional. However, they do not do so in order to allow the Commission's
sharing plan to go into effect, because they also claim that the Commission does
not have the constitutional right to adopt a non-traditional method of regulation
and that the Commission's plan should be declared invalid. Their argument, if
adopted, would therefore lead directly back to the status quo, because traditional
regulation is presently in effect.
No party asserts that any kind of plan under Section 54-4-4.1 is currently in
effect. As a consequence, whether Appellants' constitutional claims prevail or
not, the requested relief would not alter the rate order that now governs their
telephone service. Thus, all issues raised in Appellants' Docketing Statement
and Brief, with the exception of the issue relating to return on equity, are moot
and need not be decided by this Court.
C The Court should not determine the constitutionality of a statute
unless it is essential to decide the case.
With the exception of the rate of return issue, the issues raised by Appel
lants go in various ways to the constitutionality ofSection 54-4-4.1. In a long line
of cases, this Court has established the firm principle that it will avoid, where
possible, pronouncements as to the constitutionality ofstate statutes. The leading
18
case on this issue is Hovle v. Monson. 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980). In Hovle. the
Court outlined some basic principles:
The right and power of the judiciary to declare whether legislative
enactments exceed constitutional limitations is to be exercised with
considerable restraint and in conformity with fundamental rules.
One such fundamental rule of long-standing is that unnecessary
decisionsare to be avoided and that the courts should pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute only when such a determination is
essential to the decision in a case. A constitutional question does not
arise merely because it is raised and a decision is sought thereon;
rather, the constitutionality ofa statute is to be considered in the light
of the standing of the one who seeks to raise the question and of its
particular application. An attack on the validity of a statute cannot be
made by parties whose interests have not been, and are not about to
be, prejudiced by the operation of the statute.
Hoyle, 606 P.2d at 242 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). See State v. Rio Vista
Qil. Ltd,, 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990) ("[a] fundamental principle ofjudicial
review is that, when possible, we refrain from deciding constitutional questions");
State v.Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). Thus, this Court has adopted a
fundamental principle of judicial restraint on constitutional questions. Given the
fact that no earnings sharing plan is in effect, or could go into effect if Appellants
prevailed, it is not "essential" for the Court to determine the constitutionality of
Section 54-4-4.1 in this case.
D. The constitutionality of a statute mav only he attacked when the
Challenger is adversely affected hv the statute's amplication.
Other cases state that in order for a party to have standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the statute must be in the process ofbeing applied to
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the disadvantage of that party or there must be an immediate threat of its applica
tion:
The constitutionality of a statute is to be considered in the light of the
standing of the party who seeks to raise the question and of its
particular application; and a person may challenge the constitution
ality of a statute only when and as far as it is being, or is about to be
applied to his disadvantage.
Cavaness v. Cox. 598 P.2d 349, 351-52 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). In Sims v.
Smith. 571 P.2d 586 (Utah 1977), the Court stated that "before a party may attack
the constitutionality of a statute he must be adversely affected by that very statute."
571 P.2d at 587, quoting Pride Club v. State. 481 P.2H 669 fTTtah 1971^ In Duran v.
Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981), this Court stated that "[i]f the requested
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the case is moot and a court
will normally refrain from adjudicating it on the merits." Accord, Black v. Alpha
Financial Corp,, 656 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1982); Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Associ
ates, 646 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1982); State v. Kallas. 94 P.2d 414, 424 (Utah 1939).
It is undisputed that no plan of any kind is now in effect under the powers
granted to the Commission by Section 54-4-4.1. Indeed, U S WEST continues to be
regulated under the traditional regulatory regime that Appellants assert is
desirable and legally required. No possible outcome of Appellants' appeal would
change that fact. Furthermore, while U S WEST has appealed the Commission's
June 19, 1991 order, none of the issues raised by it go either to the Commission's
refusal to adopt its proposed plan or to the plan adopted by the Commission that
U S WEST elected not to accept. Appellants' interest in retaining traditional
regulation of U S WEST in Utah will not be affected in any way by a decision on the
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constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1. Therefore, Appellants' appeal on those
constitutional issues should be dismissed.
E. The Court should not render advisory oninions. even on a reouest for
declaratory iudFrment.
After articulating its policy of restraint in dealing with constitutional
issues, this Court in Hovle set forth its strong policies relating to advisory opinions
and mootness:
A further fundamental rule is that the courts do not busy themselves
with advisory opinions, nor is it within their province to exercise the
delicate power of pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in abstract,
hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases. It has been found to be far
wiser, and it has become settled as a general principle, that a
constitutional question is not to be reached if the merits of the case in
hand may be fairly determined on other than constitutional issues.
606 P.2d at 242 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). Other cases have reiterated the
strong policy against rendering advisory opinions:
Because of a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory
opinions, we do not generally consider mooted questions on appeal . .
. . "The function of appellate courts, like that of courts generally, is
not to give opinions on merely abstract or theoretical matters, but only
to decide actual controversies injuriously affecting the rights of some
party to the litigation, and it has been held that questions or cases
which have become moot or academic are not a proper subject to
review."
Reynolds v. Reynolds. 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990), ouotins MacRae v.
Jflckson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974). Accord. Black. 656 P.2d at 410-11;
Merhish, 646 P.2d at 731; Spain v. Stewart. 639 P.2d 166 (Utah 1981). In State v.
Stromquigt, 639 P.2d 171, 172 (Utah 1981), the Court made it clear that the test
whether a statute affects the legal right of a litigant is to be made in the context of
the current case, not some hypothetical future case:
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The defendant's abortive appeal to this Court can and does request
only an opinion of this Court as to the validity of a statute in which the
defendant has no further interest as it applies to the history of this
case. This Court was not intended to be, nor is it endowed with
authority to render advisory opinions, and has said so many times.
(italics in original). No current rights of any party, including those of the Appel
lants, can possibly be impacted in this case by a determination of constitutionality
of Section 54-4-4.1. Thus, Appellants' effort to secure an advisory opinion from
this Court should be denied.
The principles enunciated above are equally applicable to Declaratory
Judgment Actions under Section 78-33-2. The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act,
Sections 78-33-1 et seq., provides a means by which litigants can seek a judicial
declaration of their rights under statutes. Section 78-33-2 states:
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or
whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute,
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined
any questions of construction or validity arising under the instru
ment, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declara
tion of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
This Court has held that actions under the Act are subject to the same limitations
discussed in prior sections of this memorandum. For example, in Baird v. State.
574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978), the plaintiff sought and received a declaratory judgment
that a portion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act was unconstitutional. On
appeal, this Court reversed, ruling that the district court should have held that "it
lacked jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion." 574 P.2d at 715. The Court's
discussion is highly instructive. It first noted that plaintiff had pleaded no
"concrete facts .... indicating any specific injury sustained or threatened to
plaintiff personally." 574 P.2d at 715. Then, citing Lvon v. Bateman. 228 P 2d HIS
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(Utah 1951), the Court stated:
In Lyon v. Bateman, this Court stated that while statutes authorizing
courts to render declaratory relief should be liberally construed, the
courts must, nevertheless, operate within the constitutional and
statutory powers and duties imposed upon them. The courts are not
a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory
opinions. To maintain an action for declaratory relief, plaintiff must
show that the justiciable and jurisdictional elements requisite in
ordinary actions are present, for a judgment can be rendered only in
a real controversy between adverse parties.
. . . Generally, courts have held that the conditions which must exist
before a declaratory judgment action can be maintained are: (1) a
justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties must be
adverse; (3) the party seeking such relief must have a legally protect
able interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues between the parties
involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
To entertain an action for declaratory relief, there must be a justicia
ble controversy, for the courts do not give advisory opinions upon
abstract questions. The use of the term "rights, status and other legal
relations" in the declaratory judgment statute (§ 78-33-2, U.CA. 1953)
relates to a justiciable controversy where there is an actual conflict
between interested parties asserting adverse claims on an accrued
state of facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of facts.
Baircl, 574 P.2d at 717, quoting Lvon. 228 P.2d at 820; Backman v. Salt Lake
County, 375 P.2d 756 (Utah 1962). The Baird court also made it clear that in order
to determine the legal validity of a statute, the party must show a direct injury
resulting from the statute:
To invoke judicial power to determine the validity of executive or
legislative action, claimant must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of that
action. It is insufficient to assert a general interest he shares in
common with all members of the public, viz., a generalized griev
ance.
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Baird. 574 P.2d at 717 (emphasis added).i2
While Appellants did not proceed under the Declaratory Judgment Act, its
principles are applicable to their claim. Since Appellants' claims for review in
their appeal would fail under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Appellants are
inappropriately attempting to do indirectly what they would not be allowed to do
under the Declaratory Judgment Act. They are, in effect, attempting to obtain a
declaration from the Supreme Court that they would have been unable to obtain
from the District Court.
A reading of Appellants' Docketing Statement and Brief shows that they are
adamantly opposed to sharing plans in general and that they believe such plans
are harmful to ratepayers (App. Brief at 40-52). Yet, nowhere do they acknowl
edge the obvious fact that no such plan is or has been in effect in Utah, nor the fact
that U S WEST remains subject to the kind of traditional regulatory treatment
Appellants believe is required. This Court can grant no specific relief in this case
that will change the fact that U S WEST is currently subject to traditional regula
tion. Furthermore, in Appellants' own words, they are "customers of U.S. West."
(Id. at 5). They claim no other status.13 Other than the possibility that U S WEST
12 The Court also quoted with approval the following statement from 1
Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, 2d ed. § 9, at 49-50:
A justiciable controversy authorizing entry of a declaratory judgment is one
wherein the plaintiff is possessed of a protectible interest at law or in equity
and the right to a judgment, and the judgment, when pronounced, must be
such as would give specific relief, (emphasis added).
13 As pointed out in footnote 48, infra, Appellants intervened in their own
behalf and not as representatives of a broader class.
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or some other utility may seek an earnings sharing plan in a future case that may
affect Appellants as utility customers, they have no present interest that can be
affected by this case. Thus, Appellants have not shown that they have sustained
any direct injury from the operation of Section 54-4-4.1, nor can they show that
they are "immediately in danger of sustaining" such an injury. Their appeal is
therefore moot and should be dismissed.
F. This case does not fall within the only excention to the mootness
doctrine,
The Utah Supreme Court, in Wickham v. Fisher. 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981),
adopted a limited exception to the basic principle that it will not rule on moot
issues. In Wickham. a former pretrial detainee filed a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the constitutionality of certain aspects of the jail conditions while he
was detained. On appeal, the defendants contended that plaintiff had no standing
since he was no longer a pretrial detainee. This Court held that, while the case
was technically moot, it fell within the following limited exception:
The principles that determine the justiciability of the instant case are
the well-established rules which permit a court to litigate an issue
which, although technically moot as to a particular litigant at the
time of appeal, is of wide concern, affects the public interest, is likely
to recur in a similar manner, and, because of the brief time any one
person is affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial review.
629 P.2d at 899 (citations omitted, emphasis added). The Court cited as models for
the exception cases like Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) where, because of the
short human gestation period, the pregnancy would come to term before the
appellate process could be completed. Thus, in light of the fact that "present and
future detainees will suffer conditions at the jail for a period of time insufficient
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for a case to receive appellate review during the imposition of such conditions" the
Wickham Court held that it reflected "a continuing and recurring controversy
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court." 629 P.2d at 900.
This exception has been discussed in four subsequent cases, and in none of
them did the Court invoke the exception. In Merhish. this Court made it clear
that the exception applies only in extremely limited circumstances:
The extraordinary circumstances that occasionally provide an
exception to the mootness rule . . . are clearly absent in this case.
646 P.2d at 732 (emphasis added).
In State v. Davis. 721 P.2d 894 (Utah 1986), a criminal defendant asked this
Court to declare invalid a sentencing order that prescribed his criminal punish
ment. Despite the fact that the defendant had served his sentence and received a
termination of probation, he asked that the issue be considered under the excep
tion to the mootness rule. This Court described the exception this way:
The exception alluded to is where there is a continuing and recurring
controversy but, because of the short period for adjudication, appellate
review of the issue is effectively denied.
Davis., 721 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added). The Court held that the case did not fall
within the exception and refused to address the issue.
In Burkett v. Schewendim^n 773 P.2d 42 (Utah 1989), a motorist challenged
a driver's license revocation proceeding. Burkett's license was revoked for failing
to submit to a blood alcohol test. On appeal, he asked that the revocation be
reversed despite the fact that the one year period had already passed. The Court
noted that it occasionally invokes an exception to the mootness doctrine "when the
case presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to recur, and
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because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, is capable ofevading
review." 773 P.2d at 44 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the case was
not an appropriate one in which to invoke the exception.
Finally, in Salt Lake Citv v. Tax Commission. 813 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1991), the
Court reaffirmed the exception but held that, because of a subsequent legislative
change, the issue in the case was unlikely to recur and was therefore moot.
In order to meet the terms of the exception, ail of the following require
ments must be met:
1. It must be a public issue of wide concern;
2. It must be an issue likely to recur; and
3. Because of the brief time any one litigant is affected, the issue is
likely to evade review.
As a threshold matter, the third element cannot be met in this case because
no earnings sharing plan has ever affected Appellants in Utah. The legal
authorities require that in order to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, the
rights or interests of the party making the challenge must have been affected (or
there must be an imminent threat of such an effect). In Wickham. the only case
where this Court has actually applied the exception, the plaintiff had actually
been affected by the jail conditions while he was a pretrial detainee. Likewise, in
Roe v. Wade, the plaintiff had been directly impacted by the restrictions of the
abortion law being challenged. In contrast, the only thing that has occurred in
this case was the consideration of earnings sharing plans under Section 54-4-
4.1—the result, however, was that no plan became effective and the status quo (the
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traditional regulation of U S WEST) has not changed. Thus, Appellants cannot
meet the basic threshold requirement to even allow consideration of the exception
to the mootness rule.
Even if Appellants were affected by an earnings sharing plan, they do not
meet the other elements of the exception on the specific issues they raise in their
Brief.
Points I and II. In Point I, Appellants assert that the opt out provision,
Section 54-4-4.1(2), is unconstitutional. (App. Brief at 59-67). In Point II, Appel
lants assert that if subsection 2 is unconstitutional, then all of Section 54-4-4.1 is
unconstitutional since, in their view, subsections 1 and 2 are not severable. (App.
Brief at 67-69). There is no basis to conclude that the issue will be likely to recur in
the manner it has in this case or that it will evade review. It is entirely possible
that the Commission could in the future adopt an earnings sharing plan (either of
its own making or proposed by another party) that the public utility will reject, but
which the Commission or some other party feels should be required regardless of
the attempt by the utility to reject the plan. If the Commission were to order such
a plan despite the utility's effort to reject it, both the constitutionality of subsection
2 and its severability from subsection 1 would be at issue.
Point III. Appellants argue that subsection 1 of Section 54.4.4.1—the basic
provision allowing the Commission to adopt alternative methods of regulation—is
unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. (App. Brief at 67-69). There is no basis to
conclude that the constitutionality of the subsection will evade review. In the
event the Commission adopts an alternative form of regulation under Section 54-4-
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4.1(1) in a future case and the utility accepts it, then the issue will be squarely
faced, either on appeal or at the District Court under the Declaratory Judgment
Act. Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the constitutionality ofSection 54-4-
4.1(1) will evade review.
Point IV. In Point IV, Appellants claim that the plan adopted by the
Commission is invalid because its adoption was procedurally flawed. (App. Brief
at 97-101). Yet the plan adopted by the Commission is not in effect. Further, since
there is no reason to believe that that precise plan will again be adopted in a future
case, this is not an issue that will likely recur, nor is there any basis to conclude
that it will evade review. If, in the future, an earnings sharing plan becomes
effective, it is that plan that should be reviewed. Since a review of the Commission
plan is purely hypothetical, it is obviously a moot issue.
Point VI. In Point VI, Appellants assert that they are entitled to attorney's
fees and costs associated with challenging the constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1.
(App. Brief at 105-18). Since this issue is entirely derivative of the constitutional
question in Points I through IV, it should be dismissed along with them. It
should also be dismissed on the additional grounds set forth in Section VII, infra.
G. Snmmnry
This Court has adopted a strong policy against making a determination of
the constitutional validity of state statutes, except where "such determination is
essential to the decision in the case."i4 Likewise, this Court has consistently held
that a person has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only
14 Hoyk,606P.2dat242.
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where the statute is being applied "or is about to be applied to his disadvantage."15
It is undisputed that the determination of the constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1 is
not essential to the decision in any case—it is equally undisputed that the statute
is not currently being applied to Appellants' detriment, nor is it about to be.
Further, this Court has adopted a strong policy against rendering advisory
opinions, which is precisely what Appellants are requesting this Court to do.
Appellants are asking this Court to render a decision that they would be unable to
obtain from a District Court under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Finally, none
of the issues raised by Appellants fall within the single limited exception to the
mootness doctrine adopted by this Court.
On this basis, Respondents respectfully request that this Court dismiss on
mootness grounds all issues except the rate of return issue.
II. THE COURT SHOULD FOLLOW GENERALLY ACCEPTED RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN INTERPRETING THE VALIDITY OF
SECTION 54-4-4.1.
This section and the remaining sections of the Brief, with the exception of
Sections VII and VIII, address issues relating to the constitutionality of Section
54-4-4.1 and are only relevant if the Court declines to rule that those issues are
moot.
Prior to discussing the constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1, it is essential to
review generally accepted rules of statutory construction used by the Court in
determining the constitutionality of statutes.
In Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 789
15 Cavaness. 598 P.2d at 352.
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P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1990), this Court declared that statutes are presumed to be
constitutional:
We first note the presumption of validity accorded legislative enact
ments when attacked on constitutional grounds. The burden is on
those who would have us strike down the statute.
In State v.Rio Vista Oil Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1349-50 (Utah 1990), this Court
reaffirmed these basic constitutional principles and stated:
It is axiomatic that statutes are presumed to be constitutional and
that the party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the
burden of proving that it is invalid. This burden is especially heavy
when attacking an economic measure, [citations omitted]
In Utah Technology Finance Corn, v. Wilkinson. 723 P.2d 406, 412-13 (Utah
1986), this Court stated:
"Due respect for the legislative prerogative in law making requires
that the judiciary not interfere with enactments of the Legislature
where disagreement is founded only on policy considerations and the
legislative scheme employs reasonable means to effectuate a legiti
mate objective." [quoting Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979)]
.... It is only when a legislative determination of public purpose is
so clearly in error as to be capricious and arbitrary that the judiciary
should upset it. . . .
In Kent Club v. Toronto. 305 P.2d 870, 873-74 (Utah 1957), the Court held that
legislation
should not be judicially declared invalid on the ground that it is
unintelligible or uncertain unless it is so imperfect and deficient as to
render it susceptible of no reasonable construction that will give it
effect, or the court finds itself unable to divine the purpose and intent
of the Legislature.
held:
In Norville v. State Tax Commission. 97 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1940), the Court
Statutes duly enacted by the legislature are presumed to be constitu
tional and valid. When there is ambiguity in the terms of a statute or
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when it is susceptible of two interpretations one of which would
render it unconstitutional and the other bring it within constitutional
sanctions, the court is bound to choose that interpretation which
would uphold the statute, and to pronounce a statute unconstitution
al only when the case is so clear as to be free from doubt, [citation
omitted]
See also, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield Countv. 811 P.2d
184,187 (Utah 1991).
The burden on Appellants in this case—to demonstrate that Section 54-4-4.1
is unconstitutional—is especially heavy because statutes relating to utility rate
making are clearly economic measures. The rates charged by a public utility
have an enormous impact on the citizens of Utah and the state's economic well-
being. Under these circumstances, the Court should particularly strive to
interpret Section 54-4-4.1 as a valid statute, even if it believes that there are two
reasonable interpretations, one that would render the statute unconstitutional,
and one that would make it valid.
III. NEITHER THE CONSTITUTION NOR THE PUBLIC UTILITY CODE
MANDATES COST-OF-SERVICE RATE REGULATION AS THE ONLY
PERMISSIBLE MEANS OF ESTABLISHING JUST AND REASONABLE
RATES.
The central premise underlying all of Appellants' arguments is that
traditional cost of service rate regulation is the only method of rate regulation
authorized or permitted for natural monopoly public utilities.16 (App. Brief at 20-
16 Appellants' assumption that telephone companies are natural monopo
lies is subject to significant controversy before regulatory bodies throughout the
nation, given the tremendous changes that are taking place in the telecommuni
cations industry. However, even assuming telephone companies are natural
monopolies, Appellants' arguments are unpersuasive. Therefore, this brief will
not address this issue.
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33). Furthermore, their argument relies upon a corollary premise that under
traditional cost of service rate regulation, the authorized rate ofreturn used by the
Commission is an absolute constraint on utility earnings, such that earnings that
exceed that rate of return are presumed illegal. Neither of these premises finds
any support in any section of the Public Utility Code (Title 54), the Utah or United
States Constitutions, or fundamental principles of rate making.
This section of Respondents' Brief will demonstrate that the Commission is
bound to follow broad policy statements in the Public Utility Code, but is not
required to achieve just and reasonable rates through any particular means. In
particular, the objectives of a sharing plan are to encourage more efficiency in the
utility than would otherwise occur under traditional regulation, by providing the
utility an incentive to earn a return higher than it would under traditional
regulation, but requiring the utility to share a portion of that higher return with
its customers. Thus both the utility and the customer could be better off under
"incentive" regulation than under traditional regulation. However, regardless of
the merits of the debate over such forms of regulation, neither the Public Utility
Code nor the Constitution prohibit an attempt to achieve these objectives by
altering traditional regulation.
A. The Public Utility Code authorizes the Commission to set iust
and reasonable rates, but does not require the Commission to
utilize anv p^rtfndar method in doing so.
The Public Utility Code requires that utility rates shall be "just and reason
able" and provides general guidelines as to what that phrase means. However, it
does not specify any particular method or formula to be utilized in setting just and
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reasonable rates.
Section 54-3-1 states that rates must be just and reasonable and suggests
some criteria that may be reviewed in determining whether or not they are. It
does not establish any method for setting rates.17
Section 54-4-4(1) also provides that the Commission must set just, reason
able, non-discriminatory, and sufficient rates and sets forth procedural prerequi
sites including the necessity of a hearing and an order. However, the method of
setting rates is not addressed.18
Section 54-4a-6 provides objectives for the Division of Public Utilities in the
performance of its activities "in the public interest." Among the objectives, the
Division is to present "objective and comprehensive information, evidence and
17 In pertinent part, Section 54-3-1 provides:
All charges made .... by any public utility . . . shall be just and reasonable.
Every unjust or unreasonable charge made ... is hereby prohibited and
declared unlawful. ... All rules and regulations made by a public utility
affecting or pertaining to its charges or service to the public shall be just
and reasonable. The scope of definition "just and reasonable" may include,
but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing service to each category of
customer, economic impact of charges on each category of customer, and
on the well-being of the state of Utah; methods of reducing wide periodic
variations in demand of such products, commodities or services, and
means of encouraging conservation of resources and energy, [emphasis
added]
18 In pertinent part., this statute provides:
Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing that the rates
. . . charged or collected by any public utility for any service or product
. . . are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, or in
anywise in violation of any provisions of law, or that such rates . . .
are insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable
or sufficient rates ... to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall
fix the same by order as hereinafter provided.
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recommendations" to the Commission to "provide for just, reasonable, and
adequate rates."^ The statute does not require that any particular methodology be
utilized in achieving those objectives.
Many other sections of Title 54 refer to rates or to procedures involved in
setting rates for utilities.20 Many others do not mention rates, but establish
19 Subsection 4 enumerates several standards to guide the determination of
what is "just, reasonable, and adequate:"
For purposes of guiding the activities of the Division of Public
Utilities, the phrase "just, reasonable, and adequate" encompasses,
but is not limited to the following criteria:
(a) maintain the financial integrity of public
utilities by assuring a sufficient and fair rate of return;
(b) promote efficient management and operation
of public utilities;
(c) protect the long-range interest of consumers in
obtaining continued quality and adequate levels of
service at the lowest cost consistent with the other
provisions of Subsection (4).
(d) provide for fair apportionment of the total cost
of service among customer categories and individual
customers and prevent undue discrimination in rate
relationships;
(e) promote stability in rate levels for customers
and revenue requirements for utilities from year to year;
and
(0 protect against wasteful use of public utility
services.
20 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-2 [requiring the filing and posting of rate
schedules], 54-3-3 [providing for changes in rate schedules], 54-3-4 [providing for
joint tariffs], 54-3-7 [requiring utilities to charge the rates contained in their filed
schedules], 54-3-8 [forbidding preferences or unreasonable discrimination in
rates charged various customers], 54-3-9 [allowing sliding scales in rates and
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procedures that are applicable in setting rates.21 However, none describes, much
automatic adjustments in rates], 54-3-19 [restricting charges relative to the
distance involved in the service], 54-4-2 [authorizing the Commission to conduct
investigations and to hold hearings and enter orders based upon such investiga
tions], 54-4-12 [allowing the Commission to set joint rates], 54-4-22 [indicating that
rates may be based upon the value of properties or investments in the state and
that no increase in rates may be found justified if the increase will result in
earnings in an amount greater than a fair return on the value of properties],
54-7-9(3) [providing procedures that must be followed by customers in complain
ing about rates], 54 7-12 [providing detailed procedures that must be followed
when any party seeks a rate increase or decrease], 54-7-20 [allowing reparations
of rates charged under certain circumstances], 54-8b-3 and 54-8b-4 [authorizing
the Commission to exempt certain utilities or services from rate regulation],
54-8b-6 [forbidding telecommunications corporations from subsidizing unregulat
ed services through regulated services], 54-8b-10 [allowing the Commission to
impose a surcharge on rates to assist in providing telecommunications devices to
hearing and speech impaired persons], 54-8b-ll and 54-8b-12 [directing the
Commission to make available high-quality, universal telecommunications
services at just and reasonable rates for all classes of customers and allowing the
Commission to establish a surcharge to assist in these objectives] and 54-10-4
[directing the Committee of Consumer Services to assess the impact of rate
changes on residential and small commercial customers].
2i Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-3 [utilities cannot change their rates without
filing new schedules with the Commission]; 54-3-7 [the utility charges filed with
the Commission may not be deviated from, no refunds or rebates are to be made];
54-3-8 [no preferences are to be given]; 54-4-1 [the Commission is granted power
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate the utility and to supervise all of its
business and to do all things necessary to accomplish the matters set forth in the
Public Utility Code]; 54-4-2 [the Commission has power to investigate compliance
with its orders, to hold hearings with notice and to prepare findings and orders
based thereon]; 54-4-4 [mandating the Commission to establish just and reason
able rates after hearing and by order]; 54-4-23 [the power to establish a system of
accounts to be utilized by the utility and to review a utility's records];"54-4a-l
[general oversight regulatory power of the Division of Public Utilities]; 54-7-9
[authorizing the Commission or consumers to file a complaint against the utility];
54-7-12 [providing procedures to be followed any time rates are increased or
decreased]; 54-7-13 [allowing the Commission to rescind or amend an order
previously made after notice and an opportunity to be heard]; 54-7-15 [allowing any
party to seek review or rehearing of a Commission order]; 54-7-17 [procedures to
obtain a stay of a Commission order pending judicial review of the order]; 54-7-20
[giving customers a remedy to recover improper charges by utilities]; 54-7-21 to 25
[giving the Commission authority to enforce the Public Utility Code and its orders
and to impose penalties upon and to enjoin a utility]; 54-10-1 et seq. [establishing
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less mandates, the traditional cost of service ratemaking process that Appellants
claim is the only permitted method of rate regulation.
B. There is no constitutional requirement that rates he set utilizing
traditional cost of servire ratemaldng,
Although Appellants do not directly argue that traditional cost of service
rate making is required under the state or federal constitutions, such an argu
ment is a logical extension of their premise that traditional cost of service rate
making is the only proper form of rate making for natural monopoly utilities, and
is clearly relevant in considering whether Section 54-4-4.1 is constitutional.
The issue of the constitutionality of alternative types of regulation has
arisen in several different contexts. It has been universally held that, so long as
the end result of rate making is just and reasonable, no constitutional infirmity
exists as a result of the rate making method employed. Furthermore, courts have
held that rate moratoriums in which rates are held at fixed levels for varying
periods of time are constitutional.
1. The end result and not the method ofrate regulation determines
whether rate making is constitutional
From the outset of rate regulation, various interests have contended that
certain methods or approaches to rate making were constitutionally required.
For example, an argument similar to Appellants' was made by Utah Power &
Light Company ("UP&L") in the 1940s. In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944), UP&L argued that its rate base should
the Committee of Consumer Services and making it representative of residential
consumers and small business in Commission proceedings].
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be calculated on current fair value, rather than on original cost less depreciation,
as a matter of both statutory and constitutional law. Id. at 545-46. This Court
rejected that argument, at least in part on the basis of Federal Power Commission
v. Hope Natural Gas Co.. 320 U.S. 591 (1944):
The Hope case stands squarely for the doctrine that it is the final
impact of the rate order which is controlling insofar as Federal
constitutional limitations are concerned. So long as the rate set does
not confiscate the property devoted to public service, the rate order
will not be held to violate substantive constitutional principles. The
legislature is free to determine its own economic policy in regard to
the fixing of rates. Its power to set rates is, however, still circum
scribed by two constitutional limitations: (1) substantive constitu
tional law requires that the rates finally set shall not be confiscatory;
and (2) the requirements of procedural due process must still be
followed.
UP&L. 152 R2d at 553.
In UP&L, the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that there are only two
constitutional limitations on the authority to regulate utility rates. The first-that
the rates not be confiscatory-protects utilities from rates set so low that they do not
provide a fair return on the capital invested in utility service. Id. at 568.22 The
second-that procedural due process must be followed-protects all parties involved
by ensuring that the Commission affords notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Any method of regulation that complies with these two requirements is constitu
tionally valid. Significant by its absence was any mention ofa constitutional right
in ratepayers or the utility to have rates established in any particular manner.
Thus, while the Constitution sets limits on how low rates may be set, it has not
22 See also, Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co v Public Serv
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. On v
Public Serv. Comm'n 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
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mandated any upper limit on rates.23
The holding of Hope, as approved by the Utah Supreme Court in UP&L. has
been widely accepted and followed. It has been the basis for holding that various
alternative methods of rate regulation are constitutional. For example, in In re
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases. 390 U.S. 747, reh. denied, 392 U. S. 917 (1968), the
United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not prevent the
setting of maximum or price ceiling rates. In Wisconsin v. Federal Power
Commission, 373 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1963), the Court upheld area rates based on
reasonable financial requirements of the industry rather than on those of an
individual company.
Recently, in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch. 488 U.S. 299 (1989), the United
23 Although the Constitution has not set an upper limit on rates, this Court
has provided the Commission guidelines on its duties to set just and reasonable
rates. In Lewis v. Wvcoff Co.. 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 264, 259 (Utah 1966), the
Court stated that the Commission has the duty "of seeing that the public receives
the most efficient and economical service possible." In Committee of Consumer
Services v. Public Service Comm'n. 595 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah 1979) ["Wexpro I"], the
Court stated that
it is the duty of a public utility corporation to operate in such a
manner as to give to the consumers the most favorable rate reason
ably possible. This duty stems from the fact the State has conferred
on the utility of [sic] the exclusive right to sell and distribute gas. As
a consequence, the utility bears a trust relationship to its customers
and must conduct its operations on that basis and not as though it
were engaged in a private enterprise with no restrictions as to its
income.
These cases assist the Commission in entering a finding when it adopts a new
form of regulation under Section 54-4-4.1 that the rates that result from the new
form of regulation meet the "just and reasonable" test. Furthermore, the Utah
Supreme Court has never expressly held that there is a constitutional ceilingon
utility rates.
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States Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require the inclusion of
investments in discontinued or abandoned generating facilities in rate base, even
though the investments were prudent when made. The basis for the Court's
holding was an act of the Pennsylvania Legislature prohibiting consideration of
canceled plants. Holding that the statute did not violate the United States Consti
tution, the Court said:
It cannot seriously be contended that the Constitution prevents state
legislatures from giving specific instructions to their utility commis
sions. We have never doubted that state legislatures are competent
bodies to set utility rates. And the Pennsylvania PUC is essentially
an administrative arm of the legislature. . . . We stated in Permian
Basin that the commission "must be free, within the limitations
imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands, to
devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse
and conflicting interests." ...
Similarly, an otherwise reasonable rate is not subject to constitution
al attack by questioning the theoretical consistency of the method that
produced it. "It is not theory, but the impact of the rate order which
counts." [Citing Hope.1 The economic judgments required in rate
proceedings are often hopelessly complex and do not admit of a single
correct result. The Constitution is not designed to arbitrate these
economic niceties. . . . The Constitution protects the utility from the
net effect of the rate order on its property. . . .
Hope clearly held that "the Commission was not bound to the use of
any single formula or combination of formulae in determining
rates." ... In Wisconsin v. FPC, ... the Court observed that:
"[T]o declare that a particular method of rate regulation
is so sanctified as to make it highly unlikely that any
other method could be sustained would be wholly out of
keeping with this Court's consistent and clearly articu
lated approach to the question of the Commission's
power to regulate rates. It has repeatedly been stated
that no single method need be followed by the Commis
sion in considering the justness and reasonableness of
rates."
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The adoption of a single theory of valuation as a constitutional
requirement would be inconsistent with the view of the Constitution
this Court has taken since Hope Natural Gas, supra,. . . . The
designation of a single theory of rate making as a constitutional
requirement would unnecessarily foreclose alternatives which could
benefit both consumers and investors. The Constitution within broad
limits leaves the States free to decide what rate-setting methodology
best meets their needs in balancing the interests of the utility and the
public.
Mat 313-16.
Under Barasch. it is apparent that the traditional cost of service method is
not the only constitutionally permitted method of rate making.
2. Plans which freeze rates for a reasonable period of time are not
unconstitutional
!n Columbia Gas of West Virginia. Inc. v. Public Service Commission. 311
S.E.2d 137 (W.Va. 1983), the utility challenged the constitutionality of a statute
allowing the commission to place a moratorium on rate increases for natural gas
utilities for a period of one year. At the time the statute became effective, the
utility was in the midst of a rate proceeding. The statute granted the commission
discretion to suspend the proceeding during the period of the moratorium or to
proceed with the case as if the statute had not been enacted. The commission
proceeded with the case and found a rate increase justified, but then entered an
order suspending the effectiveness of the increase during the moratorium. On
appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute.
Similarly, rate freezes or moratoriums ranging up to three years in length
have passed constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Permian Basin. 390 U.S. at 781
(two and one-halfyears); Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas.
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Electric Light and Power Co.. 83 N E. 693, 701 (1908) (three years).
The revenue sharing plan adopted by the Commission, if accepted by U S
WEST, would not even have acted as a moratorium. U S WEST and other parties
would have been free to request changes in rates during the period of the plan,
which would have terminated the plan. Surely, if a complete moratorium passes
constitutional muster, such a revenue sharing plan would also.
C Even without the statute, the Commission has hroad authority in
determining how to regulate rates.
In UP&L, the Court considered UP&L's principal argument that, even if
rate regulation based on original cost rate base was constitutionally permitted, it
was contrary to the Public Utility Code. After reviewing several provisions of the
Public Utility Code, the Court concluded:
These sections give the Commission general jurisdiction over
utility rates. They empower the Commission to do all things neces
sary to supervise and regulate every utility in this state. They provide
that rates are to be just and reasonable and direct the Commission to
fix just and reasonable rates by order after hearing. These sections
are broad and sweeping in scope. The limitations placed on the
exercise of full legislative powers by said sections are: first, that the
Commission proceed by notice and hearing; and second, that the
rates established conform to the standard of "just and reasonable."
These sections contain no mandate that rates be based on a fair value
rate base.
IIP&L, 152 P.2d at 555. Similarly, the Public Utility Code, as it exists currently,
contains no mandate that traditional cost of service regulation is the only autho
rized method of setting rates.24
24 Appellants acknowledge that there is a wide range of different methods
of rate regulation across a spectrum from cost of service rate making, to value of
service ratemaking (used in transportation), least cost ratemaking, bidding,
prospective rate setting on an average cost basis, affirmative price controls,
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Since UP&L, the Court has reaffirmed on several occasions that the
Commission's authority in setting rates is broad. See, e.g.. Mountain States Tel,
& Tel, Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 754 P.2d 928, 931-32 (Utah 1988); Kearns-
Tribune Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 682 P.2d 858, 859 (Utah 1984).
This Utah authority is supported by many cases from other jurisdictions.
For example, in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Montana Department of Public
Service Regulation. 752 P.2d 155, 157 (Mont. 1988), the court stated:
In determining what is just and reasonable, the PSC is not restricted
to any single formula, if the method followed and the order entered
when applied to the facts and viewed as a whole do not produce an
unjust or arbitrary result.' ....
The PSC has the power to adopt any non-arbitrary method it chooses.
In People's Organization for Washington Energy Resources v. Washington
Utilities & Transportation Commission. 711 P.2d 319 (Wash. 1985), private and
public consumer agencies challenged rate orders of the commission on the
ground that it did not have authority to allow amortization by the utility of costs
associated with a canceled nuclear generating facility in setting rates. On
appeal, the court, noting the complexity of the issue presented, said:
Most states delegate their rate making power to regulatory agencies
in very broad terms, basically just directing them to set those rates
which the agencies determine to be just and reasonable. Washington
is such a state. "[T]he statutory direction to the Commission in rate
"social contract ratemaking", banded ratemaking, "incentive" ratemaking, etc.
App. Brief at 74. However, Appellants go on to assert, without citation of authori
ty, that "[c]ost of service ratemaking is the universally developed system of
ratemaking for natural monopoly utilities . . ." Id. Such a sweeping statement is
plainly in error, as shown in UP&L. Hope, and Barasch. Even if it were true, it
would not mean that the Constitution nor the Public Utility Code mandates cost of
service ratemaking.
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setting is broadly stated." The statutory mandate to the WUTC is to
set fair, reasonable and sufficient rates.
People's Organization. 711 P.2d at 324-25. (Italics in original, citation
omitted.)
In Maryland People's Counsel v. Heintz. 516 A.2d 599 (Md.App. 1986), cert.
denied, 522 A.2d 393 (Md. 1987), the Maryland commission set rates for an
intrastate, interLATA carrier within a range of reasonableness allowing the
carrier flexibility in altering rates within the range. The court described the
Commission's action as follows:
With respect to the establishment of these flexible rates, the Commis
sion found that it was not wholly appropriate to rely exclusively on
cost-of-service evidence and the "traditional" rate-making revenue
requirement methodology ....
516 A.2d at 602. The order was challenged on the bases that the revenue require
ment established by traditional cost of service analysis is the only amount that can
be utilized in establishing a just and reasonable rate, and that the amount so
established sets a maximum ceiling on just and reasonable rates.
In response to these contentions, the court said:
There is no requirement that there must be any given percentage of
return on the fair value of property. Between the lowest return that is
not unreasonable to the point of being confiscatory and the highest
that is not inordinate, there is a rather wide zone in which a return
may be reasonable under some circumstances and not under others.
[Quoting with approval Baltimore Transit Co.. 112 A.2d 687 (Md.
1955)] .. .
If the Commission is permitted leeway to determine the rate
base and rate of return, but prohibited from exercising discretion in
arriving at a just and reasonable rate based on those figures, this
would exalt form over substance. . . .
Moreover, there is nothing in rate making which requires that
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of return be a fixed percentage. All that is required is that the Commission
determine a "reasonable return." [Citation omitted.]
516A.2dat606.
These cases illustrate that regulatory commissions are not bound to follow
the traditional cost of service approach in setting rates. That is particularly the
case where a legislature has specifically authorized the commission to consider
and adopt alternative approaches, as it has done in Utah. If the Legislature had
intended that the Commission could only establish "just and reasonable" rates by
use of a cost-of-service approach, it could easily have so stated in the statute. That
it has left the statutory standard in broad terms should be taken as an indication
of its intent to grant the Commission discretion to determine rates through other
methodologies. Section 54-4-4.1 simply clarifies that the Commission has such
broad discretion, including the authority to adopt revenue sharing plans.
D. The Commission is required to set rates, not rate ofreturn
A basic flaw in Appellants' argument is the premise that the rate of return
utilized in setting rates is a limit which is not guaranteed, but which cannot be
exceeded. This premise is wrong.
There is nothing in the Public Utility Code that directs the Commission to
set a rate of return that a utility may not exceed. To the contrary, Sections 54-4-4(1)
and 54-4-7(12) specifically talk about the Commission setting rates, and Section
54-3-7 requires utilities to charge the rates set by the Commission.
If the Commission set a rate of return that could not be exceeded, then
earnings in excess of that rate of return would be illegal and subject to refund,
even though the utility was compelled by law to charge the rates that produced the
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"excess" earnings. However, in Utah Dept. of Business Reg, v. Public Serv.
Comm'n. 720 P.2d at 420-21 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated in
reference to rate making that:
This process places both the utility and the consumers at risk that the
rate-making procedures have not accurately predicted costs and
revenues. If the utility underestimates its costs or overestimates
revenues, the utility makes less money. By the same token, if a
utility's revenues exceed expectations or if costs are below predic
tions, the utility keeps the excess, (emphasis added)
Another case indirectly supports the proposition that rate of return may be
a tool, but is not the end result, of rate making. In Utah Dept. of Business Reg, v.
Public Serv. Comm'n. 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980) ["Wage Case"], the Court consid
ered whether the Commission could increase Mountain Fuel Supply Company's
("MFS") rates on the basis of two wage increases which occurred within several
months after the conclusion of a general rate case. The order approving the
increase found that the increase would not result in MFS earning in excess of a
reasonable rate of return, but did not find the resulting rates just and reasonable.
In reversing the order, the Court said:
One of the most significant deficiencies in the order was the omission
of any finding the new rates were just and reasonable. Mountain
Fuel urges such a finding is implicit within the finding concerning
the reasonableness of the rate of return .... [I]t was impossible to
determine whether the rates were just and reasonable without
consideration of the other factors involved in making such a deter
mination.
614 P.2d at 1246. Obviously, the Court did not regard rate of return as the sine qua
non of rate making, as the Appellants do.
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E- Rates that have been found iust and reasonahle do not become uniust
or unreasonable iust because thev result in earnings in excess of or
below the authorized rate ofreturn.
Appellants' argument that rates set pursuant to a revenue sharing plan
under Section 54-4-4.1 will be unjust and unreasonable is based on an assump
tion, made without citing any supporting authority, that if rates charged result in
earnings in excess of the rate of return set by the Commission, they are unjust
and unreasonable. In essence, they argue that earnings that exceed an autho
rized rate of return are ipso facto unjust and unreasonable, even when those
earnings are the direct result of the rates set by a regulatory commission, which
the public utility is required by law to charge. This argument not only ignores
decisions of this Court, it ignores overwhelming authority from throughout the
country that rates approved by a regulatory commission in a final order generally
are presumed just and reasonable until found otherwise after hearing. Indeed,
regardless of whether a utility is earning above or below its authorized rate of
return, if it failed to charge the rates set by the Commission, it would be in
violation of Section 54-3-7.
American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co.. 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987); Denver &
Rio Grande R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n. 73 Utah 139, 272 P. 939 (1928); and Utah-
Idaho Cent. R.R. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n. 64 Utah 54, 227 P. 1025 (1924), hold
that rates set in final orders are just and reasonable and are not subject to
reparations under Section 54-7-20.
It is universally accepted that public utilities are required to charge rates
established by a commission in a general rate case and that such rates are
47
presumed just and reasonable until changed. For example, in Michigan Bell Tel.
Co. v. Michigan Public Serv. Comm'n. 24 N.W.2d 200 (Mich. 1946), the Michigan
Supreme Court held that
when a regulatory body has prescribed a rate to be charged for the
future by a public utility and subsequently decides that such pre
scribed rate should be reduced, it cannot penalize the utility for
collecting the rate during the period elapsing between the date of the
order prescribing the rate and the date of the subsequent order
reducing it.
Id. at 204.
In Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison. T. & S. F. Rv. Co.. 284 U.S. 370 (1932),
the Supreme Court of the United States held that, where the rate charged by a
railway carrier was established by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC"), the ICC could not thereafter subject the carrier to reparations by declar
ing that the rate it had previously fixed was in fact unreasonable.
In State ex rel. Rovnton y, Public Serv. Comm'n. 11 P.2d 999 (Kan. 1932), the
Kansas Supreme Court,, interpreting the words "unjust and unreasonable"
reached a similar holding. The court stated:
It seems clear that when a rate has been the subject of a deliberate
inquiry in which the carriers, the shippers, and the commission's
own experts have participated, as well as any and all other persons
who cared to take a hand in it as the statute provides and permits,
any rate so prescribed by the commission and put into effect by the
carriers may be confidently collected and retained by them as their
very own, without misgiving that at some future time a further
hearing of the commission may be had and more evidence taken and
a different conclusion reached and those rates condemned as
unreasonable and reparation certificates allowed for the difference
between the rates which the commission did authorize and the rates
which it should have authorized. Such a method of regulating public
utilities has none of the earmarks of due process of law nor of the
simplest notions of justice. Nor would it be worth the while of any
shipper to receive such a reparation certificate, for it would not serve
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as a justiciable basis of recovery. That point, at least, was laid at rest
by [Arizona Grocery].
Id. at 1006-07 (citations omitted).
The law in other jurisdictions comports with that in Utah and supports the
sound rule that rates set by a commission in a general rate case are presumed
"just and reasonable." They do not become ipso facto unjust and unreasonable
simply because they result in earnings in excess of or below the rate of return
used in setting them.
IV. THE LEGISLATURE MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY EMPOWER THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TO ADOPT A REVENUE SHARING
PLAN.
This section of the Brief will address Appellants' arguments dealing with
the unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the Commission and to the
Courts (App. Brief at 70-81). In addition, this section of Respondents' Brief will
address the due process claims (Id. at 81) and antitrust policy constraints (Id. at
92) raised by Appellants.
Appellants state that "[t]hese issues arise in the event that the Court does
strike down the exercise of the veto power granted the utility . . . and in the event
the Court rejects Appellants' argument that the statute is not severable and must
be stricken in its entirety." (Id. at 70). In those circumstances, Appellants argue
that the Commission's decision to adopt a method of "incentive rate making" and
the specific plan adopted would then be resurrected as the standing order of the
Commission, and would therefore be ripe for review. (Id.) Appellants argue that
the Court should therefore determine whether the incentive plan adopted by the
Commission meets constitutional and statutory challenges.
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Respondents disagree. If the Court strikes down Subsection 2 of Section 54-4-
4.1, the Court need not determine any additional constitutional or statutory issues
concerning Section 54-4-4.1 or the validity of the plan adopted by the Commission.
As was stated in the section on mootness (Section I, supra), no plan is currently in
effect in Utah as a result of U S WEST exercising its option under Subsection 2.
Any decision to place an incentive plan in effect absent Subsection 2 should be left
up to the Commission in a subsequent proceeding and not determined by the
Court in this proceeding. The validity of any incentive plan, including its consti
tutionality, adequacy of findings of fact, and compliance with the Administrative
Procedures Act, could be determined if and when the Commission determines to
order a form of regulation different than is currently in effect today and someone
appeals that decision to the Court. It appears to Respondents that if the Court
determines that Subsection 2 is unconstitutional, it would be up to the Commis
sion in a subsequent proceeding to determine if a change in current regulation is
warranted. No incentive plan should be deemed in effect in the event Subsection 2
were declared unconstitutional.25
A- The power to adopt a revenue sharing nlan or anv method of regula
tion consistent with Title 54 does not constitute an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.
Appellants argue that the power to adopt any method of regulation consis
tent with "this title" in Section 54-4-4.1 means "that if the statute is upheld, the
25 Although Respondents believe that no revenue sharing order would be in
effect if subsection 2 is declared unconstitutional absent an additional order by the
Commission, Respondents would have no objection to a remand to the Commis
sion to determine if a change in current regulation should occur.
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Commission can adopt any method of rate making it chooses and the limitation
that the rates must be just and reasonable' ceases to have any independent
meaning." (App. Brief at 70). Appellants also state that if a method of rate
making expressly authorizes the collection of revenues in excess of those found to
be "just and reasonable" by the Commission, the concept of justness and reason
ableness will have lost all meaning as a guide in proceedings (Id. at 71).
As was stated previously, see § III(B), supra, the Constitution does not
mandate or limit the Commission to the type of regulation defined by Appellants.
No constitutional limitation is placed on permitting a method of rate regulation
that would allow the utility to earn above the authorized rate of return found by the
Commission in an earlier proceeding to be reasonable. The whole theory of
"incentive" regulation is that the end result-the rates that will be charged
customers during the revenue sharing plan period-would continue to be "just
and reasonable." The economic principle that is espoused in a revenue sharing
plan is that by allowing the utility to earn above its authorized rate of return, the
utility would be induced to decrease costs compared to what would have happened
under traditional regulation, so that the customer would be as well off or better off
than under traditional regulation. As Appellants point out (App. Brief at 74),
there is a wide range of different methods of rate regulation across a "spectrum"
from cost of service rate making, to value of service rate making (used in trans
portation), least cost rate making, bidding, prospective rate setting on an average
cost basis, affirmative price controls, "social contract rate making," banded rate
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making, "incentive" rate making, etc.26
When considering either a revenue sharing method of rate regulation, or
any of the methods listed in Appellants' Brief, the Commission would continue to
be required to find that the result of the method of rate regulation selected produc
es "just and reasonable" rates. The essential point is that the Constitution does
not restrict the Commission to selecting only the method of rate regulation defined
by Appellants, but frees the Commission to select a method of rate regulation
which best suits the factual and economic conditions being presented to it.
1. The commission is entitled to engage in legislative functions so
long as the functions are delegable functions.
Appellants argue that the delegation within Section 54-4-4.1 violates Article
VI, Section 1, of the Utah Constitution, which provides;27
The legislative powers of the state shall be vested:
1. In a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be
designated the Legislature of the State of Utah.
2. In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter stated: . . .
26 App. Brief at 74. It should be pointed out that the Commission is current
ly conducting two least cost planning proceedings. In the Matter of the Analysis
of Least Cost Power Plan for Pacific Corp. Docket No. 90-2035-01, the Commission
is investigating the role of least cost planning the electric utilities will use in
Utah- In the Matter of the Analysis of an Integrated Resource Plan for Mountain
Fuel Supply Companv. Docket No. 91-057-09, the Commission is currently
conducting an investigation into the use an integrated resource plan will have in
establishing rates and terms and conditions of service in Utah. Further, the
Commission in In the Matter of the Petition of The Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Companv for Exemption from Regulation of Various Central
Dffice Based Services, Case No. 86-049-07, Report and Order (1-25-88) at 17-18, the
Commission adopted banded rates for certain U S WEST services.
2? App. Brief at 73.
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Appellants cite several cases in which the Utah courts have declared laws
unconstitutional because they delegated an essential legislative function such as
defining a crime or imposition of a tax to an administrative agency. They cite no
cases holding that rate regulation of a public utility cannot be delegated to an
administrative agency such as the Public Service Commission.
2. The authority to set rates is a delegable legislative function-
Section 54-4-4.1 can only be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority if the power to regulate rates is a non-delegable function or if the
legislature did not provide adequate standards or procedural safeguards to guide
the Commission in regulating rates. It is undisputed and is universally accepted
that legislatures may delegate their authority to regulate rates to administrative
agencies.
In Peoples' Organization v. Washington Utility and Transportation
Commission, 711 P.2d 319, 325 (Wash. 1985), the Washington Supreme Court
observed:
The function of rate making is legislative in character and may be
directly exercised by the Legislature itself or, as in the usual case, by
administrative bodies endowed to that end ....
In this state, the Legislature has conferred the rate making power on
the WUTC, subject of course, to appropriate judicial review.
No Utah case has been found with such an explicit statement of the princi
ple that rate making is a delegable function. However, in Utah Dept. of Business
Regulation v. Public Serv. Commn. 614 P.2d 1242 at 1250 (Utah 1980), this Court
observed, in construing its powers to declare a rate order void and order a refund:
To undertake such a course would be tantamount to this Court
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engaging in rate-making which is strictly a legislative power, for the
P.S.C. in fixing and promulgating rates acts merely as an arm of the
Legislature.2«
There can be no doubt that the Legislature may delegate to the Commission
the authority to establish rates without violating Article VI, Section 1.
3. The cases cited by Appellants for an unconstitutional delega
tion oflegislative powers are inapplicable.
Three of Appellants' cases, State v. Green. 793 P.2d 912 (Utah App. 1990),
State v.Gallion. 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977) and State v. Goss. 11 P.2d 340 (Utah 1932)
involved criminal prosecutions which were found unconstitutional because the
laws or regulations under which the defendant was prosecuted involved the
delegation to another entity of the essential legislative authority to determine what
is a crime. The Supreme Court made it clear in these cases that delegation of
authority to define a crime is different than many other types of delegations. In
Gallion. 572 P.2d at 690, the Court stated:
There is a certain peril involved if administrative procedures can be
applied to the criminal law ... a determination of the elements of a
crime and the appropriate punishment therefor are, under our
Constitutional system, judgements, which must be made exclusively
by the legislature.29
Appellants also rely on Tite v. State Tax Commission. 57 P.2d 734 (Utah
1936) and Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission. 48 P.2d 526,
28 See also Kearns Tribune Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n. 682 P.2d 858,
860 (Utah 1984); Utah Dent, of Admin. Serv. v. Public Service Comm'n. 658 P.2d
601, 621 (Utah 1983); Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Serv.
£ommh, 155 P.2d 184, 187-188, reh. denied, 158 P.2d 935 (Utah 1945); Utah Power
and Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 152 P.2d 542, 546-53 (Utah 1944); Mulcahv
v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 117 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1941).
29 See also State v. Green, supra, 793 P.2d at 916, n. 8.
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528 (Utah 1935). Both cases involved imposition of taxes or penalties associated
with taxes. In Tite, the Tax Commission was prohibited from determining the
amount of penalty that should be assessed for non-compliance with a law requir
ing tax stamps to be affixed to cigarettes. The Court distinguished cases involving
public utility commissions to whom authority had been granted "like the power to
fix reasonable rates."
In Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission. 48 P.2d 526
(Utah 1935), the decision of the Tax Commission was overturned, not because it
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, but because the Tax
Commission had misinterpreted the statute. 48 P.2d 526 at 528.
In Rowell v. State Board ofAgriculture. 99 P.2d 1 (Utah 1940), the Supreme
Court struck down a statute that fixed the minimum market price for milk. The
Court noted that the Legislature had not set forth any objectives, purposes,
standards, measures or gauges to guide the Board in determining how the price
ofmilk should be fixed. Id. at 3. The Public Utility Code is replete with objectives,
purposes, and standards, the most.notable being the "just and reasonable"
standard applicable to rate making. This standard has been upheld as being
adequate in Utah. The crucial difference between Rowell and the instant case is
that the Public Utility Code provides an acceptable statutory standard that meets
the requisite constitutional test.
Appellants also cite Athay v. State Dept. of Business Regulation. 626 P.2d
965 (Utah 1981). In Athay. an individual brought an action against the Depart
ment ofBusiness Regulation for refusing to seat her at a state sanctioned psychol-
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ogist examination. She was denied admission because the statute required her to
have a course of studies in a doctoral program which was "primarily psychologi
cal." The Court determined that this standard was not sufficient. This decision
annot be used to stand for the proposition that "just and reasonable," "adequate,"
or other such standards included in the Public Utility Code are constitutionally
insufficient. In fact, Utah courts have held just the opposite.
4. The Utah Public Utility Code contains a^efluate standards and
procedural safeguards to satisfy constitutional challenges.
Appellants argue that Section 54-4-4.1 is an unconstitutional delegation
because "it provides no legislatively defined standards by which the Commission
shall make its choice and persons effected [sic] by the choice can judge or chal
lenge the wisdom or merits of the choice made." (App. Brief at 75) This argu
ment ignores the plain language of the Public Utility Code, which does set
standards to guide the Commission's actions. It is also contrary to well reasoned
authorities which hold that it is not necessary for the Legislature to provide
standards as long as it provides safeguards against improper action by the
Commission.
Section 54-4-4.1 provides that "[t]he commission may, by rule or order, adopt
any method of rate regulation consistent with this title . . . ." [Emphasis added.]
Title 54, the Public Utility Code, contains a myriad of standards with regard to
rate regulation with which any method of regulation adopted by the Commission
must comply. See Point III(A), supra.
Even if the phrase "consistent with this title" were absent from Section 54-4-
4.1, it is unlikely that the statute would be found unconstitutional for lack of
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adequate standards. Throughout their entire brief, Appellants look at Section 54-4-
4.1 as an isolated statute. It is a well-accepted principle of law that statutes
dealing with the same subject matter must be viewed as a whole. See Osuala v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co.. 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980); see also State ex rel.
Cannon v. Learv. 646 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982); Cannon v. McDonald. 615 P.2d 1268
(Utah 1980).
Appellants cite White River Shale Oil v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 700 P.2d 1088
(Utah 1985) as the case that establishes the basic standards governing delegation
of legislative power to the Commission.30 We agree. White River clearly estab
lishes that standards such as "just and reasonable," "adequate," or "public
interest" are sufficient legislative standards to avoid a constitutional challenge for
lack of adequate standards.
In White River. Utah Power and Light challenged the statute authorizing
the Commission to issue cease and desist orders on the grounds that it was an
unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority. This Court said:
As long as this delegation of authority is accompanied by adequate
guiding standards and procedural safeguards to ensure that decision
making by the- Commission is not arbitrary and unreasoned, it is a
constitutional delegation.
700P.2datl091.
Section 54-7-4.5, the statute granting the Commission authority to issue
cease and desist orders, has no standards for the Commission to apply in deter
mining when it was appropriate to issue a cease and desist order. Nevertheless,
so See App. Brief at 72, n. 108
57
on the question of the adequacy of standards, this Court stated:
The provisions of the entire Public Utilities Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 54-1-1
to 11-10 (1974 and Supp. 1983) must be considered in determining
whether there are sufficient guidelines established by the legislature.
However, the primary sources of guidance are the declarations of
legislative goals and policies which an agency is to apply when
exercising its delegated powers.
These declarations need only be as specific as the circumstances
warrant. The legislature need not lay down a detailed and specific
set of guidelines which covers every conceivable problem that might
arise in implementing the legislation. It is sufficient if there are
general policies and standards articulated which provide direction to
an administrative body possessing the expertise to adapt the legisla
tive goals to varying circumstances.
It is undisputed that the PSC has been charged with the responsibili
ty of regulating utilities in the public interest and that it has the
necessary expertise to do so. Broad standards such as "reasonable",
"unnecessary" and "public convenience and necessity" have been
held to be sufficient as standards even though incapable of precise
definition. "Public interest" certainly falls within this class of
standards and, when read in light of the entire Public Utility Act, is
not so broad as to result in an improper delegation of authority.
White River. 700 P.2d at 1091-92 (footnotes omitted).3i
Standards of this type have universally been held to be sufficient to avoid
constitutional delegation challenges. In Llovd A. Fry Co. v. Utah Air Conserva
tion Committee. 545 P.2d 495 (Utah 1975), the Court held that a statute which
allowed the Utah Air Conservation Committee to "establish such emission
requirements ... as in its judgement may be necessary to prevent, abate or control
air pollution" was a proper delegation of legislative power. Quoting from or citing
31 Other broad public utility standards have been upheld as adequate. See
New York Central Securities Com, v. United States. 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932) ["public
interest"]; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States. 319 U.S. 190, 225-226 (1943)
["public conveyance, interest or necessity"]; Citv Services Gas Co. v. State Corp.
Comm'n,, 416 P.2d 736 (Kan. 1966) ["in the interest of oil and gas conservation"].
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other cases with approval, the Court said:
The provisions of the entire air conservation act must be considered
in a determination of whether there are sufficient guidelines estab
lished.
". . . Recognizing these facts the legislature acted to prohibit or
control air contamination to the extent possible in the interest of
health and the enjoyment of life or property. It is true that the
standards set forth are broad, but they are nevertheless adequate."
[quoting Southern Illinois Asphalt v. Environmental Protection
Agency. 303 N.E.2d 606, 611 (111. App. 1973)]
In Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. State Department of Health, the
court stated that in areas of legitimate legislative activity where
precision was determined to be impossible, the courts have held such
broad standards as "reasonable" and "necessary" sufficient as
standards, although incapable of precise definition.
545 P.2d at 500 [citation and footnotes omitted].
The establishment of rates is the precise type of legitimate legislative
activity where general standards such as "just and reasonable," "necessary,"
"adequate," and "public interest" are sufficient to withstand a constitutional
challenge, although incapable of precise definition. Since there is no statutory or
constitutionally required method of rate making and rate making is not suscepti
ble to a scientific definition that is always appropriate, the Legislature delegated
authority to the Commission to regulate rates, guiding them by general concepts
which are contained in the Public Utility Act. Absent such flexibility, the very
expertise that the Court recognizes in the Commission in applying these broad
legislative goals would be lost. Appellants' argument is an attempt to limit the
ability of the Commission to apply its expertise to differing economic circumstan
ces that affect the public utilities in this state.
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5. No Standards Are Required If A Delegation Is Accompanied
With Adequate Procedural Safeguards.
The view that a legislature may constitutionally delegate authority to an
administrative agency only if the delegation is accomplished by sufficient stan
dards is becoming outdated and has been losing ground for some time. In Lloyd
A. Frv Co.. supra, this Court cited I Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 2.08 p.
113 for the proposition that:
[T]he law of delegation would be strengthened if the courts were to de-
emphasize statutory standards and to emphasize the degree of
procedural safeguards.
". . . Putting some words into a statute that a court can call a legisla
tive standard is not a very good protection against arbitrariness. The
protections that are effective are hearings with procedural safe
guards, legislative supervision and judicial review. . . ."
545 P.2d at 501 [footnotes omitted].
In Warren v. Marion Countv. 353 P.2d 257 (Ore. 1960), this view was
expressed more strongly where the constitutionality of a county building code was
challenged. The Oregon Supreme Court, also citing Davis and another adminis
trative law treatise, said:
There is no constitutional requirement that all delegation of legisla
tive power must be accompanied by a statement of standards circum
scribing its exercise. It is true that a contrary view has frequently
been expressed in adjudicative cases, particularly the earlier ones,
but the position taken in such cases is not defensible. It is now
apparent that the requirement of expressed standards has, in most
instances, been little more than a judicial fetish for legislative
language, the recitation of which provides no additional safeguards
to persons affected by the exercise of the delegated authority. Thus,
we have learned that it is of little or no significance in the adminis
tration of a delegated power that the statute which generated it stated
the permissible limits of its exercise in terms of such abstractions as
"public convenience, interest or necessity" or "unjust or unreason
able" or "for the public health, safety, and morals" and similar
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phrases accepted as satisfying the standards requirement.
. . . [T]he important consideration is not whether the statute delegat
ing the power expresses standards, but whether the procedure
established for the exercise of the power furnishes adequate safe
guards to those who are affected by the administrative action.
353 P.2d at 261 [citation omitted, italics in original].
There are adequate procedural safeguards in place to ensure that any
method of regulation adopted by the Commission pursuant to Section 54-4-4.1 is
subject to notice, hearing, and judicial review.32 Even if the Public Utility Code
did not contain adequate procedural safeguards, the Commission's rules and the
Administrative Procedures Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l et seq.) also apply to
proceedings before the Commission and supply adequate procedural safeguards.
In Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. Citv of Seattle. 665 P.2d 1328 (Wash.), cert, denied,
464 U.S. 982 (1983), various industrial customers sought to set aside a rate order of
the City of Seattle on various grounds including that the statute authorizing the
city to set rates did not contain any procedural safeguards and was, therefore,
unconstitutional. The Washington Supreme Court rejected this argument,
stating:
Procedural safeguards need not inhere in the statute itself. If the
statutory delegation provides inadequate guidelines, the procedural
safeguards may be provided by the administrative body.
Id. at 1333 [citations omitted.]
In conclusion, in addition to adequate legislative standards such as "just
32 See in particular the discussion of procedural safeguards in Point
III(A). Appellants clearly had ample opportunity to participate in the rate
making process, and to challenge it judicially, as evidenced by this appeal.
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and reasonable," adequate procedural safeguards exist within both the Public
Utility Code and the Administrative Procedures Act to ensure that notice, hear
ing, and judicial review occur for any order issued by the Commission pursuant
to Section 54-4-4.1.
a The power to adopt a revenue sharing plan does not constitute an
unconstitiifrnnfll Relegation ofjudicial power.
Appellants argue that
[t]o the extent that Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4.1 and the statutes delegat
ing power to the courts to review Commission decisions delegates
power to a reviewing court to modify or select a different method of
rate regulation than that chosen by the Commission, it would
constitute a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Utah
Constitution, Article V, Section 1 . . .
(App. Brief at 81). It is inconceivable that this Court would ever attempt to
establish rates, let alone a method of rate regulation under the statute. Appel
lants' argument is a complete misreading of the type of authority the Court has
exercised over Commission decisions.
The review by the Supreme Court of Commission decisions is consistent
with Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Since Marburv v. Madison. 5
U.S. (1 Craneh) 137 (1803), it has been accepted constitutional law that the
judiciary may review the acts of the legislature. This review also extends to
administrative bodies that have had legislative duties properly delegated to them.
Justice Marshall stated:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each. . . .
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The Utah Supreme Court has approved the concept of judicial review
described in Marburv in Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983). The
Utah Supreme Court acts within constitutional bounds when it reviews orders of
the Commission to see if they comport with the constitutions of the state and the
United States, if they violate any laws established by the Legislature, or if they are
arbitrary or capricious.
The suggestion that the statute delegates power to the reviewing Court to
modify or select a different method of rate regulation than that chosen by the
Commission is based on a misunderstanding of the Court's role in the rate
making process. In Telecommunications Resellers v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 747
P.2d 1029, 1031 (Utah 1987), the Court set forth the extent of its review of rate
orders:
Nor does this Court have authority to modify or partially set aside a
PSC order. . . . We have occasionally remanded matters to the PSC
with guidelines, ... or with suggestions as to possible future disposi
tions. . . . Nonetheless, upon hearing a petition, this Court is only
empowered to affirm or set aside a PSC order.33 [citations omitted]
In Utah Dept. of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 614 P.2d
1242, 1250 (Utah 1980), the Court stated:
The Division further urges this Court to declare the order of the
P.S.C. invalid and void from its inception, and to order the amounts
collected thereunder to be refunded. To undertake such a course
would be tantamount to this Court engaging in rate-making, which is
strictly a legislative power, for the P.S.C. in fixing and promulgating
rates acts merely as an arm of the Legislature. The review by this
Court of the orders of the P.S.C. is confined to the legal issues of
33 See also Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n. 155 P.2d 184, 188 reh. denied, 158 P.2d 935 (1945); Salt Lake Transfer Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n.. 355 P.2d 706, 711 (Utah 1960).
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whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the findings of the
P.S.C; whether the P.S.C. has exercised its authority according to
law; and whether any constitutional rights of a complaining party
have been invaded or disregarded. Any interference by this Court
beyond the aforementioned limits would constitute an interference
with the law making power of this state.
It is apparent that the Court does not have and has never asserted the
authority to select a different method of rate regulation than that utilized by the
Commission or to modify the Commission's method. If the Court determined that
there is a defect in an order of the Commission, the Court can reverse the order
and remand it to the Commission for further proceedings. Thus, Appellants'
argument has no merit.
C Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate Article T. Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution relating to due process of law.
Appellants claim that the enactment and subsequent application of Section
54-4-4.1 violates their due process rights under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution, and that application of the statute may constitute a confiscation of
their property. 34 This argument fails when viewed in light of state and federal
constitutional law.35
34 Appellants cite several cases for this proposition, but none is directly on
point. Appellants rely principally on Mevers v. Blair Tel. Co.. 230 N.W.2d 190
(Neb. 1975), and its progeny, which state that consumers are entitled to the same
protection against confiscation of property as utilities. This case was decided in
the context of a utility that was providing woefully inadequate service. The
Nebraska commission ultimately reduced rates because of the service problems.
These cases are in no way analogous to the instant case. Utah Copper Co. v.
Public Util, Comm'n, 59 Utah 191, 203 P. 627 (1921), does not apply due process
principles to ratepayers.
35 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that decisions by the United States
Supreme Court interpreting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution are highly persuasive to the application of the due process
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1. Appellants have not identified a due process property interest
in utility rates or ratemaking methodology.
The requirements to establish a constitutionally protected property interest
under the due process clause are set forth in Board of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564
(1972):
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a
safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already
acquired in specific benefits. . . .
... To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legiti
mate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institu
tion of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a
purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportu
nity for a person to vindicate those claims.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Id. at 576-77.
Appellants have not identified the specific property interest they claim they
are being deprived of without due process of law. The gist of their argument is
that they were not be able to participate meaningfully in a proceeding under the
Statute'without additional standards.
It has been a recognized principle of constitutional and public utility law
that utility customers do not have a protected property interest in their utility rates
clause in the Utah Constitution. See Untermever v. State Tax Comm'n. 102 Utah
214, 129 P.2d 881, 885-86, rev'don other grounds, 316 U.S. 645 (1942).
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under the due process clause. See, e.g., Miles v. Idaho Power Co.. 778 P.2d 757,
766-67 (Idaho 1989); In Re Implementation Of Utility Energy Conservation
Improvement Programs. 368 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. App. 1985). Utah law has
not entitled Appellants to rely on the due process clause of the state constitution to
attack ratemaking methodologies that displease them.36
The Legislature has established other avenues by which Appellants can
complain about rate increases, rate decreases or rate-making methodologies.
These avenues are found in the Public Utility Code.
2. Even ifAppellants have a "property interest" in their utility
rates, the requirements of due process have been addressed
under the Public Utility Code.
In many respects, the arguments presented by Appellants relating to
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution (App. Brief at 81-92) are the same or
similar arguments made by Appellants relating to the delegation of legislative
powers to an administrative agency. Appellants argue that they are deprived of
due process because Section 54-4-4.1 contains no standards to govern rate making.
As has been previously established, the Public Utility Code as a whole provides
sufficient standards to guide the Commission.
The United States Supreme Court has set forth the requirements for due
process in Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill. 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) where
36 It has been held that a utility has no due process property interest in a
particular ratemaking methodology. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas
Public Serv. Comm'n. 593 S.W. 2d 434 (Ark. 1980); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Arkansas Public Serv. Comm'n. 720 S.W.2d 924 (Ark.Ct.App. 1986). Surely
individual consumers, who have less to lose, cannot be said to have due process
rights in any ratemaking methodology.
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it stated:
The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an
opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in
person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a
fundamental due process requirement.
The principles of due process have been discussed by the Utah Supreme
Court in two public utility cases. In Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n. 96 P.2d 722, 725 (Utah 1939), the Court stated:
The . . . question [of due process] is self-answered because we have
held that in this case there was due process of law. The Commission
conformed to every step laid down by the statute with the exception of
the 20 day period heretofore discussed and found to be directory only. .
. . "The essential elements of due process of law are notice, an
opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding
adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction
of the case." [quoting 12 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 573]
In Salt Lake Countv v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 510 P.2d 923 (Utah 1973), the
Court reaffirmed these principles. In Salt Lake County, the Salt Lake County
attorney did not attend all of the Commission hearings in a rate proceeding. The
Court determined that the County had not been deprived of due process of law,
stating as'follows:
-We think the plaintiff hardly can complain of surprise or lack of
notice. The record abounds with facts reflecting that it knew what
was astiring, and when, where, and why it was. Opportunity to
examine everything, cross examine anyone and otherwise to become
autoptic in this case, after its intervention was granted. It absented
itself from some of the hearings, and later, with permission, walked
out of the last it attended, with the urgence of the Commission that
counsel's body might repose in absentia, but with the county's body
politic still occupied a ringside seat in this encounter. Since plaintiff
intervened it was particeps at all times, and actually, before its
counsel's departure it joined in a pleading asking for the very re
allocation which it now negates.
Id. at 924.
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Hardly can Appellants claim that it has not had an opportunity to fully
participate in the proceedings before the Public Service Commission. Counsel for
Appellants participated in the proceedings and cross examined witnesses. (E.g.
R. 1331-52,1577-1604,1622-42,1795 -1806,1950-58,1997-2000, 2024-34, 2076-85, 2726-
49). Appellants chose to present no evidence to the Commission. The level of
their participation cannot be used as a denial of their due process.
Appellants cloak their due process argument into what they claim is the
lack of notice within Section 54-4-4.1 itself of standards the Commission will use
in adopting a rate regulation methodology. This argument is in part a duplica
tion and in part a variation on the argument that the statute is an unconstitution
al delegation because it does not contain sufficient standards (see Point IV(AX3),
supra).
The Public Utility Code is comprised of a series of standards, not just to
provide a mechanism by which the Commission may establish rates, but also to
afford parties due process rights of notice and hearing in rate making proceed
ings. There are many sections of the Public Utility Code that provide procedural
standards for purposes of rate setting which applied to the adoption of a method of
rate regulation under Section 54-4-4.1. Any method of rate regulation adopted
pursuant to Section 54-4-4.1 would have to comply with all of these restrictions.
Appellants cite Rowell v. State Board ofAgriculture. 99 P.2d 1 (Utah 1940) to
support their due process argument. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court
struck down a statute which fixed the minimum market price for milk. The
Court noted that the Legislature had not set forth any objectives, purposes,
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standards, measures or gauges to guide the Board in determining how the price
of milk should be fixed. Id. at 3. As was stated, supra Section IV, the Court has
upheld the standards adopted by the legislature to guide the Commission as being
adequate.
Appellants also cite at Athav v. State Dept. of Business Regulation. 626 P.2d
965 (Utah 1981) to support both their due process argument and their delegation of
legislative powers argument. As was stated previously, the courts have held that
the "just and reasonable" standard is a sufficient guideline for the Commission
unlike the standard discussed in Athav.
Appellants also argue that the statute violates the due process clause
because of vagueness (App. Brief at 89). The United States Supreme Court has
outlined the standards that are applicable to statutes to determine if they are
impermissibly vague. In Connolv v. General Const. Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)
the Court stated:
[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process of law.
In more recent times, the United States Supreme Court has held that
differing standards of vagueness apply to criminal and civil statutes. In Village
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. Hoffman Estates. Inc.. 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982),
the Court said:
The degree of vagueness that the constitution tolerates - as well as
the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement - depends
in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, economic regulation is
subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is
often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic
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demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult
relevant legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the regulated
enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regula
tion by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process.
A Michigan Appellate Court set out specific standards which can be
utilized in reviewing public utility statutes to determine if they are vague. In
Attorney General v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 411 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Mich. App. 1987),
the Court stated:
First, the act in question must be read as a whole; the provision in
question must be construed with reference to the entire act. Next, the
standard should be as reasonably precise as the subject matter
requires or permits. Third, if possible, the statute must be construed
as being valid, that is, it must be construed as confirming adminis
trative, not legislative, power and as giving discretionary, not
arbitrary, authority. Last, the statute must satisfy due process
requirements.
Section 54-4-4.1 meets all of these criteria. It states that the Commission
has authority to adopt any method of rate regulation that is consistent with the
Public Utility Code, including a method under which an equitable sharing of
earnings above some level occurs. When the statute is read with the entire Public
Utility Code in mind it is apparent that its purpose is to clarify that the Commis
sion is not limited to only one method of rate regulation. All of the same stan
dards, rules and regulations, safeguards of the Public Utility Code and the
Administrative Procedures Act apply to any method of rate regulation adopted by
the Commission pursuant to this statute. The statute is reasonably precise given
the subject matter. Rate making is a complex matter which does not lend itself to
specific rigid formulas. Section 54-4-4.1 does not grant the Commission unbridled
authority. It restricts the Commission to adopting methods of rate regulation
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consistent with Title 54. This type of discretion has been found to be sufficient to
guide the Commission.
Appellants also argue that adopting an order under Section 54-4-4.1 would
violate the Utah Administrative Rules Act (UARA). The UARA clearly distin
guishes between rules and orders, and establishes that rule making is not
applicable where an agency proceeds by order, rather than by rule. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46a-2(14Xa) defines a "rule" as:
An agency's written statement that:
i. is explicitly or implicitly required by state or federal statute or
other applicable law;
ii. has the effect of law;
iii. implements or interprets a state or federal mandate;
iv. applies to a class of persons or another agency.
Section 63-46a-2(9) defines a "order" as "an agency action that determines the legal
rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other interests of one or more specific
persons but not a class of persons." Section 63-46a-2(14)(c)(i) specifically provides
that "rule" does not mean "order" and Section 63-46a-2(14)(c)(vii) specifically
provides that "rule" does not mean "rulings by an agency in adjudicative proceed
ings." In the present case the Commission chose to proceed under Section 54-4-4.1
by means of an order without following the procedural requirements of the
UARA. Such an order does not fall within the definition of a "rule" because it is
not a written statement that is required by statute or other applicable law, does not
implement or interpret a legal mandate, and does not apply to a class of persons
or another agency. Instead, the Commission's order issued in this proceeding, if
accepted by U S WEST, would have determined the legal rights and duties of U S
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WEST but not of other telephone corporations or other public utilities in the State
of Utah. The Commission's order in this case constitutes a ruling in an adjudica
tive proceeding which is outside the meaning of a "rule."
Appellants' reliance on Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 720 P.2d 773
(Utah 1986) is misplaced. First, the operative section of UARA have been
amended since Williams was decided.37 Second, Williams simply held that the
Commission could not reverse a long standing policy of asserting jurisdiction over
one-way paging services by means of a letter to one party, but rather had to engage
in rule making in order to make such a change. In the present case, the Com
mission's adoption of an incentive rate plan for U S WEST did not change policy
regarding any other public utility.
Even if the Court determined that rule making is an appropriate procedure
for the Commission to follow, no incentive plan is currently in effect to cause any
harm to Appellants. Respondents have indicated that if the "veto" provision is
found unconstitutional, the incentive plan ordered by the Commission in this case
should not go into effect absent further proceedings by the Commission. Finally,
the purpose ofUARA is to provide an opportunity for public comment prior to any
agency action. Appellants can hardly claim that they have not been given an
opportunity to present their views on incentive regulations at the hearings that
37 Prior to 1988, UARA denned "rule" as a "statement ofgeneral applicabil
ity . . . that implements or interprets the law or prescribes the policy ofthe agency
in the administration of its functions . . . ." The current version of UARA defines
"rule" as quoted above.
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occurred before the Public Service Commission.38
D. State antitrust policy does not prohibit adoption ofanv method ofrate
regulation consistent with the Public Utility Code including a method
of revenue sharjnf-
The arguments presented by Appellants (App. Brief at 92-96) relating to
Utah antitrust statutes and Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution are
completely misplaced in a proceeding attempting to declare unconstitutional a
provision of the Public Utility Code. Appellants themselves acknowledge that
Utah's constitutional provision and statutes regarding antitrust do not prohibit
adoption of a revenue sharing plan. (App. Brief at 93). Rather, Appellants argue
that "the basic policy of protecting the public interest by ensuring that private
economic power shall be subject to a competitive process or effectively regulated"
requires rejection of a revenue sharing rate regulation plan because U S WEST
would be able to earn "monopolistic profits" under such a plan. Id.
In essence, Appellants are presenting an economic/regulatory policy
statement that is not mandated by any law. In fact, the Utah Legislature has
explicitly recognized revenue sharing plans as being valid methods of regulation.
Utah law does not define nor prohibit "monopoly profits," it has never required
that the Commission establish a single point rate of return, nor has it ever held
that earnings above an authorized rate of return are unlawful. The Public Utility
Code requires that rates be "just and reasonable" without specifying limits as to
38 All parties were given an opportunity to present briefs on the issue of
incentive regulation. U S WEST (R. 5156-90), the Division (R. 5201-22), the Com
mittee (R. 5136-55), MCI (R. 5191-5200) and Contel (R. 5126-35) filed briefs.
Appellants chose not to file a brief.
73
what the Commission may deem to be a "just and reasonable" rate.
The legislature establishes both the state's antitrust policy and the state's
utility regulation policy. Since the legislature has specifically authorized revenue
sharing plans, it must be presumed that it did so with the state's antitrust policy
in mind. Appellants' antitrust argument has no merit, and should be rejected by
the Court.
V. THE LEGISLATURE MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY EMPOWER A PUBLIC
UTILITY TO REJECT A REVENUE SHARING PLAN.
Appellants did not first address the constitutionality of the substance of
Section 54-4-4.1, which empowers the Commission to adopt alternative forms of
regulation consistent with Title 54, including revenue sharing plans. Rather,
they argue in Point I of their Brief that Subsection 2 is unconstitutional because it
allows a public utility to "elect not to proceed" with a revenue sharing plan adopted
by the Commission. This section of Respondents' Brief will demonstrate that the
statutory recognition of such a right in utilities suffers from no constitutional
infirmity.
A- The Power to reject a revenue sharing nlan does not constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative nower 39
In a strained extension of their unconstitutional delegation argument,
39 Although Appellants assert in the heading to Point I of their brief that
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4.1(2) is an unconstitutional delegation ofjudicial power to
a private party, they do not cite any legal authority dealing with delegation ofjudicial power, nor do they otherwise make a discernibly separate argument on
delegation of judicial power. Accordingly, this section will be confined to the
question of delegation of legislative power.
74
Appellants contend that, because utilities have the right to opt out ofany revenue
sharing plan adopted by the Commission, Section 54-4-4.1(2) unconstitutionally
delegates legislative and judicial power to private persons.40 Appellants fail to
recognize that Section 54-4-4.1(2) is in essence a codification of the firmly estab
lished rule against retroactive rate-making, under which it is generally unlawful
to require a customer to make up lost profits for a utility or to require a utility to
return earnings above its authorized rate of return to ratepayers. See, e.g. Section
54-4-4(1) (empowering the Commission to determine just and reasonable rates "to
be thereafter observed and in force"); Arizona Grocery Co. v, Atchison. T. & S.F.
Rv. C°.. 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932); Utah Dep't of Business Regulation v. Pnhlin
40 App. Briefat 59-65. Note that the veto power exists only with respect to
revenue sharing plans, not with respect to other forms of regulation that the
Commission may adopt, such as traditional, cost-of-service regulation. Utah
Code Ann. §54-4-4.1(2).
The two federal cases cited by Appellants have nothing to do with delegation
of legislative power to private persons, and are easily distinguishable from the
present case. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v, Chadha.462US 913
(1983), the court struck down a statute that permitted one branch of Congress to
invalidate, by resolution, a decision of the Executive Branch to allow a particular
deportable alien to remain in the United States, holding it to be a violation of
separation of powers in that the Congress was permitted to overrule the exercise
of executive authority without pursuing the constitutionally mandated legislative
process. In Consumer's Union of U, S.. Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n. 691 F.2d
575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer
Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), the court invalidated a statute
that permitted Congress to veto any rule promulgated by the FTC. As in Chadha.
it was held to be a violation of the separation of powers provisions of the Constitu
tion. The court expressly declined to decide whether there was an improper
delegation of administrative power to Congress without any standards for the
exercise of that power.
In the present case, the statute does not purport to grant powers of one
branch of government to another, nor to give one branch ofgovernment veto power
over the acts of another branch. Utility rate making is a strictly legislative
function, which may be delegated to an administrative agency. See discussion,
Point IV(A), supra. Thus there is no issue of separation of powers in this case.
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Service Comm'n. 720 P.2d 420-21, 423 (Utah 1986) ("[I]f a utility's revenues exceed
expectations or if costs are below predictions, the utility keeps the excess. . . . [A]ll
rate making must be prospective in effect. . . ."); see also Public Utilities Comm'n
v. United Fuel Gas Co.. 317 U.S. 456, 464, reh. denied, 318 U.S. 798 (1943). The only
difference is that under the statute, the utility is permitted to exercise its right to
challenge retroactive rates by notice to the Commission, rather than through
judicial proceedings. Thus even without the statutory veto power over revenue
sharing plans, a utility would still have a de facto veto power. See, People v.
Waisvisz. 221 HI. App. 3rd 667, 582 N.E. 2d 1383, 1386 (1991) ("[A] mere grant of
authority by the legislature to a private entity to exercise, with the full backing of
the law, a right possessed by the entity at common law is not an impermissible
grant of legislative power.")
The rule against retroactive rate making is not simply a common law
prohibition, but has been held to be based on state and federal constitutions. In
Straube v. Bowling Green Gas Co.. 227 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Mo. 1950), the Missouri
Supreme Court, citing Arizona Grocery, stated as follows:
When the established rate of a utility has been followed, the amount
so collected becomes the property of the utility, of which it cannot be
deprived by either legislative or judicial action without violating the
due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions.41
41 Accord, South Central Bell Telephone Co, v. Louisiana Public Servicp
Comm'n, 594 So.2d 357 (La. 1992); Citv of El Paso v. Public Utility Comm'n. 1991
WL 155113 (Tex. App. 1991); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n. 794
P.2d 1165, 1170 (Kan. App. 1990); In re Central Vermont Public Service Corp . 473
A.2d 1155, 1158 (Vt. 1984); State ex rel. Barvick v. Public Service Comm'n. 606
S.W.2d 474, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); General Telephone Co. v, Michigan Public
Service Comm'n, 78 Mich. App. 528, 260 N.W.2d 874, 21 P.U.R. 4th 569 (Mich App.
1977)5 Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n. 90
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Thus, whether or not the veto power is stated explicitly in the statute, if the
Commission were to adopt a revenue sharing plan against the will of a utility, it
could result in a deprivation of the due process rights of the utility and would
result in a violation of the statutory requirement that rates be set prospectively
only.42 Thus, contrary to Appellants' argument, Section 54-4-4.1 would probably
be declared unconstitutional, as applied to a revenue sharing plan, if the utility's
right to reject such a plan were not incorporated into the statute, either expressly
or impliedly.
Appellants assert that the "principles prohibiting [delegation of legislative
power to a private party] are so self-evident, that such a naked delegation of power
to a private party is seldom tried by a state legislature." (App. Brief at 61) However,
they fail to note that vesting certain types of consent power in private parties has
withstood constitutional challenge. For example, in State Theatre Co. v. Smith.
276 N.W.2d 259 (S.D. 1979), the court rejected an argument that a statute permit
ting affected neighbors to "veto" the amendment of a zoning ordinance was an
N.M. 325, 563 P.2d 588, 19 P.U.R. 4th 318 (N.M. 1977).
42 The foregoing discussion is sufficient response to Appellants' argument
that it is unconstitutionally unfair (i.e. a deprivation of due process) for a veto
power to rest in the public utility, but not in others, such as themselves. The veto
power could only affect a plan in which a utility was being asked to relinquish its
existing right to retain earned revenues. That right belongs solely to the utility.
Other parties do not have the right to require a utility to make refunds of earned
revenues. In fact, it has been held that utility ratepayers do not have a vested due
process right in utility rates. If the PSC adopted a revenue sharing plan that
required customers to make up lost profits, such a plan would violate the rule
against retroactive rate making and therefore would not be consistent with Title
54. See infra, Section IV(C)(1).
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unconstitutional delegation of power. The court explained:
The validity of consents has long been debated; the absence of
standards relating to the giving of consents has been a major ground
for the invalidity of consent statutes. There appear to be two catego
ries of consent statutes: those requiring consent to establish a
restriction and those requiring consent to waive a restriction. The
former are invalid and the latter valid.
276 N.W.2d at 263. Similarly, in Brock v. Superior Court. 9 Cal. 2d 291, 71 P.2d 209,
213 (1937) (dealing with a statute regulating the marketing of citrus, which
required the approval of private parties before the director of agriculture could
enter into a marketing agreement), the court stated that "a statute is not invalid
merely because it provides for consent of interested persons to the contemplated
regulation." Thus Appellants' over broad statement that all delegations of consent
power to private persons are unconstitutional is in error. 43 ln the present case,
where the power to veto a revenue sharing plan is in effect a power to consent to a
waiver of the rule against retroactive ratemaking, there is no constitutional
infirmity.
Appellants cite Revne v. Trade Comm'n. 113 Utah 155, 192 P.2d 563, 3
A.L.R.2d 169 (1948) and Union Trust Co. v. Simmons. 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190
(1949), in support of the proposition that it is unconstitutional for the Legislature to
43 See generally, Annot., Delegation of legislative power to nongovernmen
tal agencies as regards prices, wages, and hours, 3 A.L.R.2d 188 §§ 5-7 & fn. 3
(1949) (citing legal journal articles). The annotation also notes: "As regards
delegation of the rate-making power to private corporations, it should be remem
bered that in the past public utilities frequently received by franchise the power to
fix rates." Id. at 192. See also, Jaffe, "Law making by private groups," 51 Harv L
Rev. 201, 218, (1937).
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delegate legislative authority to a private entity.44 In Revne. the statute under
44 The other cases cited by Appellants in support of the proposition that no
legislative power may be delegated to private parties are distinguishable. Appel
lants' Brief at 61-62, n. 95. In none of the cited cases did a private party have an
already existing constitutional right, which was statutorily recognized by the
legislature, as in this case.
In Rowell v. State Board of Agricult.nrP. 98 Utah 353, 99 P.2d 1 (1940), the
court did not even address delegation ofpower to a private party.
In Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n 556 P.2d 289 (Cal
1976), the court found there was no unconstitutional delegation to a private party,
because there were implicit safeguards to guide an administrator's actions in
ordering a highway crossing abolished. In fact, the court stated: "Acts of private
parties prerequisite to operation of a statute containing valid standards for action
do not constitute unlawful delegation." 556 P.2d at 293 (emphasis added).
In Colorado Energy Advocacy Office v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 704 P.2d 298(Colo. 1985), the court refused to find an unconstitutional delegation of power to a
utility, where the public utilities commission approved a tariff that allowed the
utility to make adjustments of its purchased gas cost estimates without prior
approval of the commission.
In Corvallis Lodge No. 1411 v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n. 677 P.2d 76(Or. App. 1984), the court invalidated a statute that delegated certain power to
commercial liquor vendors, not because the power was delegated, but because
there were not sufficient procedural safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of
that power.
In- Industrial Comm'n v. C&D Pipeline. Tnr, 607 P.2d 383 (Ariz App. 1979),
the court found an unconstitutional delegation of power because it allowed labor
unions to set wages which the commission was bound to accept. In the present
case, in contrast, any revenue sharing plan must receive Commission approval.
cf- Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Foundation. 130 Ariz. 550, 637 P.2d
1053 (1981) (upholding a statute requiring the racing commission to recognize an
agreement between permit holders regarding scheduling of races)
In Deer Mesa Corp. v. Los Tres Valles Special Zoning District. 103 N.M.
675, 712 P.2d 21 (N.M. App. 1985), the court invalidated a statute that permitted
private individuals to create a special zoning district without any limitation on the
size and location of the district. Again, the basis for the court's ruling was that
there were no standards, not that all delegations of authority are per se invalid.
Cf- State ex rel Angel Fire Home and Land Owners Ass'n v. South Cent. Colfax
County Special Hospt Dist,, 110 N.M. 496, 797 P.2d 285, cert, denied, 110 N.M. 330,
795 P.2d 1022 (N.M. App. 1990) (upholding a statute authorizing private persons
petitioning for creation of a special hospital district to draw boundary lines for the
district, because sufficient limitations and standards existed).
In the present case, the utility's right to reject a revenue sharing plan
cannot be deemed to be a delegation oflegislative power, because utilities already
possess such a power, through the rule against retroactive rate making.
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review delegated authority to the Utah State Barber Board, an organization
composed of barbers in the state, to set minimum prices and other conditions of
service for barbers in Utah. The Court found the statute unconstitutional because
it authorized this private entity to establish a price schedule contrary to the public
interest. The Court acknowledged that
the legislature may properly delegate to some administrative body the
duty of ascertaining the facts upon which the provisions of the law
are to function, and also, that one of the methods of initiating activity
on the part of that administrative body may be by petition of the
citizens concerned. Such procedure is not in and of itself defective as
an improper delegation of legislative authority.
192P.2dat567.
Obviously, the fact that a utility may initiate a proceeding to consider an
alternative form of rate regulation under Section 54-4-4.1 does not result in an
unconstitutional delegation under the explicit language of Revne. In addition,
the fact that a utility may opt out of a revenue sharing plan is hardly the equiva
lent of the utility setting its own prices and conditions of service, as the barbers
did in Revne. If a utility opts out of a revenue sharing plan, the Commission
would still have the authority to set the utility's rates and otherwise to regulate its
service.45 Unlike the situation in Revne. under Section 54-4-4.1, no utility may
unilaterally set its own rates or terms of service; any plan of rate regulation must
be approved by the Commission.
In Union Trust Co. v. Simmons. 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949), also cited
by Appellants, the Court held that a statute that required the consent of all other
45 In fact, pursuant to that power, the Commission reduced U S WEST's
rates by $19.8 million as part of its order in this case. (R. 5481, Addendum B)
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banks in a city before any bank could establish a branch in that city was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The basis for the decision, which
distinguishes that case from the one at bar, is that the statute allowed third party
competitor banks to prevent an administrative agency from exercising its existing
authority to approve branch banks. Thus the competitor banks, acting contrary to
the public interest, could impose their will on the public by refusing to allow
another bank to establish a branch. In the case at bar, on the other hand, the
Commission retains authority to approve any revenue sharing plan. The veto
power merely insures that a utility retains its existing constitutional right to
assert the rule against retroactive ratemaking. Therefore, it is not an unconstitu
tional delegation of legislative power.
In a more recent case, Utah Technology Finance Corn, v. Wilkinson. 723
P.2d 406 (Utah 1986), this Court held that there was no unconstitutional delega
tion of legislative power, where the Legislature established a corporation to
promote economic development through assistance to high technology business
es, funding it with $1,000,000 of public money. This Court stated:
"Due respect for the legislative prerogative in law making requires
that the judiciary not interfere with enactments of the Legislature
where disagreement is founded only on policy considerations and the
legislative scheme employs reasonable means to effectuate a legiti
mate objective." [quoting from Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233 (Utah
1979)] .... "[A]cts of the Legislature are presumed constitutional,
especially when dealing with economic matters based on factual
assumptions." [quoting from Rio Algom Corn, v. San Juan County.
681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984)] It is only when a legislative determination
of public purpose is so clearly in error as to be capricious and
arbitrary that the judiciary should upset it. . . .
What is public purpose varies and changes with the times. . . . "The
strong presumption of the act's constitutionality will not be overcome
simply because the plaintiffs economic forecasts differ from those of
the legislature." [quoting from Wilson v. Connecticut Product
Development Corp.. 167 Conn. Ill, 355 A.2d 72 (1974)]
In the present case, Appellants' efforts are primarily motivated by their
preference for a single economic theory: cost of service rate regulation. In Section
54-4-4.1, the Utah Legislature has recognized that other forms of utility regula
tion, including revenue sharing plans, may be appropriate for the changing
times, especially in industries that are increasingly subject to competition. This
Court should defer to the Legislature's effort, which is neither arbitrary nor
capricious, to address current economic reality by permitting revenue sharing
plans that are consistent with Title 54.
B. The power to reject a revenue sharing plan does not constitute a
denial of due process.
Appellants cite no authority in support of their argument that a utility's
power to reject a revenue sharing plan under Section 54-4-4.1(2) is a denial of their
due process rights. (App. Brief at 65-67). Rather, they complain that the mere
existence of a veto power "vests leverage in the utility regulated over every aspect
of the ratemaking process," and that other parties do not also have a veto power.
IApp. Brief at 65, 66). Remarkably, Appellants claim that they were precluded
from offering their preferred version of incentive ratemaking, although there is
absolutely nothing in the record to show that they even attempted to file a proposed
plan, much less that they were precluded from doing so.
Appellants' argument that all parties to a rate proceeding should be on
equal footing (i.e., that all parties should have a veto power if the utility has one) is
unpersuasive when considered in light of the fact that under a revenue sharing
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plan, only the utility's earned revenue, received from the collection of lawful,
tariffed rates—which would otherwise be protected by the rule against retroactive
rate making—would be at risk. No other party to a rate proceeding, including
Appellants, bears a similar risk under a revenue sharing plan. Hence it is
appropriate that only the utility have power to reject a revenue sharing plan.
Thus it cannot be a deprivation of due process or equal protection^ for a utility
alone to have the power to reject a revenue sharing plan.47
VI. THIS COURT NEED NOT RULE ON THE SEVERABILITY ISSUE
NEVERTHELESS, IF SUBSECTION 2 OF SECTION 54-4-4.1 IS DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE ENTIRE STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITU
TIONAL.
No sharing plan is in effect at this time. Indeed, no party (including
Appellants) is taking the position that the Commission's plan should go into
effect, whatever the Court's decision on the constitutional issues raised in this
case. Appellants argue that the Commission plan would be resurrected by a
decision invalidating Subsection 2 but not Subsection 1. However, Appellants
further argue that the Commission plan should then be overturned on other
grounds (App. Brief at 97-101). Respondents also take the position that the
Commission's plan should not go into effect. Any decision to place a sharing plan
into effect in the absence of Subsection 2 should be left up to the Commission in a
46 Although Appellants mention equal protection (App. Briefat 66), they do
not further develop an argument on this issue, probably because it is so apparent
that in a rate proceeding, the utility's position is unique, and no other party is
similarly situated.
47 It may be observed that the Commission also has power to reject any
proposed revenue sharing plan.
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subsequent proceeding or on remand, at which time the Commission would have
the opportunity to consider such a plan in the light of the fundamentally different
legal premise that would be occasioned by the invalidation of Subsection 2. Given
the unanimity of the parties to this proceeding that no plan is in effect or should
go into effect, whatever the Court decides, there is no need for the Court to
determine the severability issue.
However, in the unlikely event that Subsection 2 were struck down, Re
spondents do not agree that Subsection 1 would necessarily fall, because Subsec
tion 1 is broader than Subsection 2. Subsection 1 authorizes the Commission to
adopt any form of regulation consistent with Title 54, including sharing plans.
Subsection 2, on the other hand, allows a utility to opt out of a sharing plan, but
not other forms of regulation. As discussed in Section V.A, supra, the obvious
purpose of that provision is to continue to protect the utility (in the absence of its
consent) from a plan that would violate the rule against retroactive ratemaking.
Thus, if Subsection 2 were struck down, no sharing plan that requires retroactive
refunds ofearnings could be put in place without the consent of the utility.
However, to the extent that the Commission, pursuant to Subsection 1, were
to adopt a form of regulation that does not violate the rule against retroactive
ratemaking and was in all other respects consistent with Title 54, there is no
reason that an invalidation of Subsection 2 should prevent the Commission from
taking such an action.
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VII. APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES NOR COSTS
FROM US WEST.
A. Background.
Appellants intervened in the Commission proceeding in September 1990 on
their own behalf and not in any kind of representative capacity.48 In the Commis
sion proceedings, Appellants made no indication of an intention to seek to recover
costs and attorneys fees. Indeed, it was not until they filed their docketing
statement with this Court that Appellants claimed a right to costs and attorneys
fees49 and it was not until their Brief was filed that Appellants disclosed that they
were seeking attorney's fees from U S WEST. (App. Brief at 118-19). While citing
several theories, Appellants rely on two exceptions to the general "American" rule
that attorney's fees are awarded only when either a statute or contractual
provision so authorize: (1) the "Substantial Benefits" rule and (2) the "Private
Attorney General" doctrine. (App. Brief at 108-16).
For the reasons set forth hereafter, Appellants' request for costs and
attorney's fees from U S WEST must be denied, whatever the outcome of Appel
lants' constitutional challenge.
48 In their Petition to Intervene, Appellants alleged that "[ejach of the
petitioners uses the services of [U S WEST] . . . and each is vitally affected by the
regulation plan used and rates charged by that entity in this state" and that "[t]he
petitioners' legal and financial interests may be substantially affected by the
proceedings in this matter." (R. 4135-36). The Order granting Appellants'
intervention request makes it clear that they are intervening in their individual
capacities and not on behalf of anyone else. (R. 4130-31). Appellants have done
nothing to change their status.
49 Appellant's Docketing Statement, at 10, 14.
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B. Appellants' Claim for Attorney's Fees is Procedurally Flawed
1. Appellants' Claim Fails to Meet the Basic Principles of
Procedural Due Process.
Not only did Appellants claim attorney's fees from U S WEST for the first
time in their Brief, they ask this Court to establish the amount of such fees and
require U S WEST to pay them as a part of this case. In other words, without any
of the fundamental protections of due process - such as notice, an opportunity to
engage in discovery, the requirement that the claimant present evidence in
support of their claim,50 and an opportunity for U S WEST to present responsive
evidence - Appellants ask this Court to assume that all of their factual allegations
are true and require U S WEST to pay their attorney's fees. If their request were
granted, it would constitute a gross violation of U S WEST's due process rights,
rights which have been established by decisions of both the United States and Utah
Supreme Courts. In Morgan v. United States. 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938), the U.S.
Supreme Court stated:
But a 'full hearing'—a fair and open hearing—requires more than
that. The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present
evidence, but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the
opposing party and to meet them.
This Court recognizes the same principles. In Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207,
1212-13 (Utah 1983), this Court stated:
Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness.
50 Under Utah law, a party asserting a claim for attorney's fees has the
burden of proof to support an award of attorney's fees by evidence in the record.
See Section VII.C, infra.
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To satisfy an essential requirement of procedural due process,, a
'hearing' must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs
the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet ....
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be reduced to a
formula with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circum
stances. Rather, the demands of due process rest in the concept of
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to
the case and just to the parties involved.
Since there was no request for attorney's fees below, and since the fundamentals
of due process cannot be met through the briefing process the parties are current
ly engaged in, an award of attorney's fees by this Court would violate U S WEST's
due process rights.51
2. Appellants are Inappropriately Attempting to Invoke the
Original Jurisdiction of the Court.
Appellants' effort to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court is legally imper
missible. Because the attorney's fees issue was not raised below, Appellants'
effort to raise the issue for the first time on appeal is an inappropriate attempt to
invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court. The extent of this Court's original
5i Furthermore, U S WEST and Appellants are not opposing parties in the
same sense that a plaintiff and defendant in a civil suit are. By their nature,
administrative hearings, like the one conducted in this case, do not place parties
in the same kind of adversarial position vis-a-vis each other as adversarial
proceedings in a court. It is axiomatic that, in order to pursue a claim for
damages, a party must appropriately invoke the jurisdiction of the court from
which the remedy is sought. In a legal action where damages are sought, a
claimant has the duty to file a complaint under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
that is sufficient to outline the factual basis and legal theory under which the
claim is made. Unless one were to take the surreal position that these require
ments are met by a single sentence in a Docketing Statement and an argument in
a Brief, Appellants have utterly failed to meet these basic requirements.
87
jurisdiction is defined and limited by Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitu
tion:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and to answer questions ofstate law certified by a
court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by
statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the
exercise by the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete deter
mination of any cause.
[emphasis added). Accord, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2) and (3). Thus, the original
jurisdiction of this Court extends only to questions of state law certified by a
federal court and to the issuance of extraordinary writs. Obviously, a request for
attorney's fees does not fall into either area.
In order for Appellants to have pursued an attorney's fees claim against
US WEST (or any other party) they should have challenged the constitutionality of
the statute in the district court and raised the attorney's fee issue at that time.52
In the cases cited by Appellants, the attorney's fees claim was raised in the
original lawsuit.53 In none of the cases did the party seeking attorney's fees
52 Appellants could possibly have challenged the constitutionality of the
statues under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq.. or,
in the event an unconstitutional sharing plan went into effect that was causing
Appellants harm, they could have sued to have the plan declared invalid and to
recover damages for themselves and potentially for all ratepayers pursuant to a
class action under Rule 26, URCP. To the extent that Appellants could articulate
a basis to support an award ofattorney's fees they could have made it a part of the
case. In that event, there would be a clear plaintiff and defendant, notice that
such fees were being claimed, and an opportunity to present evidence. None of
these attributes of due process are present in the current posture of the case.
53 Arnold v. Dent, of Health Services. 775 P.2d 521, 523 (Ariz. 1989) (attor
ney's fees awarded by trial court); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Citv of
Berkeley, 226 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268, 274 (Ct. App. 1986) (attorney's fees sought in
remand proceedings; court noted that plaintiffs had sought attorney's fees in
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attempt to invoke the original jurisdiction of the appellate court, as Appellants are
attempting to do here.
3. Because Appellants Failed to Raise the Issue of Attorney's
Fees Below. Thev are Precluded from Raising it on Appeal.
As Appellants acknowledge, the issue of attorney's fees was not raised
below.54 The Court of Appeals in Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 788 P.2d 1049 (Utah
App. 1990), held that the failure to raise a request for attorney's fees at the trial
court precluded a request for them on appeal. Appellants attempt to distinguish
C&H, claiming that all the exceptions to the rule against awarding attorneys fees
are equitable in nature and cannot be asserted before an administrative agency.
While that may be true, the fact is that any ground for appeal from an order of the
Commission must be preserved in a petition for rehearing. Utah Code Ann. § 54-
7-15(2)(b) states unequivocally that "no applicant may urge or rely on any ground
not set forth in the application [for rehearing] in an appeal to any court."55 This
amended complaint so that defendants were on notice of claim); Crawford v. Los
Angeles Bd. of Education. 246 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (Ct. App. 1988) (attorney's fees
awarded by trial court); D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners. 520 P.2d 10, 27
(Cal. App. 1974) (attorney's fees awarded by trial court); Mandel v. Hodges. 127
Cal. Rptr. 244, 247-48 (Ct. App. 1976) (attorney's fees awarded by trial court);
Northington v. Davis. 593 P.2d 221, 222-23 (Cal. 1979) (attorney's fees awarded by
trial court); Serrano v. Priest. 569 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Cal. 1977) (attorney's fees
awarded by trial court).
54 App. Brief at 117-118. In fact, in none of the pleadings or briefs filed by
Appellants below, including Appellants' July 15, 1991 Motion for Rehearing, was
there even a glimmer of an indication that they were seeking recovery of attor
ney's fees and costs.
55 As noted in Section VILB.l, supra, the failure of Appellants to raise the
issue below is fatal for another reason: U S WEST was never given adequate
notice that Appellants were asserting an attorney's fees claim against it. Now, on
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Court, in Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commis
sion. 789 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1990), recently reaffirmed the principle that "an issue
is not preserved for consideration on appeal unless it has been specifically raised
in a petition for rehearing before the PSC.W Appellants, by their own admission,
failed to do so.
C. Because Appellants' Claim for Attorney's Fees is Based on a Fun
damental Factual Flaw. Appellants Have Failed to Meet Their
Burden ofProot
In their Docketing Statement, Appellants stated the issue relating to their
request for attorney's fees this way:
Whether Petitioners are entitled to their attorney fees and costs for
challenging the constitutionality of a statute and Commission Order
which might cost the consumers ofUtah millions of dollars in higher
phone rates than they might otherwise pay if the Commission's
Order or the plan proposed by U. S. West is allowed to go into effect
(App. Docketing Statement at 10; emphasis added). This statement either shows
an incredible naivete on Appellants' part or is a deliberate attempt to mislead the
Court. The basic premise of Appellants' claim is that their actions will save the
ratepayers of Utah potentially millions of dollars in preventing either the Com
mission's plan or U S WEST's plan from taking effect. 56 ln reality, Appellants
are "saving" ratepayers from a non-existent threat.
appeal, U S WEST has no opportunity to engage in discovery or to present evidence
on the issue. This deprives U S WEST of its basic due process rights to notice,
discovery, and an opportunity to confront and respond to the evidence presented
against it.
56 Appellants claim that their appeal will result in "benefits to be realized
... in the immediate future [which] largely reside in the realm of monies
consumers of telephone service will not have to pay because of the Commission's
unconstitutional and unlawful order." (App. Brief at 107).
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Contrary to Appellants' inference, U S WEST's plan was definitively
rejected by the Commission. (R. 5469-77). Furthermore, no party asserts that the
Commission plan is in effect. U S WEST opted out of the plan (R. 5692-93) and no
other party claims that it is or should be in effect, including Appellants. Thus,
Appellants' claim that their action will save ratepayers millions of dollars has
absolutely no basis in fact.
Furthermore, even if the Commission plan were in effect, there is no basis
for a factual conclusion that the plan will cost consumers millions of dollars. An
examination of the Commission plan shows that the Commission retained full
authority to terminate the plan, whenever it determined that it was not operating
in the public interest. (R. 5479, «fl 7, Addendum B). Thus, the acceptance by this
Court of Appellants' assertion that the Commission's plan will cost ratepayers
millions would be inappropriate. The plan is not in effect, and even if it were,
there is no factual basis to conclude that it would harm ratepayers.
A party claiming attorney's fees bears the burden of proof to establish the
award. Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp.. 806 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah App.
1990); Jones v. Muir. 515 A.2d 855, 859 (Pa. 1986). Such "an award . . . must be
supported by evidence in the record." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985,
988 (Utah 1988), Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 226 (Utah App. 1991). The factual
basis for Appellants' claim has simply not been demonstrated. In fact, Appel
lants placed no evidence in the record below either as to the factual basis for their
claim for attorney's fees or the amount of such fees. They have therefore failed to
meet their burden of proof.
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D. Neither of the Two Theories Relied Upon hv Appellants - Substantial
Benefit or Private Attorney General - Has Been Adopted in Utah.
In a long line of cases regarding attorney's fees, this Court and the Court of
Appeals have adopted the "American" rule: "In Utah, attorney fees are awarded
only if authorized by statute or by contract." E.g.. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764
P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale. 776 P.2d 643, 648
(Utah App. 1989); Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 1989); Govcrt
Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen. 801 P.2d 163, 173 (Utah App. 1990).
In the federal arena and in some states, courts have recognized some
equitable exceptions to the American rule. A commonly accepted exception is the
so-called "common fund" rule. Under that rule, attorney's fees have been
awarded "to the successful plaintiff when his representative action creates or
traces a common fund, the economic benefit of which is shared by all members of
the class." Hall v, Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 n.7 (1973). Under the common fund doctrine
there must be an identifiable fund from which the fees are paid and the beneficia
ries must be easily identifiable. Aleveska Pipeline Co. v. Williams Society. 421
U.S. 240, 264-65, n. 39 (1975); Boeing Co. v. Van Oenert. 444 U.S. 472, 479 (1980).
This exception has been adopted in numerous state jurisdictions,57 although not
in Utah.58 Appellants do not rely on the "common fund" theory, recognizing that
57 E^Hamer y, Kirk, 356 N.E. 2d 524, 528 (111. 1976); Van Emmerik v.
Montana Dakota Utilities Co. 332 N.W. 2d 279, 282, (S.D. 1983); Jones v. Muir 515
A.2d 855, 858 (Pa. 1986); Shelby Countv Comm'n v. Smith. 372 So.2d 1092, 1096-97
(Ala. 1979)Dennis v. State. 451 N.W. 2d 676, 687-88 (Neb. 1990).
58 Appellants' assertion (App. Brief at 106) that this Court adopted the
"common fund" exception in Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990) is a gross
mischaracterization. Plumb involved a review of the level of the District Court's
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there is no fund (App. Brief at 107-08).
Another common exception to the American rule that has been adopted by
many courts is the "bad faith" exception:
[I]t is unquestioned that a federal court may award counsel fees to a
successful party when his opponent has acted 'in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons!'"
Hall v. Cole, supra. 421 U.S. at 5. This exception has been statutorily adopted in
Utah.59 Appellants do not rely on this exception either.
Neither the "substantial benefit" nor the "private attorney general" excep
tion - the exceptions relied upon by Appellants - has been adopted in Utah.
E. Even If the Substantial Benefit Doctrine Had Been Adopted in Utah.
It Does Not Support Appellants' Claim.
The "substantial benefit" rule is an extension of the common fund rule - the
major difference is that under the substantial benefit rule, no defined fund is
necessary. Appellants rely on the "substantial benefit" rule in support of their
attorney's fees claim. (App. Brief at 108-09). A reading of Appellants' principal
case, Serrano v. Priest. 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977) and other authorities related to
award of attorney's fees in the thrift settlement. The basis for the attorney's fees
award was a written agreement between the class representative and class
counsel and was not based upon the "common fund" exception to the American
rule. The only reference to "common fund" in the Court's opinion was obviously
not for the purpose of adopting the exception. Ir].. at 740. This Court in Turtle
Management v. Haggis Management. 645 P.2d 667, 671 n. 1 (Utah 1982) made it
clear that it has not ruled on this exception.
59 Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991).
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this rule demonstrates that Appellants' reliance on this theory is utterly mis
placed.60
Appellants grossly misrepresented the "substantial benefits" rule in their
Brief. They quote Serrano for the proposition that the rule permits "the award of
fees when the litigant, proceeding in a representative capacity, obtains a decision
resulting in the conferral of a 'substantial benefit' of a pecuniary or non-
pecuniary nature." 569 P.2d at 1309 (App. Brief at 108). They failed, however, to
imote the next sentence from Serrano:
In such circumstances, the Court, in the exercise of its equitable
discretion, thereupon may decree that under the dictates of justice
those receiving the benefit should contribute to the costs of its produc
tion.
569 P.2d at 1309 (emphasis added). Thus, Appellants failed to mention a major
part of the substantial benefits rule: that it is the beneficiaries of representative's
actions who pay the fees. All courts that have adopted the "substantial benefit"
rule make it clear that the fees are to be paid by those who benefit. The seminal
case is Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Mills was a derivative
action brought by minority shareholders to set aside a merger based on a mislead
ing proxy statement. In Mills, the Court upheld an award of attorney's fees from
the corporation on the basis of the substantial benefit rule which permits
reimbursement in cases where the litigation has conferred a
substantial benefit on members of an ascertainable class, and where
eo Not all courts have adopted the "substantial benefit" rule. For example,
in Hamer v. Kirk. 356 N.W. 2d 524, 528 (111. 1976), the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled that "in the absence of a fund, a plaintiffs attorney is not entitled to attor
ney's fees merely because he has conferred a benefit upon members of a class."
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the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes
possiblean award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately
among them.
M. at 393-94 (emphasis added). Thus, the substantial benefit rule requires (1) the
conferral of a benefit to a class that can be readily identified and (2) the court must
be in a position to spread the attorney's fees proportionately among the class.
Accord, Hall, supra, 412 U.S. at 5-7, Doe v. State. 579 A.2d 37, 48-49 (Conn. 1990);
Jones y, Muir, 515 A.2d 855, 860-61 (Pa. 1986); Van Emmerik v. Montana Dakota
Utilities Co.. 332 N.W. 2d 279, 283-84 (S.D. 1983).
In applying this rule, the courts in other states have consistently rejected
efforts to recover fees from parties who are not beneficiaries of the class represen
tative's acts. For example, in Doe, a class action resulted in an injunction against
state officials from restricting payment for abortions for indigent women. The
plaintiffs appealed from a trial court ruling denying them attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs claimed attorney's fees from the state on the basis that they had benefit
ted all poor women in the state. The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected plain
tiffs' request for attorney's fees, concluding that "the plaintiffs' have not conferred
a substantial benefit upon all those whom they seek to impose the financial burden
of their counsel fees." 579 A.2d at 49. In an effort to avoid the conclusion that a
benefit had not been conferred upon all the citizens of Connecticut, plaintiffs
(much like Appellants in this case) argued that they "have conferred a benefit
upon all citizens of this state by challenging unconstitutional actions by the state."
The court rejected this claim, stating that it would expand the substantial benefit
doctrine "beyond its underpinnings." Id. In Van Emmerik. plaintiff sought to
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recover attorneys fees from utility companies who had collected sales taxes
pursuant to a sales tax statute that was later invalidated. The trial court denied
the request. On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, pointing out
that "we see no benefit accruing to the utilities as a result of appellant's law suit."
332 N.W. 2d at 283.
In this case, Appellants seek attorney's fees from U S WEST. Yet, in their
argument they assert that if they are successful in their appeal "the}'- will have
conferred a substantial benefit upon the ratepayers of U.S. West and a potential
lbenefit upon all the ratepayers of other rate regulated natural monopoly utilities
in this State who may have sought similar treatment." (App. Brief at 109; empha
sis added). Nowhere do the Appellants claim that their appeal is in the best
interest of or for the benefit of U S WEST. Thus, Appellants have failed to meet one
of the basic elements of the "substantial benefit" rule.61 Likewise, they fail to meet
the requirement that they be operating in a representative capacity. This is not a
class action; further, Appellants' Petition to Intervene makes it clear that they
entered the case to protect their own financial interests.62
While the substantial benefit rule has not been adopted in Utah, Appellants,
61 If Appellants were to seek attorney's fees from all ratepayers, they would
fail under another aspect of the "substantial benefits" rule, which requires that
"the classes of beneficiaries [be] small in number and easily identifiable [so that]
there was reason for confidence that the costs could indeed be shifted with some
exactitude to those benefitting." Aleyeska. supra, 421 U.S. at 265, n. 39. Jones v.
Muir, supra. 515 A.2d at 861 (denying attorney's fees under substantial benefit
rule on the ground that the benefits "were supposed to accrue to the general
public."); Doe v. State, supra, 579 A.2d at 49.
62 See footnote 48, supra.
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as a matter of law, would not meet the requirements of the rule even if it had been
adopted in Utah.
F. The Private Attorney General Doctrine is Clearly the Minority Rule
in the United States and Should he Rejected hv this Court.
The second theory upon which Appellants rely is the "Private Attorney
General" doctrine. Under this rule, attorney's fees can be awarded to a litigant
where the litigant is forced to step in and litigate an important societal interest
that broadly benefits the public. The leading case in favor of the doctrine is
Serrano v. Priest. 569 P.2d 1303, 1312-16 (Cal. 1977).
1. Appellants Have Failed to Meet Their Burden of Establishing
the Elements of the Private Attorney General Theory in this
Case.
As will be discussed below, this doctrine, unlike the common fund and
substantial benefit rules, has not been widely adopted by the courts in this country
- it remains in the distinct minority. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that it
were the law of Utah, it is clear that Appellants have failed to meet their burden in
demonstrating its elements in this case.
In order to meet the rule, three distinct factors must be satisfied:
(1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated
by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the
magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, (3) the number of
people standing to benefit from the decision.
Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314. Appellants claim that the first element is met because
they are vindicating important statutory and constitutional rights. Yet, it is
undisputed that no sharing plan will go into effect, whatever the Court's decision
on the constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1. Thus, at this point, the constitutional
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issues are of purely academic interest. In light of that fact, it would be impossible
to conclude that a matter of great societal importance hangs in the balance.
With regard to the second factor - the necessity of private enforcement and
the burden on Appellants - Appellants claim that the public authorities (the
Commission, Division and Committee) actively failed to undertake their duty of
challenging the statute and that Appellants were therefore forced to bring their
appeal. What they fail to take into account is the fact that the Commission, based
on what it considered good authority, did not feel it appropriate for it to determine
the constitutionality of a statute granting it powers. (R. 5059-62). Further, both
the Division and Commission believe the statute is constitutional. And, while the
Committee raised questions as to the constitutionality of the opt out provision (R.
4806-10), it also opposed incentive regulation in general (R. 5136-54). Since no
incentive or sharing plan is or will be in effect, the Committee apparently did not
feel it necessary to appeal. The fact is that there is no necessity for private
enforcement since, even under Appellants' view of proper rate regulation,
nothing injurious to the public can result from this case. If U S WEST or another
utility in the future seeks a sharing plan under the statute, there will be every
opportunity for the issues raised by Appellants to be considered.
The third element - the number of people standing to benefit - fails for the
same reason. Nothing that results from this case will put ratepayers in Utah in
any different position than they are now in, since U S WEST is currently subject, to
traditional regulation.
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2- The Private Attorney GeneralDoctrine Should Not be Adopted
in Utah-
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court strongly rejected the private
attorney general doctrine in Aleveska Pineline v. Wilderness Society. 421 U.S. 240
(1976). In 1977, California accepted the doctrine in Serrano. In the sixteen years
since Aleyeska and Serrano, only four jurisdictions - Arizona, Idaho, Wisconsin
and Oregon - have adopted the private attorney general doctrine.63 During that
same period, decisions in eight states - Washington, Connecticut, Massachu
setts, Illinois, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Alabama -
expressly rejected the doctrine.64
In Aleyeska, a group of environmental organizations sued to prevent the
issuance of permits for construction of a pipeline in Alaska. Although subsequent
legislation rendered their effort unsuccessful, they were awarded attorney's fees
on the theory that they had protected substantial public interests. On appeal, the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected that theory. The Court noted that Congress, while
63 Arnold v. Arizona Dept. of Health, 775 P.2d 521 (Ariz. 1989): Hellar v.
Cenamisa, 682 P.2d 524 (Id. 1984); Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n.
345 N.W. 2d 482 (Wise. 1984); Umrein v. Heimbi^mer. 632 P.2d 1367 (Ore. App
1981). ^
64 Blue Skv Advocates v. State. 727 P.2d 644, 648-49 (Wash. 1986); Doe v.
Heinfz, 526 A.2d 1318, 1322-23 (Conn. 1987); Doe v. State. 579 A.2d 37, 48 (Conn.
1990); Pearson v. Board of Health . 525 N.E. 2d 400 (S.Ct. 1988); Hamer v. Kirk. 356
N.E. 2d 524, 527-28 (111. 1976); Van Emmerik v. Montana Dakota Utilities Co.. 332
N.W. 2d 279, 284 (S.D. 1983); Jones v. Muir. 515 A.2d 855, 861 (Pa. 1986); Providence
Journal Co, v, Mason, 359 A.2d 682, 688 (R.I. 1976); Shelby Countv Comm'n y.
Smith, 372 So. 2d 1092, 1096-97 (Ala. 1979). In addition, courts in Colorado and
Nebraska have cited with general approval cases rejecting the private attorney
general doctrine. People v. District Court,. 808 P.2d 831, 835 (Colo. 1991); Dennis v.
State. 451 N.W. 2d 676, 687-88 (Neb. 1990).
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recognizing the American rule, has made
specific and explicit provisions for the allowance of attorney's fees
under selected statutes granting or protecting various federal rights.
. . . Under this scheme of things, it is apparent that the circum
stances under which attorney's fees are to be awarded and the range
of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for
Congress to decide.
421 U.S. at 260, 262 (emphasis added). The Court was particularly impressed by
the fact that Congress had "carved out" numerous statutory exceptions to the
general American rule. In light of that fact, the Court concluded that the federal
courts
are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance
of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in federal litigation or to pick
and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under which they sue
and to award fees in some cases but not in others, depending upon
the courts' assessment of the importance of the public policies
involved in particular cases.
Id. at 269. On this basis, the Court concluded that "it is not for us to invade the
legislature's province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested by
respondents . . . ." Id. at 271.
Likewise, the Utah legislature has adopted specific and explicit statutes
allowing attorney's fees in a variety of situations.^ Among these statutes are the
65 E.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-15-1(3) (Supp. 1991) (bad checks); 13-11-17.5
(Supp. 1991) (consumer sales practice); 13-lla-4(2)(c) (Supp. 1991) (truth in
advertising); 13-14a-7 (Supp. 1991) (equipment repurchase from retail dealers); 13-
15-6(3) (Supp. 1991) (business opportunity disclosure documents); 13-16-7(3) (Supp.
1991) (motor fuel marketing practices); 13-23-7 (Supp. 1991) (health spas); 13-24-5
(Supp. 1991) (trade secrets); 14-2-1 & 2 (Supp. 1991) (suit under bond - failure to
obtain bond); 31A-15-108 (1991) (action against unauthorized insurer); 34-27-1
(1988) (suit for wages); 34-28-13 (1988) (assignment of wage claims); 38-1-18 (1988)
(enforcement of mechanic's liens); 45-3-5 (1988) (action for abuse of personal
identity); 57-11-17(2) (1990) (land sales practices); 57-15-9 (1990) (security interests
in real estate); 57-22-6(3)(e) (Supp. 1991) (unfit premises); 62A-11-410(2) (1989)
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provisions that codify the "bad faith" exception to the American rule, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56, and that allow attorney's fees in suits brought against peace
officers and other governmental employees for violations of the Fourth Amend
ment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. § 78-16-3. Thus, the rationale underlying the
Aleyeska decision applies directly in Utah. The Utah legislature has acted in a
variety of situations to statutorily allow an award of attorney's fees to protect
various state rights. Appellants, who can cite no statute allowing the recovery of
attorney's fees in this type ofcase, are thus asking this Court to "invade the [Utah]
legislature's province" and redistribute litigation costs.
Each of the state decisions rejecting the private attorney general doctrine
has explicitly agreed with the rationale articulated in Aleveska. For example, in
Doe v. Heintz. the Connecticut Supreme Court stated:
In view of this legislative policy of selecting the special situations
where attorneys' fees may be awarded, we agree with the trial court
that it is inappropriate for the judiciary to establish under the private
attorney general doctrine a broad rule permitting such fees ....
526 A.2d at 1323. In Blue Skv Advocates, the Washington Supreme Court cited
language from Aleyeska and stated that w[w]e are convinced of the wisdom of this
reasoning for our state system and adopt it." 727 P.2d at 649. In Shelby Countv.
the Alabama Supreme Court responded to Serrano by stating that "[w]e, however,
are not inclined to make such a drastic change in Alabama law and overrule such
(failure to withhold child support); 63-30c-l et seq. (1989) (recovery by public
officers of attorney's fees for defense of actions under Article V); 70C-7-204 (1990)
(violation ofConsumer Credit Act); 76-9-406 (1990) (violation ofprivacy offenses); 78-
11-10 (1987) (actions against peace officers); 78-16-3 (1987) (actions for 4th
Amendment violations); 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991) (actions or defense in bad faith); 78-
37-9 (1987) (mortgage foreclosures).
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a clear line of precedent without legislative authorization." 372 So. 2d at 1097.
Respondent U S WEST submits that the rationale of Aleyeska. particularly
in light of the broad ranging state statutes allowing attorney's fees in a variety of
situations, should be followed by this Court, since it maintains an appropriate
balance between the judicial and legislative branches of government.
G. Appellants Have Failed to Articulate Anv Rational Basis for a Claim
ofAttorney's fees Against U S WEST.
The sole basis for Appellants' claim that U S WEST should pay Appellants'
attorney's fees is contained in these two sentences:
The practical problem with determining who should pay Appellants'
costs and attorney's fees is also easily resolved in this case. They
should be paid by the major proponent of this unconstitutional
statute, U.S. West.
App. Brief at 118-19.66 If the implications of this statement were not so serious,
the claim would be laughable.
Appellants cite no authority to support their claim for attorney's fees on the
theory that favoring a piece of legislation renders one legally liable to someone
who later challenges the legislation.67 They do not address the bizarre chilling
impact that such a standard of liability would have on the fundamental democrat
ic right of citizens - including corporations - to seek legal change through
legislative action. They ignore the fact that the plan proposed by U S WEST was
rejected by the Commission and that the plan ultimately adopted by the Commis-
66 Those two sentences comprise the entirety of Appellants' "case" against
U S WEST for attorney's fees.
67 It is virtually unimaginable that any court has ever imposed liability on
a party on the ground that they favored a piece of legislation.
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sion was as unacceptable to U S WEST as it is to Appellants.
It is a fundamental principle of Utah law that a party seeking damages
from another party must articulate a legally cognizable basis for the relief sought.
By any standard, Appellants have failed to do so. Their claim for costs and
attorney's fees should therefore be rejected.
VIII. THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF A RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY OF
12.2% WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Appellants presented no testimony dealing with rate of return nor did they
(or their counsel, Mr. Barker) participate in the hearings held in December 1990,
when the rate of return witnesses for U S WEST, the Division and the Committee
were cross-examined. (R. 531, 695). Despite their non-participation on this issue,
Appellants attempt to overturn the Commission's finding of a 12.2% return on
equity, claiming it is not based on substantial evidence.
A. Appellants failed to marshall the evidence in support of a 12.2% rate
of return.
The sole ground for Appellants' attack on the Commission's rate of return
finding is their claim that "the Commission's adoption of a 12.2% rate of return is
unsupported by substantial evidence." (App. Brief at 101). Under the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), the reviewing court can grant relief if
the Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by an action of the agency that "is
based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). While the substantial evidence test
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of the UAPA grants courts greater latitude than prior standards, Grace Drilling
Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 1989), it also imposes greater
duties upon a party seeking to challenge the agency's finding:
It is also important to note that the "whole record test" necessarily
requires that a party challenging the Board's findings of fact must
marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contra
dictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence.
Id. at 68 (italics in original). Accord, First Nat'l Bank v. Countv Board of Equal
ization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) ("party challenging the findings . . . must
marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings"); West Vallev Citv v.
Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).
Appellants did not marshall the evidence in this case relating to the rate of
return issue. While Appellants filed a 121 page brief, their treatment of the rate of
return is scant. They dedicate only one paragraph to it in their fact section and
less than four pages to it in their argument,68 despite the fact that the four
witnesses who addressed the rate of return issue filed 600 pages of testimony and
exhibits (R 5976-6012, 6018-22, 6595-6607, 6612-6735, 7041-71, 7307-7510, 7512-7780)
and the transcript of their cross-examination extended for over 400 pages. (R. 530-
941) In addition, U S WEST, the Division and Committee filed extensive post
hearing briefs. (R. 4714-59). Despite this voluminous record, there is not a single
68 App. Brief at 51-52, 101-05.
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reference to the factual record in Appellants' argument.69 Thus, Appellants have
not even attempted to meet their duty of marshalling the evidence. Instead, as
Appellants acknowledge, their entire argument is based on a facial analysis of the
Commission's order. This is how Appellants characterized their challenge in
this manner:
Once again, the Commission's Report and Order - on its face —
demonstrates that there was no record evidence to support a finding
of a 12.2% rate of return.
App. Brief at 102 (emphasis added). Appellants have utterly misperceived their
duty in challenging a finding based on lack of substantial evidence. The question
is not whether the Order "on its face" sets forth sufficient evidence to support the
finding; rather, the question is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record
to support the filing. In failing to marshall the evidence on this issue, Appellants'
challenge to the rate of return finding must fail, particularly in the face of the
principle that a failure to marshall causes the challenged finding to be treated as
conclusive:
If indeed [appellant] is challenging the finding that she was termi
nated for a failure to adhere to the store's coupon policy, she has
failed to meet her burden of marshaling the evidence in support of
that finding. Therefore, we accept the Board's finding as conclusive.
Nelson v. Den't of Employment Security. 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah App. 1990)
(emphasis added); Merriam v. Board ofReview. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991);
69 See App. Brief at 101-05. In their argument on this issue, Appellants
quote the Order five times and never cite the factual record. That is the full extent
of their effort to persuade the Court that the 12.2% return is not "supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court."
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Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review. 775 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah App. 1989).
Because Appellants failed to marshall the evidence, the Commission's
finding of 12.2 percent return on equity must be treated by this Court as conclu
sive.
B. There is substantial evidence in the record to support a 12.2% rate of
1. Appellants' Analysis is Misleading and Flawed.
Appellants' challenge to the Commission's rate of return finding is based
solely on a facial review of the order rather than a substantive review of the
evidence presented.
Appellants' discussion of the Commission's 13 page analysis of rate of
return (R. 5397-5409, Appendix 1) is highly selective and completely misleading:
Appellants point out the Commission's statement that U S WEST has
been able to raise capital at an 11.8 percent rate of return and that
capital costs had been trending downward (App. Brief at 102).
Appellants attribute the Commission's finding of a rate of return
higher than 11.8 percent as being based on an unsubstantiated
finding that conditions in the industry and the economy are unsettled
in the near term. (Id. at 102-03).
Based solely on the Commission's statement that "[t]his is a time
when states are in a sense competing for high-tech additions to and
™ The Division takes the position that the Commission's finding of a 12.2%
rate of return is supported by substantial evidence. However, the Division did not
participate in this portion of the Brief.
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refinements of telecommunications plant and equipment" (R. 5409,
App. 1), Appellants assert that the Commission's decision to raise
the rate of return from 11.8% to 12.2% is a regulatory bribe made to
persuade U S WEST to invest more in the telecommunications
infrastructure in Utah. (Id. at 103-04).
What is most amazing about Appellants' argument is what they did not
mention. There is not a single reference to any of the models used to estimate
costs of capital, such as the discounted cash flow model (DCF) and the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM). Yet, the Commission's Order discusses these
issues at length. (R. 5402-08, Addendum B). And, while Appellants profess
outrage that the Commission raised the rate of return, they fail to mention, let
alone discuss, the specific reasons that the Commission gave for doing so:
Without dispute, capital costs have declined since the previous rate of
return decision of 11.8 percent, and even since the filing of direct
testimony. Taken alone, this would argue for reduction in allowed
return. But other compelling factors have a role to play. The record
on risk-return comparability, while not complete, on balance suggest
ing increasing risk; the questioned reliability of model results during
unsettled moments in the economy and industry; the large, even
contrary, difference in results obtained by witnesses for the Com
pany compared with witness Compton for the Division using CAPM;
the knowledge that the utility may to a degree be shedding certain
utility characteristics; and the ambiguous record on expected
behavior of stock price, are all influential considerations which must
be evaluated in the context of a wide range of cost of equity results
obtained by witness application of models. The Commission con
cludes there is no reason to grant an award at the upper end of the
range, and indeed there are reasons why this would be error. The
Commission is convinced a reduction in the current equity return,
though advocated by witnesses for the Committee and the Division,
would likewise be in error, given the risk implications of the chang
ing industry and the status of the general economy in relation
thereto.
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R. 5407-08, Addendum B; emphasis added. Thus, contrary to Appellants' infer
ence, the Commission did not just arbitrarily raise the return. Instead, the
Commission examined a variety of results produced by several different models,
relying primarily on the DCF model. It looked at conditions in the economy and in
the industry and the fact that U S WEST "may to a degree be shedding certain
utility characteristics." On balance, the Commission chose to establish a rate of
return that was neither at the top of the range proposed by U S WEST's witnesses
— 14.5 to 15 percent — nor at the bottom of the range suggested by other witness
es — 11.1 to 11.6 percent.
As to the assertion that the rate of return finding is a regulatory bribe,
Appellants' reading of the Order ignores all other reasons cited by the Commis
sion. Their argument is a cynical effort to attribute motives to the Commission
that the order does not bear out. All the Commission was saying is that there is a
relationship between rate of return and investment decision making, and that this
relationship, along with other relevant considerations, should be considered in
deciding the rate of return issue. (R. 5409, Addendum B). If, as Appellants infer,
the Commission raised the rate of return to "bribe" U S WEST to invest more in
Utah, one can only wonder why the Commission in the same order mandated that
U S WEST place a fiber backbone system and modernize 41 central offices. (R. 5460-
62, Addendum B). Obviously, the Commission did not believe it needed to bribe U S
WEST to make investments the Commission considers necessary.
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Commission's Finding.
While it is Appellants' burden to marshall all of the evidence supporting the
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finding, even a cursory review of the evidence demonstrates that the Commis
sion's rate of return finding is supported by substantial evidence.?!
Consider first of all the DCF evidence. All witnesses presented DCF
analyses. U S WEST witness Cummings presented several DCF analyses. His
DCF analysis of U S WEST alone produced a calculated rate of return of 12.2% —
an analysis of all seven Regional Holding Companies (RHCs)?2 produced a 12.8%
return (R. 7562-71, 7590, 7640). Using independent telephone companies, Mr.
Cummings' DCF analysis resulted in a calculated rate of return of 14.3%; using
comparable non-regulated companies, his DCF result was 15.2%. (R. 7567, 7641-
42). Dr. Morin, another witness sponsored by U S WEST, obtained a DCF calculat
ed rate of return for the RHCs of 13.11%, 13.74% for both independent telephone
?i Although there is no precise definition of substantial evidence, it is clear
that it is more than a "scintilla" and less than a preponderance. Grace Drilling
Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 1989); First Nat'l Bank v.
Countv Bd. of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) (defines "substantial
evidence" as the "quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion").
?2 The RHCs are the seven companies created to provide local exchange
services following the AT&T divestiture. U S WEST, Inc., the parent company of
Respondent U S WEST Communications, Inc., is one of them. The seven RHCs
are engaged in similar business activities, have similar bond ratings, size and
capital structure and are subject to similar economic and regulatory risks. (R.
7370-71, 7422, 7424-25). Dr. Marcus, the Committee witness, pointed out that the
RHCs are the most comparable companies to U S WEST (R. 883-84). U S WEST
took the position that it was inappropriate for the Commission to base its finding
of U S WEST's return on a single company rate of return, particularly in light of
the Supreme Court decision in the Hope and Bluefield cases that emphasize the
need for setting a return at levels earned by "other enterprises having correspond
ing risks." Federal Power Commission v. Hope National Gas Co.. 320 U. S. 591,
603 (1944); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n.
262 U. S. 679 (1923). The Hope and Bluefield cases have been expressly followed by
this Court in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission. 107 Utah 155,
152 P.2d 542 (1944).
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companies and gas distribution utilities and 14.92% for high-quality industrials.
[R. 7342-81, 7424-30). Dr. Compton, the Division's witness, took an approach that
looked only at U S WEST, rather than comparing it to other companies.. He found
a 12.2% return for U S WEST, Inc., parent of Respondent U S WEST Communica
tions, Inc., which he then reduced to reflect what he perceived to be less risk for U
S WEST Communications, Inc., the regulated entity. He ultimately proposed an
11.5% return on equity (R. 6731, 7053-60). However, when doing an analysis of the
RHCs, Dr. Compton produced an RHC average DCF calculated rate of return of
12.5%. (R. 7054). Like Dr. Compton, Dr. Marcus (the witness for the Committee)
did a DCF analysis of U S WEST, Inc. that supported his recommendation of a
rate of return of 11.3% for the regulated entity, although he also did an analysis of
the DCF of the RHCs, which he estimated at 12.3% (R. 884).
In addition, the Division presented an exhibit (R. 6653), showing the
comparative DCF rate of return results for Pacificorp, the parent of Utah Power
and Light, Questar, the parent of Mountain Fuel, and U S WEST, Inc., the parent
of Respondent U S WEST Communications, Inc. The record showed that the rate
of return found by the Utah Commission for both Utah Power and Mountain Fuel
was 12.1%. (R. 866). The exhibit showed that the relative DCF calculated rates of
return for the three companies were: Pacificorp at 10.7%, Questar at 11.1% and
U S WEST, Inc. at 11.9%. (R. 6633). Thus, comparing U S WEST to the other
major regulated utilities in Utah, its required return was higher. Since the
commission had set the return on equity for Mountain Fuel and Utah Power at
12.1% as recently as 1991, it is entirely consistent with the evidence that it set U S
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WEST's return at a higher level, in this case a modest increase to 12.2%. The
point is that there is a wealth of DCF evidence that supports a finding of a rate of
return from 11.3% to over 14%. The Commission's finding falls well within that
range.
In addition to the DCF testimony, there was considerable testimony
regarding the changes in the industry and to U S WEST that impact its risk. (R.
7334-35, 7338-41, 7393, 7546-50). Another U S WEST witness testified as to the
uncertain nature of the United States economy and U S WEST's financial pros
pects (R. 7302). Dr. Morin testified at length regarding the problems of relying on
a single methodology - such as DCF - in estimating rate of return, particularly in
unsettled economic times (R. 7347-48). Both he and Mr. Cummings presented
other approaches (R. 7382-88, 7431-33, 7572-81, 7643-48), whose calculations
resulted in rate of return estimates well above 12.2%.73
While the foregoing represents only a portion of the evidence presented on
rate of return, it demonstrates beyond question that the Commission's finding is
based on substantial evidence in the record.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully request that the Court:
1. Dismiss the issues raised in Points I-IV and VI of Appellants' Brief
73 While the Commission showed a clear preference for the DCF approach,
it did not reject the other approaches. Indeed, one of the reasons cited by the
Commission for its 12.2% finding was that a variety of considerations "must be
evaluated in the context of a wide range of cost of equity results obtained by
witness application of models." (R. 5408, Addendum B).
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on the ground that they are moot or, in the event the Court does not dismiss these
points on mootness grounds, Respondents request that the Court determine that
both subsections of Section 54-4-4.1 are constitutional and deny Appellants'
requests for costs and attorney's fees.
2. Affirm the Commission's finding that a 12.2 percent return on equity
is reasonable.
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ADDENDUM A
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND
STATUTES
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Sec. 7. [Due process of law I
,No Pen;on shall be depnved of life lil^rt
eny. w.thoutdue procej• oflaw U'^
ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Settion
!• fThree departments of government, j
^"Se^w 1Tfh?e dePart™nt* "f government.]
shall £7 , °f^ S«ven,n,ent of the State of Utah
^ la ,veV1th Knt° tHr"e distim-1 d^«m,nts; thepsiative, the Executive, and the Judical; and no
P« son charged with the exercse „f powers proper"
*n Son0"' °f the"^^"hail ex^
el ^ ^P^tammg to either of the otherspt in the case. .,erem expressly directed lir p,r.
ARTICLE VI
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section I. [Power vested in Senate, House and
People.]
The Legislative power of the State shall be vested.
1. In a Senate and House of Representatives which
shall be designated the Legislature of the State of
Utah.
2 In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter
stated:
The legal voters or such fractional part thereof, of
the State of l.tah as may be provided b> law. ijnder
such conditions and :n -uch manner and within such
time as may be provided by law, may initiate anv
tie-ired iegislat.on and cause the same to be suhmit-
tec to a vote of the people for approval or rejection, or
may require any law passed by the Legislature ex
cept those laws pas.-oi by a two-third.-! vote <f the
members elected to each house uf the Legishit'..ft-' to
be -uomitt-'d to the voters of the State before -uch
biv- -h.dl take effect.
The legal \oter- or such fractional part theP'of a.s
mov he provided by iaw. of any legal subdivi-). >n of
the State, under .-uch conditions and in such :n.inner
and within such ;;:"r:e a- may be provided bv law, mav
initiate any desired legislation and cause the \.mt to
be submitted to a vote of the people of said legal -ub-
division tor approval it rejection, or may require anv
lav. nr ordinance pa-.-ed b> the L»w making bmiv ot'
said leeal subdivision to be submitted to the voters
thereof betbre such a.v, or ordinance shall iake'-ffecl
It**)
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. [Judicial powers - Courts ]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a
supreme court, in a trial court ofgeneral jurisdiction
known as the district court, and in such other courts
as the Legislature by statute mav establish The Su
preme Court, the district court, and such other courts
designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts
not ofrecord shall also be established bv statute ]984
ARTICLE XII
CORPORATIONS
Sec. 20. [Trusts and combinations prohibited.]
Any combination by individuals, corporations, or
associations, having for its object or effect the control
lingof the price of any products of the soil, or ofany
article of manufacture or commerce, or the cost of
exchange or transportation, is prohibited, and hereby
declared unlawful, and against public policy. The
Legislature shall pass laws for the enforcement of
this section by adequate penalties, and in case of in
corporated companies, ifnecessary for that purpose, it
may declare a forfeiture of their franchise. 1896
STATUTES
5-1-3-1. Charges must be just; service adequate;
rules reasonable.
All charges made, demanded or received by any
public utility, or by any two or more public utilities,
for any product or commodity furnished or to be fur
nished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered,
shall be just and reasonable. Every unjust or unrea
sonable charge made, demanded or received for such
product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited
and declared unlawful. Every public utility shall fur
nish, provide and maintain such service, instrumen
talities, equipment and facilities as will promote the
safety, health, comfortand convenienceof its patrons,
employees and the public, and as will be in all re
spects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. All
rules and regulations made by a public utility affect
ing or pertaining to its charges or service to the pub
lic shall be just and reasonable. The scope of defini
tion "just and reasonahle" may include, but shall not
be limited to, the cost of providing service to each
category of customer, economic impact of charges on
each category of customer, and on the well-being of
the state of Utah; methods of reducing wide ner'Mic
variations in demand of such products, commodities
or services, and means ofencouraging conservation of
resources and energy. 1B77
54-3-7. Charges not to vary from schedules —
Refunds and rebates forbidden — Ex
ceptions.
Except as in this chapter otherwise provided, no
puhlic utility shall charge, demand, collect or receive
a greater or less or different compensation for any
product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, or
for any service rendered or to be rendered, than the
rates, tolls, rentals and charges applicable to such
products or commodity or service as specified in its
schedules on file and in effect at the time, nor shall
any such public utility refund or remit, directly or
indirectly, in any manner or by any device, any por
tion of the rates, tolls, rentals and charges so speci
fied; nor extend to any person any form of contract or
agreement, or any rule or regulation, or any facility
or privilege except such as are regularly ,m<: uni
formly extended to all corporations and persons; pro
vided^ that the commission may, by rule or order,
establish such exceptions from the operation of this
prohibition as it may consider just and reasonable as
to any public utility. 19M
54-4-1. General jurisdiction.
The commission is hereby vested with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the busi
ness of every such public utility in this state, and to
do all things, whether herein specifically designated
or in addition thereto, which are necessary or conve
nient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction;
provided, however, that the Department of Transpor
tation shall have jurisdiction over those safety func
tions transferred to it by the Department of Transpor
tation Act. 1975
54-4-4. Classification and fixing of rates after
hearing.
(1) Whenever the commission shall find after a
hearing that the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or
classifications, or any of them demanded, observed,
charged or collected by any public utility for any ser
vice or product or commodity, or in connection there
with, including the rates or fares for excursion or
commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations,
practices or contracts, or any of them, affecting such
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications,
or any of them, are unjust, unreasonable, discrimina
tory or preferential, or in anywise in violation of any
provisions of law, or that such rates, fares, tolls,
rentals, charges or classifications are insufficient, the
commission shall determine the just, reasonable or
sufficient rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifi
cations, rules, regulations, practices or contracts to be
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the
same by order as hereinafter provided.
(21 The commission shall have power to investigate
a single rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classification,
rule, regulation, contract or practice, or any number
thereof, or the entire schedule or schedules of rates,
fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules,
regulations, contracts and practices, or any number
thereof, of any public utility, and to establish, after
hearing, new rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, clas
sifications, rules, regulations, contracts or practices,
or schedule or schedules in lieu thereof.
(31 The commission, in its determination of just
and reasonable rates, may consider recent changes in
the utility's financial condition or changes reasonably
expected, but not speculative, in the utility s reve
nues, expenses or investments and may adopt an ap
propriate future test period, not exceeding twelve
months from the date of filing, including projections
or projections together with a period of actual opera
tions in determining the utility's test year for rate-
making purposes. 1975
54-4-1.1. Rules to govern rates — Shared earn
ings.
(li The commission may, by rule or order, adopt
any method of rate regulation consistent with this
title, including a method whereby revenues or earn
ings of a public utility above a specified level are
equitably shared between the public utility and its
customers.
;^i Not later than til) davs from the entry of an
order or adopi on of a rule adopt.ng a method ol rate
regulation wo reby revenues or earnings of a public
utility above . specified level an' equitably -lar-d
between the public utility and its customers, the pun-
Uc utility may elect not to proceed with the method of
rate regulation by filing with the cmmission a n-'. :•
that it does not intend to proceed with the method ..>i
rate regulation. I99°
54-7-12. Rate increase or decrease — Procedure
— Effective dates — Electrical or tele
phone cooperative.
11) As used in this section:
1a1 "Rate increase" means any direct increase
in a rate, fare, toll, rental, or other charge of a
public utility or any modification of a classifica
tion, contract, practice, or rule that increases a
rate, fare, toll, rental, or other charge of a public
utility
ibi "Rate decrease" means any direct decrease
in a rate, fare, toll, rental, or other charge of a
public utility or any modification of a classifica
tion, contract, practice, or rule that decreases a
rate, fare, toll, rental, or other charge of a public
utility.
(2) <ai Any public utility or other party that pro
poses t& increase or decrease rates shall file ap
propriate schedules with the commission setting
• forth the proposed* rate increase or decrease,
fb'i The commission shall, after reasonable no
tice, hold a hearing to determine whether the
proposed rate increase or decrease, or some other
rate increase or decrease, is just and reasonable.
If a rate decrease is proposed by a public utility,
the commission may waive a hearing unless it
seeks to suspend, alter, or modify the rate de
crease.
•c1 Except as otherwise provided in Suhser-
tions i;j! and i4i. no proposed rate increase or
decrease is effective until after completion of the
hearing and issuance of a final order by the com
mission concerning the proposed increase or de
crease.
13> The following rules apply to the implementa
tion of any proposed rate increase or decrease filed by
a utility or proposed by any other party and to the
implementation of any other increase or decrease in
lieu of that proposed by a utility or other party that is
determined to be just and reasonable by the commis
sion:
13! On its own initiative or m response to an
application by a public utility or other partv. :he
commission, after a hearing, may allow any pro
posed rate increase or decrease, or a reasonable
part of the rate increase or decrease, to take ef
fect, subject to the commission's right to order a
refund or surcharge, upon the filing of the util
ity's schedules or at any time during the pen
dency of its hearing proceedings. The evidence
presented in the hearing held pursuant to this
subsection need not encompass all issues that
may be considered in a rate case hearing held
pursuant to Subsection (2Kb), but shall establish
an adequate prima facie showing that the in
terim rate increase or decrease is justified,
ib) li) If the commission completes a hearing
concerning a utility's revenue requirement
before the expiration of 210 days from the
date the rate increase or decrease proposal is
filed, it may issue a final order within that
period establishing the utility's revenue re
quirement and fixing its interim allowable
rates before it determines the allocation of
the increase or decrease among categories of
customers and classes of service.
(ii) If the commission in its final order on
a utility's revenue requirement finds that
the interim increase order under Subsection
uS)(a) exceeds the increase finally ordered, it
shall order the utility to refund the exce.-- to
customers. If the commission in its final or
der on a utility's revenue requirement finds
that the interim decrease order under Sub
section (31(a) exceeds the decrease finally or
dered, it shall order a surcharge to customers
to recover the excess decrease.
(c) If the commission fails to enter its order
granting or revising a revenue increase within
240 days after the utility's schedules are filed,
the rate increase proposed by the utility is final
and the commission may not order a refund of
anv amount already collected by the utility un
der its filed rate increase.
id) (i) When a public utility files a proposed
rate increase based upon an increased cost to
the utility for fuel or energy purchased or
obtained from independent contractors,
other independent suppliers, or any supplier
whose prices are regulated by a governmen
tal agency, the commission shall issue a ten
tative order with respect to the proposed in
crease within ten days after the proposal is
filed, unless it issues a final order with re
spect to the rate increase within 2U days af
ter the proposal is filed.
(ii) The commission shall hold a public
hearing within 30 days after it issues the
tentative order to determine if the proposed
rate increase is just and reasonable.
(4) la) Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this title, any schedule, classification, practice, or
rule filed by a public utility with the commission
that does not result in any rate increase shall
take effect 30 days after the date of filing or
within any lesser time the commission may
grant, subject to its authority after a hearing to
suspend, alter, or modify that schedule, classifi
cation, practice, or rule.
ihl When the commission suspends a schedule,
classification, practice, or rule, it shall hold a
hearing on the schedule, classification, practice.
or rule before issuing its final order
ici For purposes of this Subsection •-('. anv
schedule, classification, practice, or ru,e 'v\..< in
troduces a service or product not previously •>!-
fered may not result in a rate increase,
if)) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of
this title, whenever a common carrier files with
the commission any schedule, classification,
practice, or rule that does not result in an in
crease in any rate, fare, toll, rental, or charge,
the schedule, classification, practice, or rule shall
take effect 30 days after the date of filing or at
any earlier time the commission may grant, sub
ject to the authority of the commission, after a
hearing, to suspend, alter, or modify the sched
ule, classification, practice, or rule
ib) li) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this title, whenever a common carrier files
with the commission a request for an in
crease in rates, fares, tolls, rentals, or
charges based solely upon cost increases to
the common carrier of fuel supplied by an
independent contractor or independent
source of supply, the requested increase shall
take effect ten days after the filing of the
request with the commission or at any ear
lier time after the filing of the request as the
commission mav by order permit.
(ii) The commission shall order the in
crease to take effect only after a showing has
been made by the common carrier to the
commission that the increase is justified.
(iii) The commission may, after a hearing,
suspend, alter, or modify the increase,
ib") This section does not apply to any rate changes
of an electrical or telephone cooperative that meets
ill of the following requirements:
(a) The cooperative is organized for the pur
pose of either distributing electricity or providing
telecommunication services to its members and
the public at cost, "At cost" includes interest
costs and a reasonable rate of return as deter
mined by the cooperative's board of directors.
(b) The cooperative's board of directors and
any appropriate agency of the federal govern
ment have approved the rate increase or other
rate change and all necessary tariff revisions re
flecting the increased rate or rate change.
(c) Before implementing any rate increases,
the cooperative has held a public meeting for al!
its customers and members. The cooperative
shall mail a notice of the meeting to all of the
^cooperative's customers and members not less
•than ten days prior to the date that the meeting
is held.
Id) The cooperative has filed its tariff revisions
reflecting the rate increase or other rate change
with the commission, who shall make the tariffs
available for public inspection.
(7) Procedures for the implementation of a pro
posed rate increase by a telephone corporation having
bss than 5,000 subscriber access lines are as follows:
(a) li) The proposed rate increase may be
come effective upon the filing of the proposed
tariff revisions and necessary information to
support a determination by the commission
that the proposed rate increase is just and
reasonable.
tii) The telephone corporation shall pro
vide 30 days' notice to the commission and
all potentially affected access line sub
scribers of the proposed rate increase.
lb) d) The commission may investigate
whether the proposed rate increase is just
and reasonable.
(ii) If the commission determines, after
notice and hearing, that the rale increase is
unjust or unreasonable in who.e or in part,
the commission may establish the rates,
charges, ur classifications that it finds to be
just and reasonable.
tc) The commission shall investigate and hold
a hearing to determine whether any proposed
rate increase is just and reasonable if 10% or
more of the telephone corporation's potentially
affected access line subscribers file a request for
agency action requesting an investigation and
hearing, 1989
63-4bb-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Orders.
In formal adjudicative proceedings:
U) Within a reasonable time after the hear
ing, orafter thefiling ofany post-hearing papers
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the
time required by any applicable statute or rule of
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and
issue an order that includes;
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's
findings offact based exclusively on the evi
dence of record in the adjudicative proceed
ings or on facts officially noted;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's
conclusions of law;
(c) a statement ofthe reasons for the pre
siding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by
the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for recon
sideration;
(0 a notice of any right to administrative
or judicial review of the order available to
aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable toany recon
sideration or review.
(2) The presiding officer ma\ use his experi
ence, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
(3) No finding of fact that was contested mav
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
(4) This section does not preclude the presid
ing officer from issuing interim orders to:
la) notify the parties offurther hearings;
(hi notify the parties ofprovisional rulings
on a portion of the issues presented; or
(c) otherwise provide for the fair arid effi
cient conduct oftheadjudicative proceeding.
1988
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica
tive proceedings.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
la) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu
tional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic
tion conferred by any statute;
(ci the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
ie) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro
cedure or decision-making proceFs, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
ib) the agency action is:
d) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency hy statute;
iii i contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iiii contrary to the agency's prior prac
tice, unless the agency justifes the inconsis
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in
consistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. ia««
ADDENDUM B
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH
REPORT AND ORDER
DATED JUNE 19, 1990
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Application
of US WEST COMMUNICATIONS for
Approval of an Incentive Regulation
Plan.
In the Matter of the Investigation
into the Reasonableness of the
Rates and Charges of US WEST
COMMUNICATIONS.
DOCKET NO. 90-049-03
REPORT AND ORDER
DOCKET NO. 90-049-06
JJ?.SUED: June 19 , 1_9_ _9 1
SHORT TITLE
1990 General Rate Case
SYNOPSIS
The Commission herein orders a reduction in revenue require
ment of $19,799,000. The reduction is based on a stipulation by the
parties on all issues except depreciation expense and cost of
capital, which is set by the Commission at 12.2 percent rate of
return en common equity and 10.93 percent rate of return on invest
ment. Revenue requirement reductions ordered in this docket, the sum
of two interim reductions and this final one, total $38,748,000. In
addition, the Commission adopts a proposal to invest in central
office and transport plant and equipment to modernize and upgrade the
network^ The Commission also formulates an "incentive regulation"
plan which, if implemented, would permit the Company to retain a
share of excess earnings, if any, over the allowed rate" of return, as
an incentive to promote more efficient utility operations.
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 2, 1990, US WEST Communications (USWC or the
Company) filed an application with the Commission seeking approval of
an incentive regulation plan. Docket No. 90-049-03 was assigned to
the case. As part of the application, USWC provided a general
description of its proposed plan, which contained both incentive
regulation and network modernization proposals. On March 16, 1990,
the Committee of Consumer Services (Committee) filed a Motion to
Dismiss Application and Strike Docket on the ground that Senate Bill
115, the legislation that enacted Utah Code Ann. Section 54-4-4.1
(1991), had not yet become law. On March 26, 1990, USWC filed its
detailed Utah Incentive Regulation Plan.
On March 28, 1990, the Division of Public Utilities
(Division) filed a Petition in Docket No. 90-049-06 seeking an
investigation into the reasonableness of the rates and charges of
USWC and requesting a hearing to consider an interim rate reduction
of $5.7 million.
On April 27, 1990, the Committee withdrew its Motion to
Dismiss when USWC agreed that its application be deemed to have been
refiled on April 27, 1990. In its Order of May 10, 1990, the
Commission ruled that USWC's application and other pleadings relating
to incentive regulation would be deemed to have been refiled as of
April 27, 1990 without the necessity of actually refiling them. In
the same order, the Commission ordered that Docket Nos. 90-049-03 and
90-049-06 be "consolidated for purposes of hearing only," and
C* f" *""* ••"•'
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established a schedule for filing of testimony and for hearings. The
Commission required that analyses of both the incentive and the
modernization plans consider the current definition of "universal
service" as well as what would be required when the term of a plan
ended. In late April 199 0, the Division and the Committee filed
testimony in support of their requests for an interim decrease. On
May 1, 1990, the Committee filed a motion requesting that the
Commission reduce rates on an interim basis by $16 million. On May
18, 1990, USWC filed responsive testimony regarding the proposed
interim rate decrease. The Division filed supplemental testimony on
May 18 and May 23, 1990, increasing its requested interim decrease to
$8.6 million. Hearings were held on May 24-25, 1990. Following the
hearings, various parties filed briefs summarizing their positions
regarding the proposed interim rate decrease. On June 22, 1990, the
Commission ordered an interim rate decrease of $10.65 million, based
on a 1989 test year, 11.8 percent return on equity, and adjustments
consistent with those ordered in Docket No. 88-049-07. The
Commission also determined that the standards for interim rate
decreases and increases need not be the same.
On June 29, 1990, USWC filed its direct testimony on
incentive regulation issues, as well as amendments to its proposed
Utah Incentive Regulation Plan. On July 12, 1990, the Commission
issued its order amending the schedule. On July 20, 1990, parties
(other than USWC) filed position statements on incentive regulation
issues. on August 14, 1990, the Commission issued its Second Amended
Scheduling Order revising some of the filing and hearing dates. On
J t'VT n --. —
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August 27, 1990, various parties filed their preliminary revenue
requirement calculations. On September 8-9, 1990, the Second Amended
Scheduling Order was published in the Salt Lake Tribune and the
Deseret News. In early October 1990, various parties filed testimony
on rate of return and capital structure issues.
On October 24, 1990, all parties filed testimony in
response to USWC's proposed incentive regulation plan. On October
30, 1990, USWC, the Division, the Committee, and AT&T entered a
Stipulation and Joint Motion on Revenue Requirement Issues, resolving
most revenue requirement issues, and calling for a further interim
reduction of $8,238 million to be implemented January 1, 1991. On
October 31, 1990, James L. Barker, representing himself and six other
interveners, filed a Request for Declaratory Order challenging the
constitutionality of 54-4-4.1, the statute that enables the
Commission to adopt earnings sharing plans like the one proposed by
USWC. On November 1, 1990, the Commission issued its Third Amended
Scheduling Order. On November 23, 1990, the Commission issued its
Fourth Amended Scheduling Order in which it ordered parties to
consider the effects of demand for service on depreciation, and
stated that the determination of revenue requirement must address the
persistence of overearnings. In addition, the Commission ordered
that the interim rate reduction be spread on an equal percentage
basis to residence and business local exchange services, toll, and
switched access, excluding nonrecurring charges, and stated the
Commission's determination of its authority to order investments to
upgrade the system. On November 26, 1990, the parties filed rebuttal
A
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testimony on rate of return and capital structure issues. On
December 4, 1990, pursuant to the request of the Company, the
Commission issued a Revised Public Notice of Hearing, which was
published in the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News on December
8-19, 1990, and which was mailed directly to all persons and entities
who had filed letters with the Commission indicating an interest in
incentive regulation and network modernization issues. On December
8, 1990, the parties filed surrebuttal testimony on rate of return
and capital structure issues. On December 17-19, 1990, the
Commission held hearings on the Stipulation and Joint Motion on
Revenue Requirement and on rate of return and capital structure
issues. By order issued January 3, 1991, the Commission approved the
Stipulation pursuant to its terms. On January 11, 1991, the parties
filed briefs on rate of return and capital structure issues. On
January 16, 1991, all parties filed rebuttal testimony on incentive
regulation issues. On January 18, 1991, the parties filed testimony
on depreciation represcription issues. Also on January 18, 1991,
several parties filed briefs and motions responding to Mr. Barker's
Request for Declaratory Order. On January 22, 1991, the parties
filed direct testimony on rate design issues. In late January and
early February 1991, various witnesses filed additional testimony on
depreciation represcription issues. The Commission held a hearing on
February 3, 1991 on depreciation represcription. Also on February 8,
1991, Mr. Barker filed a Reply Memorandum regarding the
constitutional issues. On February 15, 1991, the parties filed
surrebuttal testimony on incentive regulation issues and rebuttal
i• ,<-> r- «;> -f' l*f
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testimony on rate design issues. On February 22, 1991, the
Commission issued an order dismissing Mr. Barker's Request for
Declaratory Order. Hearings on incentive regulation and rate design
issues commenced on February 28, 1991 and concluded on March 13,
1991.
On April 19, 1991, USWC, the Division and the Committee
filed position statements regarding disputed issues relating to the
Stipulation and Joint Motion on Revenue Requirement Issues. On April
26, 1991, the same parties filed responsive position statements. On
May 1, 1991, USWC moved that the Commission accept the position
statements as evidence in this proceeding and sought oral argument.
On May 15, 1991, USWC, the Division and the Committee presented oral
argument on the disputed issues relating to the Stipulation and the
position statements were accepted as evidence in this proceeding.
II. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS
WITH RESPECT TO REVENUE REQUIREMENT
A. STIPULATION
On October 30, 1990, the parties entered into a
Stipulation that was intended to resolve all revenue requirement
issues except depreciation and cost of capital, which were reserved
for later hearing. Following hearings on December 17th, the
Commission adopted the Stipulation by order issued January 3, 1991.
The October Stipulation was based on the first six
months of 1990 actual results of intrastate operations then available
and the Company's budget estimates for the calendar year 1990.
'-0153G3
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Attached to the Stipulation was a Joint Exhibit in which 32
adjustments to actual results were identified. The value of 23 of
the adjustments were to be held fixed, including the June 22, 1990
interim rate reduction, and the value of the remaining nine
adjustments were to be updated when actuals for all 12 months of 1990
became known. The intent of the signatory parties to rely on the
Stipulation as crafted and to exclude consideration of further
adjustments is made clear in paragraphs six and seven of the
Stipulation.
The Stipulation is a negotiated settlement of revenue
requirement issues, as distinct from each party advancing its own
interest through discovery and hearing, in an adversarial way, on
every single issue. Negotiation is a process of compromise in the
interest of reaching an end result that each party is able to accept.
The Commission has criticized this process of bargaining and
compromise before, because it leaves the Commission unaware of
important details. The Commission knows only outcomes. In addition,
and perhaps most importantly, some issues have been "decided" in the
course of the negotiations without having been brought to the
Commission's attention. Therefore, the Commission has been reluctant
to accept stipulations in recent major cases, and, where stipulation
seemed the prudent course, has sought to confine them to purely
technical as distinct from policy issues.
In the current docket, stipulation was entertained as
the reasonable course in order to free up Company and regulatory
resources to deal with the Company's incentive and modernization
i .r\ - *> '• Q
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proposals. Also, it seemed revenue requirement issues, according to
the parties, could be resolved in conformance with Commission
decisions rendered in the previous, recently concluded Docket No.
88-049-07. Since the issues were not to be reargued, the policy
aspect was removed, and resolution would be on technical grounds.
It is in this context that, later in the docket
proceedings, parties began to argue the meaning of the Stipulation's
limitation on updates and adjustments of test year data. USWC
proposed four new adjustments to test year data, on issues the other
signatory parties had not seen at the time the Stipulation was signed
and which had the effect of increasing revenue requirement. The
Division then sought to update several of the 23 adjustments which
the Stipulation said could not be updated and which had the effect of
decreasing revenue requirement. The Committee argued that the plain
meaning of the Stipulation prevented either the introduction of new
adjustments or the updating of fixed adjustments, and urged the
Commission to reject them both.
The Commission could not have been presented a more
penetrating example of the problematic nature of stipulations. Here,
signatory parties could not agree what their own words meant, and
seized this dispute as an opportunity to advance their own interests
on what otherwise might have been reasonable grounds. USWC argued
its proposed new adjustments were of the sort routinely permitted in
the normal fashioning of a test year. With the full 12 months of
1990 actual results of operations information in hand, the Division
0^ *' O r\--> \J J kJ
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argued the superiority of these "actuals" to the budget information
upon which the Stipulation was based.
When the Commission accepted the Stipulation on January
3, 1991, the nature of the document as a compromise based on the best
information then available to the parties was clearly understood.
That each party must have given up something in signing the
Stipulation,, and might on some issues have argued differently if
cfiven the chance in an adversarial proceeding, goes without saying;
that is the very purpose of negotiation in a settlement conference.
It is what is meant by stipulation. Parties cannot now come back to
the Commission and attempt to redefine things to their own advantage.
To do so places the Commission at an unacceptable disadvantage and
severely compromises case proceedings. The record does not contain
full examination of contested issues. The Division has not audited
the 1990 information and neither the Division nor the Committee can
state what, except for the agreement reached in the Stipulation
itself, the test year would ideally be.
There has also been some discussion about what the
parties could, did, or should have understood was contemplated by the
Stipulation. At this point in time, all that is important is what
the Commission understood to be stipulated to by the parties at the
time it accepted the Stipulation. None of the adjustments now argued
for by USWC or the Division were considered open issues by the
Commission. On this basis, the Commission has two choices. The
Stipulation can be accepted without alteration except as specifically
permitted by its terms, or the case record can be reopened ^fp;r_%
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receipt of further information intended to redefine the test year.
Reopening the record is not acceptable. To do so would be tantamount
to beginning the revenue requirement determination anew. There is no
doubt that each moment's delay in reducing rates costs ratepayers
money. This the Commission cannot countenance. Therefore, the
Commission concludes the Stipulation must be accepted essentially
unaltered. Parties are, as always, free to bring a new action to
further examine rates as soon as this order is final.
The Commission finds that the new adjustments proposed
by the Company are not permitted by the terms of the Stipulation and
are therefore rejected. The Commission finds that the updates
proposed by the Division are not permitted by the terms of the
Stipulation and are likewise rejected.
There exists one remaining dispute regarding the
interpretation of the Stipulation, that being the treatment of the
June interim rate reduction. On June 22, 1990, the Commission
ordered that rates be reduced to achieve a revenue reduction cf
$10,655,000 pending a final order establishing permanent rates in
this proceeding. As implemented the interim reduction totalled
$10,711,000 effective June 22, 1990, for local exchange service, July
1, 1990, for 800 and OutWATS services, and July 18, 1990, for message
toll and switched access services. In the Stipulation the parties
have agreed to properly annualize and normalize 1990 actual revenues
to reflect the realized $10,711,000 revenue decrease on a prospective
annual bas is.
. ",f~ n <". n
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What is in dispute is the method by which the interim
reduction is to be annualized. The Company interpreted the
Stipulation to mean that the total $10.7 million be removed from
actual 19 90 revenues as if the reduction had been in place for the
entire year as shown in the Joint Exhibit attached to the
Stipulation. The Division and the Committee interpreted the
Stipulation to mean that the method of annualization should reflect
the mid-year timing of the reduction and that the $10.7 million shown
in the Joint Exhibit was to illustrate the parties' agreement to the
total reduction to be considered as the basis for annualization. In
order to fully reflect the realized $10,711,000 revenue reduction on
a prospective, annualized basis as agreed to by the parties, the
Commission finds that actual 1990 revenues need to be reduced by
$5,080,000 to account for the mid-year timing of the interim
reduction and thereby remove the impact of the higher rates in effect
only during the first half of 1990.
B. DEPRECIATION
On November 23, 1990, USWC submitted its triennial
depreciation study to both the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and this Commission. This study proposed changes in the
projection-lives and future-net-salvage parameters previously
approved by the Commission in 1988. In conjunction with the rate
case and the Incentive Regulation Plan, the Commission requested that
the Division review the study and report to the Commission with
recommendations. Following its review of the study, the Division
* ;"\ ~ *? •-> o
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conducted an audit and held discussions with USWC's corporate staff
in Denver.
On January 18, 1991, USWC filed direct testimony and on
February 5, 1990, rebuttal testimony detailing the depreciation rates
for the three-year period January 1, 1991 through December 31, 1993.
This study involved a detailed examination of historical data coupled
with expert evaluation of the plans, trends, developments and other
factors that impact on the future life expectancy of existing plant
and equipm.ent.
The Company, through witness Jerry D. Harris, testified
that the depreciation study was prepared in conformance with
extensive depreciation study guidelines established by the FCC. The
study process required an extensive analysis of each depreciable
plant account to determine the appropriate projection life, future
net salvage and retirement curve shape which constituted depreciation
rate parameters.
The Company proposed to increase its annual Utah
intrastate depreciation expense by $7,391,000.
The Division submitted its analysis of the depreciation
study to the Commission through testimony filed by Division witness
Larry Fuller. The Divis ion recommended two alternative equi pr.ent
life and depreciation expense proposals. The first alternative was
based on "business as usual" absent the modernization proposal and
would decrease intrastate depreciation expense by $9,337,000
annually. The second alternative included changes that would be
justified if the Commission approved the modernization plan with or
i .'> "Z ^ ~ A
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without an Incentive Regulation Plan. This alternative would result
in a decrease in intrastate depreciation expense of $4,441,000
annually.
The Committee filed testimony by Michael Arndt
providing comments concerning USWC's 1991 Utah depreciation rate
study and recommended a decrease in the annual intrastate
depreciation expense of $7,151,000 annually.
The Commission heard testimony on February 6, 1991
concerning the differences in equipment service lives and deprecia
tion philosophies recommended by the different parties.
USWC stated that the purpose of depreciation is to
recover the capital investment of the Company over the useful life of
the investment and that such recovery is accomplished by the proper
estimation of expected lives of the assets.
The Division stated that the first objective of the
depreciation review is to establish depreciation rates based on Utah-
specific evaluations of the projected service lives of the various
existing equipment investment accounts. A secondary objective is to
establish overall annual depreciation expenses that would help
synchronize investment requirements for future equipment that will be
replacing the existing equipment.
The Committee proposed that the depreciation rates the
Commission approves be applied to the Company's average 1990 plant
investment. Use of the 1990 average depreciable plant investment
would produce the necessary matching of revenues, expenses and
investment for the 1990 test year.
.. ... . <JD
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Considerable testimony on depreciation represcription
was directed towards the correct interpretation of depreciation
accounting. The Committee asserted that depreciation expense
constitutes customer contributed capital. The Company argued and
presented evidence that depreciation expense is an accounting
mechanism to recover investors' funds for capital expenditures. The
Commission agrees with the Company's definition of depreciation
accounting. However, this Commission determines depreciation policy.
In past decisions, the Commission has granted shorter asset lives and
thereby increased depreciation expense. One result of this policy
has been to protect the Company from the risks of technological
obsolescence. Another has been to enhance the Company's positive
cash flow thus enabling it to continue to expand and modernize the
Utah infrastructure. The Commission finds that there is an implied
relationship between its depreciation policy and its expectations for
prudent and economic future investments.
The Commission finds that the Division's proposed
depreciation parameters and associated depreciation rates consistent
with the proposed Modernization Plan should be applied for the
purpose of determining test year revenue requirement. Booking of the
new depreciation expenses shall be ordered retroactively to January
1, 1991. In the future, the Commission will require the use of
average plant balances for the purpose of computing depreciation
expense.
( ,-> — <'« -i rs
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C. COST OF CAPITAL
1. COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL
Witnesses for USWC, the Division, and the Committee
presented equity cost of capital testimony in this docket.
Testifying for USWC, Peter C. Cummings placed equity cost at 14.5 -
15.0 percent, and argued that a finding in favor of the incentive
form of regulation necessitated the addition of 50 basis points or an
equity return award at the high end of the range. A second company
witness, Dr. Roger A. Morin, generally supported Mr. Cummings'
position, but in final testimony estimated equity cost as 13.5 - 14.0
percent. Dr. George Compton, witness for the Division, gave a range
of ll.l -11.6 percent as that within which the cost of equity might,
depending upon the assumptions chosen, reasonably be found. The
Committee's witness, Dr. Matityahu Marcus, related his estimate of
equity cost directly to the capital structure used in the proceeding:
11.3 percent, if USWC's; 11.8 percent, if USW Inc.'s.
Witness Cummings developed his equity cost estimate by
analyzing three groups of companies, which he selected to be
comparable to USWC, using the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) models. He argued in favor of the
CAPM approach, and checked his results for reasonableness by
comparing them with returns associated with the S & p 500 (slightly
higher, as would be expected given a utility's lcwer risk), and with
USW Inc.'s cost of new debt. Since the latter is approximately 10
percent, an equity return four to five percentage points higher is
reasonable, he asserted. Moreover, issuance costs should be included
•" o ^ 9 "i i7
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in the equity return award. Though he agreed that capital costs in
general have declined since the last equity award, and even since
direct testimony was filed in this docket, the witness argued that
other relevant factors supported his higher estimate. His claim that
incentive regulation, if adopted, would necessitate the addition of
50 basis points, owed to his conclusion that increased risk would be
incurred by USWC (the result of the changed nature of regulation and
the agreement by the Company not to seek rate increases). According
to the witness, sole reliance should not be placed on the results of
a DCF analysis because at the current time the technique uniformly
gives results that are too low. One possible reason, he asserted, is
the failure of current market price of common equity stock to
adequately reflect the future value of USW Inc's cellular business.
A key point in the witness's analysis is the use of nonregulated
firms in samples of alleged comparability. This, he asserted, is a
legal requirement arising under the Hone and Bluefield decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court. He did not dispute, however, that the return
awarded in the last docket, 11.8 percent, had been sufficient to
permit, as legally required under these decisions, the Company to
raise capital at reasonable rates. The. witness did acknowledge that
the Company is close to 100 percent internally financed, owing
largely to depreciation and deferred tax sources. He also
acknowledged that USWC has lower risk than its parent, USW Inc.
The second rate of return witness for the Company, Dr.
Morin, asserted that several methods, and not simply the DCF, must be
used to estimate equity cost. Thus, he applied risk premium, CAPM,
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and DCF methods to sample companies. A particular point he made was
the difficulty of estimating the dividend growth rate, the variable
'g' in the DCF formula at moments, such as the present, of unusual
economic conditions. According to the witness, the DCF may under- or
over-estimate the cost of capital when interest rates are moving
strongly; hence, its results should be evaluated in the context of
other models' results. When the results from several models cluster
closely around a particular value, a good indication of equity cost
is obtained; but when, as in this case, the results of DCF
applications are at variance, he asserted, the analyst should
question whether the model's assumptions adequately reflect current
conditions. They do not, he contended. Emerging competition and a
tendency toward deregulation are putting telecommunication utilities
in a different risk category than electric and natural gas utilities,
he stated, making them more like industrials generally. He agreed
with Mr. Cummings that USWC is a less risky entity than its parent,
USW Inc., however. Sample firms to be used to estimate equity cost
for the utility must be selected on the basis of comparable risk, and
for this purpose no single measure of risk is alone sufficient,
according to the witness. Selection of sample firms is therefore a
difficult analytical task, but this is no reason simply to rely on
telecommunication companies—the seven regional holding companies—
alone, he said. Doing so is defective analysis owing to inherent
circularity of reasoning involved, according to Dr. Morin. Because
of this and his assertion that utilities are now more like
industrials as to characteristics of risk, Dr. Morin based his equity
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cost estimate on a sample composed equally of regional holding
companies and industrials.
Dr. Compton, witness for the Division, stressed the
point that all evidence showed a decline in capital costs since the
last rate case. Based on his analysis, a return on equity award in
this docket should not be higher than the 11.8 percent currently
allowed, the range of reasonable estimates now being 11.1 - 11.6
percent. His explanation for why this is 300 and more basis points
below Company witnesses' recommendations lies generally in the degree
of emphasis placed upon the DCF model and the analysis of risk
supporting choice of comparable firms. Dr. Compton stated that
comparability of risk is indicated by similarity of results obtained
from DCF analysis, and questioned the wisdom of relying on the risk
measure 'beta' as company witnesses had done. He indicated the role
played by beta in portfolio analysis, distinguishing this from the
task of selecting comparable firms fcr rate of return estimation.
The witness supported inclusion of flotation costs in theory and, as
to the appropriate version of the DCF model to use, supported one
that incorporates the quarterly dividend adjustment. He did not,
however, alter his final recommendation to account for either of
these because, in his opinion, they were offset by other factors.
Testifying for the Committee, Dr. Marcus directly
related his equity cost recommendation to capital structure, arguing
that USWC is less risky than its parent, USW Inc., as is its capital
structure. Thus, if USWC's capital structure is employed, the proper
equity return is 11.3 percent, he stated, whereas, if the capital
m't .; r-, o
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structure is to be the parent's, equity return should be 11.8. His
recommendation is that USWC's capital structure and equity return are
what is at issue in this proceeding and, since both can be estimated,
adequately, they are what should be considered. Hence, the
appropriate equity award is 11.3 percent. Dr. Marcus employed the
DCF model and argued this is appropriate for a company like USW,
which is one of the 50 largest in the U.S., is a stable entity
because the bulk of its revenues is from telecommunications
operations, and is continuously analyzed by at least a dozen security
analysts. It is the sort of company for which there are no directly
comparable firms, he stated. In fact, owing to the points
enumerated, direct observation is appropriate; there is no compelling
need to seek proxies, he testified. Comparable companies cannot be
selected on the basis of a single risk measure like beta, as Company
witnesses had done, in any event, according to Dr. Marcus. Other
risk measures, including those employed by Dr. Morin, give different
results, thus requiring the exercise of judgment by the witness. He
argued beta is unreliable if used to select comparable firms. In
particular, the beta indication that telecommunications utilities are
riskier than natural gas and electric utilities, as asserted by Dr.
Morin on the basis largely of his beta analysis, cannot stand, said
Or. Marcus. He asserted, moreover, that the difference between
regulated utilities and unregulated industrials is a critical one
that cannot be ignored in the selection of comparable firms. Dr.
Marcus did not support inclusion of issuance costs in an equity
return award for this company because the Company issues stock at
'-•.: 1C 1
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prices well above book value, benefitting existing shareholders by an
amount greater than such costs might be. Regulators set return based
on book value, he stated, and book value had gone up. Moreover, the
facts alone do not justify allowance for issuance costs, according to
the witness, if only because such costs apply to the sale of common
equity in the market. The Company, by contrast, can finance
internally, and, as a supporting point, no evidence shows such costs
were transferred to USWC at divestiture. Nothing at this time
suggests the DCF model cannot be relied upon, he averred, and
arguments to the contrary are misleading if based on the notion that
things are in flux, for in fact, things are always in flux. There is
also evidence for the proposition that the DCF may now be overvaluing
equity cost, given Company witnesses' testimony that the market may
be undervaluing stock price. This is at least as credible as these
witnesses' assertion that the DCF-determined equity cost is too low,
according to Dr. Marcus.
The Commission believes it necessary to estimate the
costs of equity of USWC, the regulated utility, not USW Inc., the
parent corporation, though analysts may focus on USW Inc. as the
entity which issues common stock. All witnesses agree that USWC is
not as risky as USW Inc., and this fact, considered alone, argues for
an equity award lower than would be indicated by an analysis of USW.
Dr. Marcus, for example, quantifies this risk difference at 50 basis
Domts .
When the DCF analysis is performed consistently and in
line with our discussions and decisions in recent orders, it becomes
DOCKET NO. 90-049-03 and 06
-2 4-
difficult to argue for an equity award much above the existing 11.8
percent arises. There is no ambiguity about the fact that,
"hroughout the economy, since the last USWC rate case, capital costs
have trended downward. This trend has meant that all witnesses
reduced their recommendations between the filing of direct testimony
and the close of the hearing, a short time later. Nor does this
case, in spite of the efforts of Company witnesses, produce new
evidence or persuasive argument to convince us to revise our negative
views of the capital asset pricing model and risk premium approaches
to estimation of equity cost. Moreover, the Company's argument that
reliance on a DCF analysis to estimate the cost of equity must
produce, under current circumstances in the industry and economy, an
unreasonable result, fails on this record. This is the case princi
pally because their analysis of comparable companies was not convinc
ing. The determination of risk similarity, which is the heart of the
approach, was not adequate.
Were this a complete summary of our conclusions, a
return award at, or, more probably, below the current allowed return
would be inescapable. But the fact is, near term conditions in the
industry and the economy are quite unsettled. We have on this
record, for example, expert witness opinions that are diametrically
opposed. Company witnesses have argued that the DCF underestimates
equity cost because the model cannot be relied upon during times of
strong interest rate movement and because the market has not yet
properly valued the future potential of a present Company position in
cellular. The Committee witness, on the other hand, testified that
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the DCF might be producing a cost of equity estimate that is too
high, if the opinion of Company executives that the market currently
undervalues USW's common stock is reliable.
Expert witness disagreement is not unusual. But where
performance of common stock in the market is so critical to the
analysis, the lack of agreement as to future direction--not
magnitude--of change is notable. This difference of opinion seems
rooted in appraisals of general conditions in the economy; that is,
where things now stand in relation to the business cycle, and how the
market price of USW Inc.'s common stock can be expected to move with
respect to it. These appraisals are decidedly different. The
Commission is aware that utility stock price movements bear a
relationship to interest rate changes. Should interest rates go up
in the near future, as may be the case if the attention of policy
makers shifts from recession to inflation, the market price of
utility common stock, ether things being equal, would tend to fall
and the cost of equity to rise.
Too much should not be made of such speculation, not
least because no coherent form of it appears on the record--though it
is generally acknowledged that utility comm.cn stock prices and
interest rates vary inversely. The testimony of Company witnesses
stands for the proposition that this relationship is weakening as
telecommunications firms begin to look more like industrials. But
their point is disputed. It does, however, focus attention, and
quite properly, on uncertainty, the basic problem a cost of capital
witness must confront. Any model employed has its principal value in
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providing a structure by which uncertainty can be managed. This
value derives mainly from a consensus among experts that the model is
useful and produces results that can be relied upon. For example, in
the DCF, the growth component, 'g', cannot be known with certainty,
but the model gives an acceptable way of estimating it. The DCF
permits an evaluation of market price on the basis of the future flow
of dividends and the investors' required rate of return (estimated,
of course) ; the problem of estimating 'g' is to infer what growth
rate in dividends is currently being expected by investors. But by
one technique of analysis or another, each model permits its user to
grapple with the uncertainty of the future, and to do so in ways that
have been found acceptable.
The Commission's task is to estimate the investors'
required rate of return. The models used by witnesses present a
range of estimates of the cost of- equity capital. Required rate of
return and cost of equity capital may differ for several reasons,
including the allowance of flotation costs, adjustments for manage
ment performance, and other factors. In this docket, the Commission
finds the required return exceeds the cost of capital estimate
produced by mechanical application of the DCF model.
Estimating investors' required return is an exercise of
informed judgment. At its heart, the problem is placed in an
uncertain future, where many things, both known and unknown, affect
outcomes. The problem is complex and subtle. Mathematical models
are a guide and a framework for thinking about the problem, but are
no substitute for the exercise of informed judgment. Ungualified
; -', - <••,• h
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reliance on model results would be misplaced. For example, it is
easily shown on the record in this docket that the DCF may, under
present circumstances, both over- and underestimate equity cost.
Even so, the Commission regards it as more reliable than the CAPM and
risk premium approaches, but acknowledges the effort of Company
witnesses to discredit the DCF and to elevate CAPM and risk premium.
The key to the return on equity decision is an award
which adequately compensates investors for willingness to bear risk.
Our knowledge of the determinants of, measurement of, and implica
tions of risk assessment, is, on this record, incomplete. Part of
the reason is to be found in the nature of the problem, as discussed
previously, and part in the failure of the record to contain a
complete and coherent examination. The record, instead, contains
expert testimony on various aspects of risk in relation to return,
but only disputes on how well it has been measured. This is particu
larly evident in the comparable firms entanglement. A sample of
firms selected on the basis of one risk measure, such as beta, is
unreasonable, and the more so where other allegedly supplemental
measures the analyst may have employed seem to confound choice rather
than to clarify it. The Commission finds that no single measure of
risk can be sufficient to establish the risk comparability of firms.
The U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Hope and Bluefield,
cited by witnesses cannot reasonably be read to require comparison of
a regulated utility with non-regulated firms. These entities are so
unlike one another that, whatever the merit of attempting to escape
circular reasoning, the difficulties in establishing risk
., , 'JO
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comparability have not been overcome on this record. The Commission
finds that this task has not been accomplished, and, were it a
straightforward requirement of the Court, as Company witnesses seem
to assert, no decision could be made unless the record were
supplemented. This, the Commission rejects. On one point,, however,
the record is clear. Attraction of capital under reasonable terms is
a test articulated by these Court decisions. A return on equity
decision must be compatible with it. Evidence is uncontroverted that
the Company has been able to attract capital favorably with the 11.8
percent return on equity awarded in the previous docket.
Through testimony, USWC has attempted to liken itself
to an unregulated company, loosely fitting the market's 'industrials'
category. This effort has failed. The Commission draws this
conclusion even though recognizing that the telecommunications
industry is changing in significant ways. Such changes have yet to
disturb the essential characteristics of USWC as a regulated provider
of essential services in this jurisdiction: the well known aspects
of a monopoly position'in the relevant market, the trust relationship
between utility and consumers, and the imposed constraints upon both
prices charged for services and rate of return. As conditions
change, tae Commission may, in future dockets, conclude otherwise.
Without dispute,, capital costs have declined since the
previous rate of return decision of 11.8 percent, and even since the
filing of direct testimony. Taken alone, this would argue for
reduction in allowed return. But other compelling factors have a
role to play. The record on risk-return comparability, while not
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complete, on balance suggesting increasing risk; the questioned
reliability of model results during unsettled moments in the economy
and industry; the large, even contrary, di fference in results
obtained by witnesses for the Company compared with witness Compton
for the Division using CAPM; the knowledge that the utility nay to a
degree be shedding certain utility characteristics; and the ambiguous
record on expected behavior of stock price, are all influential
considerations which must be evaluated in the context of a wide range
of cost of equity results obtained by witness application of models.
The Commission concludes there is no reason to grant an award at the
upper end of the range, and indeed there are reasons why this would
be error. The Commission is convinced a reduction in the current
equity return, though advocated by witnesses for the Committee and
the Division, would likewise be in error, given the risk implications
of the changing industry and the status of the general economy in
relation thereto.
The Company repeatedly stressed that its discretionary
investment decisions are driven by profitability considerations,
meaning in part that economic analysis, or business case analysis, is
employed to rank alternatives. Implied at tines and explicit at
times was the message that jurisdictional rate of return allowed bv
commissions could be the determining factor. The rate of return on
equity in Utah is 11.8 per cent, the lowest in the 14-state USWC
service territory. The Company's witnesses labeled that rate
unreasonable and made the connection between it and discretionary
investment a imod for the state.
* - f\
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It is the fact that the earned rate of return on
equity, as distinct from what is allowed, in Utah is among the
highest in the 14 states, and has been so in recent years. The
Company, however, argued that expected rate of return, based on
allowed not past actual rate of return, is what is related to
investment decisions. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that in the
recent past when the allowed rate of return in Utah was among the
highest, no discernably different pattern of discretionary investment
decisions affecting Utah appeared. The Commission concludes that
aistorical evidence does not reveal a clear relationship between
either allowed or earned rate of return on equity on the one hand and
the amount of discretionary investment in the state on the other.
Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges the logic of
the relationship between rate of return and investment
decisionmaking. Regulation presumes a reasonable management. This
is a time when states are in a sense competing for high-tech
additions to and refinements of telecommunications pi ant and
equipment. The Commission concludes that it is prudent to take these
considerations into account when determining rate of return.
Together, they argue for an addition to the cost of capital estimate
produced by models.
The Commission is concerned enough with the factors
enumerated in the discussion to raise the allowed return on equity
capital to 12.2 percent from the existing 11.8, and finds this return
to be reasonable.
:;o
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2. CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Because debt is cheaper than equity, and interest
expense on debt is tax deductible, the higher the debt ratio, other
things being equal, the lower the cost of capital. The trade off is
that increases in the debt ratio increase financial risk. It could
be said that management should employ as much debt as is prudent,
given this trade off, while regulators must be sure that too much
equity is not employed in order to prevent an increase in the cost of
capital that could be harmful to ratepayers. Company witnesses
argued that because business risk is increasing, the debt ratio must
be decreased in order to maintain bond ratings. A lower debt ratio
decreases financial risk, maintains bond rating and protects
shareholders. But the lower debt (higher equity) ratio costs
ratepayers more, other things being equal, by increasing the cost of
capital. This appears on this record to be true even though a higher
bond rating reduces the cost of financing. Clearly, at least in
principle, there is a financially prudent capital structure which
could be employed for ratemaking purposes that would yield the lowest
cost for ratepayers.
The proper composition of the capital structure for
ratemaking purposes is one issue before the Commission in this
docket. A related issue, whether to use USWC's or USW Inc's capital
structure, captured equally as much attention. Neither is hypo
thetical, but the equity return recommendations may vary according to
the choice since financial risk differs.
r:..;.:o
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As pointed out in previous discussion, all witnesses
acknowledged that USWC is a less risky entity than USW (lower
business risk). Moreover, USW's capital structure risk (financial
risk) is greater. The equity ratio is 60.4 percent for USWC, while
for USW it is 48.2 percent. Company witnesses argued in favor of
employing USWC's capital structure to determine overall cost of
capital. A strong capital structure—more eguity, in adverse times
assures an acceptable bond rating (preferably AA), thus protecting
both shareholder and ratepayer interests, they stated. Company
witness Morin also argued that the equity ratio advocated by the
Company is similar to that of peer companies; otherwise he would
recommend use of a hypothetical capital structure. Committee witness
Marcus testified that the variation in equity ratios between the two
structures had not existed in previous rate cases, when in fact the
ratios had been almost the same. He speculated that the divergence
might be a transitional phenomenon, which should, with Commission
encouragement (a lower equity award), disappear. Witness Marcus
urged the Commission to be aware of the parent company's ability to
control the amount of equity in the capital structure, of USWC, a
wholly owned subsidiary. Witness Compton generally supported use of
"JSWC's capital structure, asserting that an equity ratio of approxi
mately 60 percent is not unexpectedly high. He noted that a hypo
thetical structure with 55 percent equity would be acceptable and
called attention to the lack of preferred stock in the capital
structure though it is usually found in that of the energy utilities.
In total the equity share may only appear high, and, therefore, Dr.
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Compton supported maintenance of a AA bond rating, which he
associated with the higher equity ratio.
No witness advanced a hypothetical capital structure in
this docket. Each was confident that an actual capital structure,
either USWC's or USW Inc.'s, could, with justification, be employed.
In this case, the Commission finds that the weight of the evidence
supports a higher equity ratio found in the USWC capital structure.
As with the equity award decision, there are compelling arguments
that this is an unsettled time, that business risk may be increasing,
and that bond ratings may bo jeopardized by a low equity ratio. All
witnesses supported use of USWC's capital structure for determination
of the overall rate of return. Witness Marcus, however, did tie his
recommended equity return to the capital structure—11.3 percent if
USWC's; 11.8, if USW Inc.'s—to alert management that the Commission
should tolerate a divergence in the two capital structures only for
a short period of time. The Commission finds that USWC's capital
structure, composed of 60.4 percent equity and 39.6 percent debt, is
reasonable for purposes of determining the overall rate of return to
be granted in this docket. At the allowed equity return of 12.2
percent, this produces an allowed overall rate of return of 10.93
percent.
D. SUMMARY
The actual 1990 intrastate results of operations as
well as the positions of the parties with respect to the
determination of revenue requirement are summarized and presented in
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Table 1 below. The unadjusted actual 1990 results excluding imputed
directory revenues show the Company earned a rate of return on equity
equal to 13.35 percent, exceeding the 11.80 percent allowed rate of
return on equity used to establish the rates in effect during 1990.
The Company's interpretation of the October Stipulation
and its recommended adjustment to depreciation expenses had the
effect of reducing the rate of return on equity expected to be earned
during the test period to 11.33 percent. Given its recommended 13.5
percent allowed rate of return on equity, the Company had proposed to
increase revenues by $9,804,000.
The effect of the Division's and the Committee's
adjustments was to raise the rate of return on equity expected to be
earned in the test period to 16.57 percent and 17.19 percent,
respectively. Given an 11.35 percent allowed rate of return on
equity, the midpoint of the range recommended by Division witness
Compton, the Division had proposed to decrease revenues by
$23,434,000. Given an 11.30 percent allowed rate of return on
equity, recommended by Committee witness Marcus for the US West
Communications capital structure, the Committee had proposed to
decrease revenues by $26,527,000.
The Commission's findings with respect to the
Stipulation and adjustment to depreciation expenses result in
increasing to 16.58 percent the rate of return expected to be earned
in the test period. Given the Commission finding of a 12.20 percent
allowed rate of return on equity, the Commission finds that revenues
should be reduced by $19,799,000.
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TABLE 1
REVENUE REQUIREMENT
Summary of the PoS.tioiih of tin; I'arties
and Commission Decision
1000 Utah Intrastate Results of Operations
Test Period ($000)
1990
Actual
(Exel. Directory
Revenues] Company Division Committee Commission
315,730 3 •3,037 320,00 J 3:"(,;G8 319,208
252,016 253,1-13 240,075 237,491 240,109
10,427 12,172 17,LM1 10,752 15,742
-135 51 200 _4,"3 -4n3
53,1r.8 48,373 02.593 <;-;,504 02,SO4
457,107 404,800 401,073 403,120 403,126
11.63% l'l 41% 13 50'"".
13.35% 11.33% 16 54%
11.80% 13.50% 11.35%
10.69% 11.71% 10 41%
30,804 (523 434 1
13.94 g 13.57\-c
17.15% 10 5 7 %
11 30% 12 20%
in 38% 10 93%
;5- 52-) ;j:o,7oo)
Absent the two interim rate decreases of this docket,
revenues in the test period would be $338,217,000. With the Juno 22,
1990 interim reduction of $10,711,000, the January 1, 1991 interim
reduction of $8,233,000, and the final decrease of $19,799,000, test:
period revenues will have been decreased by a total of $33,748,000 to
$299,469,000, representing an 11.4 percent decrease in prospective
rates as a result of this docket. The Commission also notes the 1990
test period revenue requirement is about 6 percent lower than the
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1988 test period revenue requirement of $319,047,000 found in Docket
No. 88-049-07, despite the growth in access lines and minutes of use
during that period.
HI- DISCUSSION. FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO
REVENUE SPREAD AND RATE_DESIGN
A- COST-OF-SERVICE
I- BACKCROUND AND OVERVTEW
Since divestiture in 1934, the Commission has accorded a
rising priority to cost-of-service studies in ratemaking decisions.
There have been three general rate cases since divestiture, Docket
Nos. 84-049-01, 85-049-02 and 88-049-07. In both Docket Nos. 84-049-
01 and 85-049-02, the Commission stated that the relationship between
cost incurrence and service provision was inadequately explored and
the respective records were inadequate for pricing decisions. As a
consequence, the Division was requested to provide the Commission
with telephone cost-of-service studies.
In Docket No. 88-04 9-07, the Division submitted its
cost-of-service model, termed DCOS, for its fi rst review by the
Commission. DCOS was created ovor a tvo-yo.ir period from the
Company's 1987 prototype Management Marketing Information System
cost-of-service model, termed MM18. The DCOS model and disputes
concerning its study methods were described on pages 89-111 of the
Report and Order issued October 18, 1989 in Docket No. 88-049-07.
As a result of the Commission's review of the initial DCOS
model, the Company and the Division were ordered in Docket No.
for- i .1 f-
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88-049-07 to investigate several issues. The Commission also invited
the Committee to participate. The parties held several meetings,
some of which the Commission Staff attended. On April 6, 1990, the
Company, the Division and the Committee submitted their Joint Report
to the Commission. Cost-of-service issues addressed in the Joint
Report included a peak method for allocating traffic sensitive (TS)
costs, a method for allocating non-traffic sensitive (NTS) costs, an
examination of DCOS product definitions and corresponding tariffed
rate elements, the correlation of DCOS information with the test
period employed in the determination of revenue requirement, and
future updates of the DCOS model. The Joint Report detailed the
positions of the parties on the above issues and identified areas of
agreement and/or disagreement. The most significant disagreement
concerned the allocation of non-traffic sensitive costs.
The prototype MMIS model has since been abandoned by the
Company and replaced with a new model designed for use throughout all
14 states served by the Company. In addition, basic changes had been
made in the new MMIS model to incorporate the new USOA accounts and
procedures adopted by the ECC. Eor these reasons, the Division had
to virtually reconstruct its DCOS model subject to its own resource
constrai nts and the time limitations imposed by this case. The
Division's current version of the DCOS model basically duplicates the
essential parts of the latest version of the Company's MMIS model.
Every revenue, expense and investment category or portion
thereof that requires a separate direct assignment or allocation is
shown in the DCOS model. Within DCOS, 946 Utah intrastate investment
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and expense items and a number of revenue items are assigned or
allocated to 54 product groups. The DCOS model employs 19 exogenous
allocation factors developed from external data and special studies
and 139 allocation factors developed within the model.
The current version of DCOS again contains an investment
translator which is used to reconcile Central Office Equipment and
Outside Plant investments contained in separations categories with
the amounts booked in Uniform System of Accounts (USOA) subaccounts,
the latter being inputted into the cost-of-service model.
The current DCOS study utilized 1989 actual revenues and
expenses. The rate base utilized was obtained from a 12-month
average of 1989 actual investments.
• The Company did not file its own embedded cost-of-service
study. The Company stated that since its MMIS model is an integrated
14-state model, it is therefore limited in its ability to accommodate
every state specific requirement. Furthermore, the Company agreed in
Docket No. 8S-049-07 to use the general format of the DCOS model in
future rate cases and to argue for modifications where appropriate.
2. UNO IS PUTED ISSUES
Upon review of the DCOS study submitted by the Division in
direct testimony, the Committee recommended several modifications to
which the Division agreed. The Committee recommended that customer
deposits be excluded from and cash working capital be included in the
determination of rate base, consistent with the treatment of these
items in the revenue requirement phase of this case.
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Some private line investments had been included with message
service investments and were subsequently allocated to message
service products. The Committee referred to detailed separation
reports in which the private line investments were separately
identified thus providing for their allocation to private line
products.
Investments in Non-Pair Gain Circuits, a category of Central
Office Equipment, had been allocated to access products only. The
Committee recommended these investments be allocated to all products.
Automatic number identification equipment which identifies
and records message billing data, as well as other types of local
switching equipment which are only required for or used proportion
ately more for message-rated toll and switched access services were
allocated to flat-rated local products. The Committee recommended
that these costs be allocated to toll and switched access products
based on the number of messages for which billing data is available.
The additional circuit equipment necessary to provide the
higher quality and more costly transmission characteristics required
by data and other private lines had been allocated uniformly to all
types of access lines. The Committee recommended that these costs be
allocated to the private line products.
The Committee also recommended that 50 percent of local TS
investments be allocated based upon relative number of peak calls and
50 percent based on relative duration of peak calls.
;:3
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3. DISPUTED ISSUES
a. Allocation of Imputed Pi rectory Revenues
In Docket No. 88-049-07, the Commission found with the
Committee that the imputed Yellow Page directory revenues were to be
included in the residential local exchange access products (DCOS
Product Nos. 5 and 7) .
In the current case, the Company has again recommended that
imputed directory revenues should not be allocated to local exchange
access products but should be displayed separately. The Company
argued directory revenues are generated by business customers
purchasing Yellow Pages advertising and are not produced by residence
customers. To allocate imputed directory revenues to local exchange
access products would blur the study results and undermine the
usefulness of the cost-of-service study.
The Division recommended that imputed directory revenues be
allocated to local exchange access product groups (DCOS Product Nos.
1, 3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 21, 23, 30, 33) based on the relative number of
local exchange access lines. The Division argued that all local
exchange access lines and trunks create directory listings and all
Lines and trunks should be credited with imputed directory revenues.
The Committee, consistent with the prior Commission order,
recommended that the directory revenues remain with the residential
local exchange access products (DCOS 5, 7). The Committee argued
that Judge Greene allowed the local operating companies to retain the
directory services in order to provide support for universal service.
In the "Modification of Final Judgment," dated August 24, 1982, Judge
DOCKET NO. 90-049-03 and 06
-41-
Greene stated that Yellow Pages directories were left with Bell
operating companies rather than AT&T for the purpose of providing
support to local exchange rates, since the loss of revenues from
directory advertising would require large rate increases for local
service. Further, "...large rate increases of this type will reduce
the number of households with telephones and increase the disparity
between low-income and well-off citizens. This result is clearly
contrary to the goal of providing affordable telephone service for
all Americans." (US v AT&T, 552 F.Supp. 131 (1982), p.193-4)
From Judge Greene's statements it is not clear whether the
objective of retaining directory revenues with local operating
companies is to promote lower rates for both residential and business
customers or residential customers alone. Under the Division's
recommendation that imputed directory revenues should be allocated
based on the relative number of access lines, and since residential
customers account for 67 percent of all 1990 access lines, the
Division provides a fair interpretation of Judge Greene's intentions.
The Commission therefore finds that imputed directory
revenues should be allocated to all residential and business local
exchange access products based on the relative number of local
exchange access lines.
b. Weekend Adjustment to_Peak Usage A]location Factor
In Docket No. 88-049-07, the Commission ordered the separa
tion of usage or traffic sensitive (TS) costs into set-up and holding
costs, with set-up costs allocated based on the number of calls
during the peak period and holding costs allocated based on the
0
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duration of calls during the peak period. In its Report and Order of
October 18, 1939, the Commission also ordered the Company to design
and develop a new statewide valid sample for the Subscriber Line
Usage Study (SLUS) . The reports were to show minutes of use for each
intrastate product on an hourly basis by day of the week in order to
identify an appropriate peak period for allocation purposes. The new
SLUS data required for full implementation of the DCOS model is still
in the developmental and collection stage. The Company has yet to
provide 1990 data from the modified SLUS as ordered by the
Commission. Also the 1988 and 1939 data were flawed due to training
problems incurred when switching the SLUS program from decentralized
to centralized control and operation. Therefore the only valid data
available for determination of relative peak use was the 1987 SLUS
data provided in Docket No. 88-049-07 which identified minutes of use
for intrastate products by hour of the day but not by day of the
week.
Stating there was no reliable information to do otherwise,
the Division determined the peak period to be the three busy hours of
each day including weekends. By default, the Division obtained the
relative minutes of use during the peak period from the 1987 SLUS
data submitted in Docket No. 88-049-07.
The Committee argued that residential customers make a
higher percent of their calls during weekends than business
customers. Ignoring this difference by treating weekend calls like
week-day calls, as the 1987 SLUS does, would over-allocate costs to
residential products and under-allocate costs to business products.
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As evidence indicati.ng that the weekend is off-peak, the Committee
referred to local measured service rates, and intrastate and
interstate toll rates, all of which have discounts which apply during
the weekend hours.
The Committee recommended that the variation in weekday
versus weekend toll usage be used as a proxy to remove the effect of
weekend usage from the determination of the peak period. The
Committee argued that any error in the study results induced by the
use of toll information to approximate a weekday peak period would be
less than that due to ignoring the difference in usage between the
weekday and weekend periods. While the Division agreed with the
philosophy of the CCS recommendation, the Division argued that toll
usage was not an accurate reflection of local usage. The Division
recommended proceeding on this issue later in the year, after the
case, to which the Company agreed.
The Company has had sufficient time to revise and submit a
currently valid subscriber line usage study. The impact of the
Committee's recommendation is significant and cannot be ignored. The
Commission therefore finds with the Committee that for purposes of
this case, toll usage information should be employed to distinguish
weekday from weekend usage in the determination of relative use
during the peak period.
c. Assignment of the End Use Line Charge (EULC) Revenues
and Allocation of Non-Traffic Sensitive Costs
In Docket No. 88-049-07 the Commission stated that exchange
access supports and is inseparable from all uses made of the telecom-
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m.unications network. A.s a consequence, the Commission found that the
local exchange access products (DCOS Product Nos. 1, 3, 5, 7, 12, 14,
21, 23, 30, 33) should be allocated only a portion of the non-traffic
sensitive (NTS) costs. Therefore a portion of NTS costs must be
reallocated to products other than local exchange access. The
Company, the Division and the Committee agreed that a portion of the
NTS costs be reallocated to toll usage and switched access products
(DCOS Product Nos. 18, 20, 47, 54-57).
In the DCOS model, all categories of Central Office Equip
ment and Outside Plant investments were allocated based on usage or
were directly assigned with the exception of three categories which
constituted NTS investments: Loops, Pair Gain and Non-Pair Gain
Circuit Equipment. Investment in Loops, totalling $426,708,706, is
a category of Outside Plant, and investment in Pair Gain Circuit
Equipment, totalling $39,883,557, is a category of Central Office
Equipment. Both were allocated based on adjusted relative length of
1989 access lines. Investment in Non-Pair Gain Circuit Equipment,
totalling $41,414,337,' is a category of Central Office Equipment and
was allocated based on adjusted relative number of 1989 access lines.
These three categories, the NTS investments, accounted for 52 percent
cf Central Office Equipment and Outside Plant in Service, and 38
percent of total Plant in Service.
There were two issues in dispute. The first was whether the
revenues obtained from the End User Line Charge (EULC) and associated
NTS costs were to be assigned to local exchange access products or
assigned to interstate switched access products. The second issue
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concerned the adjustment of the NTS allocation factors so as to
reallocate a portion of NTS costs from local exchange access products
to toll usage and switched access products.
In the FCCs Part 36 separations procedure, the interstate
Basic Allocation Factor (BAF), formerly the Subscriber Plant Factor
(SPF) , was used to allocate NTS costs to the interstate jurisdiction.
For 1990, the Company's interstate BAF equalled 28.4768 percent. The
End User Line Charge (EULC) , formerly the Subscriber Line Charge
(SLC), and the interstate Common Carrier Line Charge (CCLC) are rate
elements authorized by the FCC for interstate toll and switched
access services. The EULC is a flat monthly charge paid by end-users
of access lines to the Company for interstate toll service. The
interstate CCLC is a usage-based charge paid by interexchange
carriers to the Company for switched access service to originate and
terminate interLATA calls using the Company's facilities. The EULC
and the interstate CCLC rate elements are designed to collect
revenues to cover the interstate portion of local exchange costs,
including the NTS costs allocated to the interstate jurisdiction
based on the interstate BAF.
Since EULC revenues are collected from end-users of access
lines, the Division recommended that these revenues be directly
assigned to the exchange access products from which they originated.
Under this approach, the revenues collected from the interstate EULC
rate element were assigned to local exchange access products and the
revenues collected from the interstate CCLC rate element were
assigned to the interstate switched access products. Therefore the
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Division recommended that one half of the NTS investments allocated
to the interstate jurisdiction on the basis of the 1990 BAF be
allocated to local exchange access products and the other half, or
14.2384 percent, be reallocated to the interstate switched access
products. The Division also recommended that the NTS investments be
reallocated to the intrastate toll usage and switched access products
based on 1989 relative minutes of use, or 6.0477 percent and 0.6431
percent, respectively. In total the Division recommended that
20.9292 percent of NTS investments be reallocated from local exchange
access to toll usage and switched access products.
The Company argued that if EULC revenues are assigned to
exchange access products as recommended by the Division, then
interstate switched access minutes of use relative to total minutes
of use be used to reallocate NTS investments to interstate switched
access products rather than an arbitrary one half of the interstate
BAF. This resulted in a reallocation of 13.5625 percent of the NTS
investments to the interstate switched access products rather than
the Division's recommended 14.2384 percent. The Company agreed with
the Division's recommendation that the reallocation of NTS invest
ments to the intrastate toll usage and switched access products be
based on relative minutes of use. In total the Company recommended
that 20.2533 percent of NTS investments be reallocated from local
exchange access to toll usage and switched access products if EULC
revenues were to be assigned to local exchange access products.
Since EULC revenues are designed to cover a portion of
interstate costs, the Committee recommended that the EULC revenues in
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addition to the interstate CCLC revenues be assigned to interstate
switched access products. As a consequence, the Committee
recommended that all NTS investments allocated to the interstate
jurisdiction based on the interstate BAF, or 28.4768 percent, be
reallocated to interstate toll and switched access products. The
Committee also recommended that NTS investments be reallocated to
intrastate toll and switched access products based on 1990 intrastate
BAFs for intrastate toll and switched access, or 11.8996 percent and
1.0402 percent, respectively. In total the Committee recommended
that 41.4166 percent of NTS investments be reallocated from local
exchange access to toll usage and switched access products.
The Company argued that if EULC revenues are assigned to
interstate switched access products as recommended by the Committee,
then relative minutes of use be used to allocate NTS investments to
intrastate toll usage and switched access products, as recommended by
the Division, rather than intrastate BAFs. in total the Companv
recommended 35.1676 percent of NTS investments be reallocated from
local exchange access "to toll usage and switched access products if
EULC revenues were to be assigned to interstate switched access
products. The Company also recommended that the reallocation of NTS
investments to other than local exchange access products continue to
be addressed in informal meetings between the Company, the Division
and the Committee.
The recommendations of the parties with respect to the
reallocation of NTS investments are summarized in the following
table:
o
Interstate Toll
& Switched Access
Intrastate
Toll Usage
Intrastate
Switched Access
Subtotal
Local Access
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TABLE 2
REALLOCATION of NTS INVESTMENTS
EULC Revenues in
Local Exchange
Access Products
D ivi si on
14.2384%
6.0477%
0.6431%
20.9292%
79.0703%
Company
13.5625%
6.047/^%
0.6431%
20.2533%
79.7467%
EULC Revenues ir
Interstate Switched
Access Products
CoiTmi ttee
28.4768%
11.8996%
1.0402%
41.4166%
58.5834%
Company
28.4768%
6.0477°%
0.6431%
35.1676%
64.8324%
The Division's recommendation mixes both interstate and
intrastate revenues and costs whereas the Committee's recommendation
maintains a separation between interstate and intrastate operations.
It is the latter approach which is more relevant for intrastate
pricing decisions. The Commission therefore finds with the Committee
that both EULC revenues and the current NTS investments allocated to
the interstate jurisdiction as provided by the 1990 BAF be allocated
to interstate switched access products.
'Whereas this Commission has no authority over the determina
tion of the NTS investments allocated to the interstate jurisdiction,
the Commission does have authority over NTS investments allocated to
the intrastate jurisdiction and the method by which the NTS
investments are allocated among intrastate products.
Relative number and length of access lines are modified bv
relative minutes of use to provide a measurable, state-specific means
,.- . -; v7
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of sharing intrastate NTS costs among intrastate products. The
original Subscriber Plant Factor was based primarily on a multiple of
Subscriber Line Usage. The Basic Allocation Factor is based on an
industry-wide average of interstate Subscriber Plant Factors. Thus
to use intrastate BAFs would result in the allocation of intrastate
NTS investments based on some multiple of industry-average intrastate
usage rather than state-specific information.
The Committee argued that if usage is to be the basis for
allocating NTS costs, then it is necessary to recognize the effect on
usage of the different rate structures for local and long distance
service. Since long distance service is on a message-rated basis,
its usage is curtailed relative to flat-rated local service. Thus
while BAFs are not state-specific, they do recognize the availability
of the network for long distance service on a basis more comparable
to local service.
The Commission is required by statute to determine rates
based on state-specific cost information. To the largest extent
possible, it is desirable that allocation factors be based on current
state-specific information as well. While the Committee's point is
well taken, information is insufficient to adopt the recommendation.
Therefore, the Commission for the purposes of this case finds with
the Division and the Company that the NTS investments be reallocated
to intrastate toll and switched access based on state-specific
relative minutes of use rather than intrastate BAFs.
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d. Classification of Some of the Local Central Office
Switching Equipment Costs as Non-Traffic Sensitive
It is acknowledged by all parties that a portion of the
investment in local switching, a category of Central Office Equip
ment, is NTS. In 1989 investment in local switching totalled
$222,022,302 or 44 percent of the investment in Central Office
Equipment. Prior to implementation of the latest USOA procedures,
the telephone companies separately classified Central Office
Equipment investments into TS and NTS categories. Thus the prior
versions of MMIS and DCOS models differentiated between TS and NTS
investments in local switching equipment, with TS allocated based on
relative usage and NTS based on relative number and length of access
lines. In the latest USOA procedures, the separate classification of
investments in local switching equipment into TS and NTS categories
has been eliminated and telephone companies are no longer required to
make this accounting separation. As a result, USWC no longer
maintains records that separate investments in local switching
equipment into TS and NTS categories. Consequently, in neither
current version of MMIS nor DCOS is the TS/NTS distinction made. The
current separation of central office investments and expenses to
interstate are based on usage. The Commission would prefer not to
have NTS investments allocated based on. usage but concludes, that
there is insufficient information to modify MMIS or DCOS at this
time. We direct the Company and the Division to provide additional
information to the Commission in order for us to determine if
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separate identification and allocation of the NTS costs will be
appropriate in the future.
g- Allocation of Accelerated Depreciation Expenses
The Company has stated that current Central Office Equipment
provides adequate service and testified that the general growth in
demand for services is the basis for equipment replacement. The
Committee, however, testified that such equipment is replaced more
rapidly to meet the demand for non-basic services than is necessary
to provide basic services. Therefore the Committee recommended that
the additional depreciation and amortization expenses caused by the
accelerated replacement of central office equipment be allocated to
the non-basic services.
The Division argued that keeping step-by-step offices in the
network would retain higher overall costs and would maintain substan
dard service to customers. The Division also stated that its
recommended depreciation rates for Central Office Equipment were
based only to a minor degree on the revenues from custom calling and
other vertical services compared to ether justifications. The
Company also disagreed with the Committee's recommendation, terming
it an implementation nightmare with respect to a cost allocation
system.
The Commission rejects the recommendation of the Committee.
f. Allocation _of_j;nco^e Taxc_s
In DCOS, all income taxes are allocated to each product
based on each product's allocated share of rate base. The Committee
recommended that income taxes be allocated to each product based on
' •" '" * O* ,>
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relative taxable income. In Docket No. 79-035-12 the Commission
found the allocation of income taxes based on relative rate base "to
be appropriate in cost studies designed to determine class revenue
requirements where each class is assumed to earn the jurisdictional
rate of return, and directs that this approach be used in the
future." (Report and Order, April 12, 1982, page 9) To the extent a
class or product does not earn the jurisdictional rate of return,
income taxes allocated based on taxable income distorts information
necessary for pricing decisions. The Commission affirms its earlier
decision in Docket No. 79-035-12 and rejects the recommendation of
the Committee.
4. SUMMARY
Two DCOS studies incorporated the undisputed issues and
Commission findings with respect to the disputed issues as discussed
above. The results of these two studies are provided in Tables 3 and
4. Table 3 aggregates into 9 broad market categories the results for
the 54 product groups shown in Table 4.
Doth studies were based on actual 1989 expenses and
investments. The first study, termed Actual, was based on actual
1939 revenues. The second study, termed Proforma, annualized actual
1939 revenues to reflect the rate changes that have occurred between
1989 and the present, i.e. the revenue reduction ordered in Docket
38-049-07 effective November, 1989, and the revenue reductions
resulting from the two interim reductions ordered in the current
, : ,.J 1
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docket, effective July, 1990, and January, 1991, respectively. Both
studies used the 1987 SLUS data.
TABLE 3
AGGREGATE SUMHART
COST-OFSERVICE STUDr RFSULTS
Rate of Return on Rate Base
1989 Revenue, Expanses j-vi I rwest;rients
Actual PrcfoTra* DCCS Fr^n.ct
ASIC LOCAL EXCHANGE PRODUCTS
RESIDENCE 10.98% 0.14% 5-8
BJSIKESS 44.94% 29.93% 1-4, 2-24
com
-4.21%
-5.53;; 9, 12-15, 61
C T1- E R
-22.03% -23.58% 25,30,3'.,3.5,3-,36,37,40,
42,44,4;,R,•:->:,62,65,66
16.01% 5.14%
INTRASTATE TRANSPORT PRODUCTS
TCL 33.28% 26.95% 17-20, 47, -9, 5C
SUITC-ED ACCESS 38.18% 33.54% 53, 55, 5/", 64
PRIVATE LIKE -9.61% -9.76% 38, 63R
19.94% 15.67%
INTERS'A'E -s: DEREGULATED PRODUCTS
INTESTATE SWITCHED ACCESS 15.50% "5.5C% 51, 52, 54, 56 5;
DEREGULATED -108.-6% -1CS.-6S 45D, 63D
12.3-;.;
'ALL EARNED RA'E CF RETURN 15.68% 9.46?
-••E-ALL A„"-:-:Zz? RATE OF RETURN 10.69%
' . 7 j '
" Prorcrrr.n ^c^usts revenues for trie rate reductions Ton: 19;',9 to the
present rissuirinq quantity sold in 19S9 is uni h.intjrd.
In Table 3 there are four broad markets
services consisting of residence, business, coin telephone, and other
exchange services. There are three broad markets for intrastate
transport services consisting of toll, switched access, and private
lines. The remaining two broad markets are interstate switched
access and deregulated services. The overall rate of return earned
•r local exchange
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TAB! E 4
COST-OF-SERVICE STUDY SUMMARY RESULTS
DCOS Product Rate of Return on Rate Base
1989 Revenues, Expenses, and Investments
Aggregate DCOS Group P-oduct
RESIDENCE" 5 Residence - Flat Access
LOCAL 6 Residence - Flat Usage
EXCHANGE 7 Residence - Measured Access
8 Residence - Measured Usage
BUSINESS 1 Business - Flat Access
LOCAL 2 Business - Flat Usage
EXCHANGE 3 Business - Measured Access
4 Business - Measured Usage
21 PBX - Flat Access
22 PBX - Flat Usage
23 PBX - Measured Access
24 PBX - Measured Usage
COIN 9 Public Telephone
TELEPHONE 12 Public Access Line - Access
LOCAL 13 Public Access Line - Usage
EXCHANGE 14 Semi Public Coin - Access
15 Semi Publi c Coin - Usage
61 Booth Advertising
CTWER 25 Centron I Features
LOCAL 30 Centron Custom - Access & Featun
EXCHANGE 31 Centron Custom - Usage
33 Centrex - Access £ Features
34 Centrex - Usage
36 Info Services (976, 960, 900)
37 Versanet
40 Mobile
42 Custom CalIing
44 Remote Call Forwarding
45R Regulated Time S Materials
46 Inside Wire • Embedded
60 Listing Services
62 Emergency Services (911)
65 Other Services
66 ISDN
INTRASTATE 17 IntralATA InuardUAlS - Access
TOLL 13 IntraLATA Inward WATS - Usage
19 IntraLATA Outward UATS - Access
20 IntraLATA Outward UATS - Usage
*7 IntraLATA Message ToU & Options
49 Operator Services
50 Directory Assistance - End Us^r
INTRASTATE 53 Intrastate Silling S. Collection
SWITCHED 55 Carrier Feature Group AaB
ACCESS 57 Carrier Feature Group C&D
64 Contract Services (SNFA)
I>,TRAS;A;E 35 Pnvnre L•ne - Scecial Access
PRIVATE LUF 63R Diyip.ic
INTERSTATE 51 Directory Assistance - Carrier
52 Interstate Billing 8. Collection
54 Carrier Feature Group A\3
56 Carrier Feature G. oup C^D
53 Private L ine
CEREGULATED 450 Premise Service
630 Protocol Conversion
Actu, I Profo rnid*
Revenues RCR
4.93%
Revenues
58,9/5,782
ROR
75,862,458 -5.10%
42,730,664 30.13% 35,778,838 16.6 5%
1,539,197 6.76% 1,255,199 -1.21%
655,294 87.43% 5/2,064 68.40%
42,305,713 70.41% 36,634,319 52.95%
21 ,130,344 20.45% 13,610,821 11.7 /%
708,5 70 19.64% 620,964 6.88%
64 7,698 524.48% 627,943 547.4 0%
9,523,589 82.07% ',587,556 52.81%
8,242,160 11.50% 6,177,570
-4.09%
410,378 70.17% 340,403 48.72%
568,734 718.04% 542,109 750.00%
6,176,321 -26.64% 6,176,321 -27.24%
708,553 46.56% 6o2,3o4 38.Rv/„
473,281 510.95% 468,661 553.52%
459,714 -29.43% 412,200
-40.25%
7/6,020 215.19% 771,906 224.17%
347,692 1122.99% 34 7,692 1122.99%
2,323,156 -26.62% 2,324,419
-27.43%
4,901,998 5.05% 4,929,258 5.26%
1,391,851 -26.19% 1,048,4 73 -31.74%
565,020 -21.24% 565,332 -21.33%
430,459 -24.80% 396,535 -26.92%
213,273 -56.00% 212,848 - 56.86%
47,887 -33.39% 47,887 -33.39%
226,789
-44.57% 240,036
-42.71%
8,692,739 32.82% 8,697,460 32.67%
588,001
-26.11% 588,001 -27.77%
17,106 - 1563.61% 17,106 -1561.05%
31 52.20% 31 52.20%
4,540,630 -20.24% 4,474,692 -22.40%
1,009,900 433.05% 1,009,542 427.07%
547,046
-166.64% 5^7,046
-166 . 70%
9,815
-!57.o0% 9,315 -157.62%
586,937 15.50% 553,375 11.44%
6,095,969 138.27% 5,612,926 122. K%
208,392 6.80% 195,377 2.52%
1,627,518 51.37% 1,485,230 42.47%
63,117,125 34.20% 58,35-,738 26.13%
6,553,165 -10.61% 7,508,549 13.;::%
3,818,095 - 19.12; 3,81)5,312
-1v.<=9%
142,735 3281.50% 1-2,735 3281.30%
2,268,341 31.35% 2,119,917 26.15%
2,700,550 33.42% 2,541,097 28.56%
962,487 81.48% 9o?,487 51.48%
16,133,142
-8.7-% lo, 1 57,9.% . 71
53,310
-70.69 4 53,310
- 70.:;; •;
3,561,605 229.65% 3,561,605 229.65%
7,009,783 36.87% 7,009,783 36.8 7%
27,310,303 44 .03% 27,^10,303 44.0 5%
74,254,930 5.49% 74,254,930 5.49%
17,237,174 32.29? 17,28/, 174 32.28%
5,182,328 •108.55% 5,182,328
-103.55%
0 -31.17% 0
-31.17%
Overall Earned Rate of Return on Rate Base: 478,149,470 15.68% 436,243,338 9.46%
Overall Allowed Rate of Return on Rate Base- 10 69* — ••*•>•
Based on an Allowed Rate of Return on Equity of: 1K80% 1220%
Profnr™ adjusts revenues for the rate rcdut tions from 1989 1„ th*>
present assuming expenses, investments, and quantities sold in 1989 are unchanged.
•::::?.3
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on rate base shown in the 1989 Actual study was 15.68 percent as
compared to the authorized rate of return of 10.69 percent.
The results of the 1989 Actual study showed comparable rates of
return earned by business local exchange, intrastate toll and
switched access services, all considerably above the overall earned
rate of return. Residence local exchange service provided a rate of
return approximately equal to the authorized rate of return. The
remaining services, coin telephone, other local exchange and private
line services all showed negative rates of return. Other local
exchange services consist primarily of Centron and Centrex business
services, custom calling features and listing services.
The results of the Proforma study reflect the spread decisions
of Docket No. 88-049-07 and the two interim decreases of the current
docket. The revenue reductions in Docket No. 88-049-07 were spread
to reduce residential and business local exchange revenues by 17
percent and 10 percent, respectively, with intrastate transport
services receiving none of the reduction. The two interim decreases •
have been spread to produce an equal percentage reduction for
residence and business local exchange and intrastate toll and
switched access revenues. The usefulness of the Proforma study is
severely limited in that the effects of time and growth on operations
have been ignored. Only prices have been updated to the present,
effectively yielding proforma revenues as the product of 1989 usage
and 1991 prices.
The determination of jurisdictional revenue requirement was
based on a stipulated 1990 test year, the DCOS studies were run on
1989 information, and the relative usage information employed in the
DCOS studies were from the 1987 SLUS data. This lack of consistency- *?j ,\
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of information among the phases of the ratemaking process is
unsettling to say the least. The Commission strongly encourages the
parties to provide ratemaking information from a consistent time
period.
The Commission finds that the Company is to provide the
Division with 1990 SLUS information and other 1990 information
necessary to allow the Division to perform a DCOS study based on 1990
actual results of operations consistent with Commission findings in
this docket. The Division shall perform and report the results of
the 1990 DCOS study with the Commission and make available the study
to the Committee and any other interested party. The results of the
forthcoming 1990 DCOS study shall be employed by the Division to
evaluate Company tariff filings. No tariff filings will be
considered in the absence of 1990 DCOS analysis.
The current version of the DCOS model does not separate
recurring from nonrecurring revenues and expenses. To aid in pricing
decisions, the Commission encourages the Division to investigate
incorporating this separation in future versions of the DCOS model.
B. REVENUE SPREAD AND RATE DESIGN
The Commission's determination of utility product or service
prices (rates) is guided by ratemaking or pricing objectives.
Certain of these objectives are attained when rates are based on the
costs of providing the services. Cost-based rates thus are means to
other ends.
It is the fact that the several pricing objectives may
conflict; that is, the attempt to attain one may lead away from
attainment of another. The Commission's pricing decisions therefore
" .; jJ yy
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inherently involve trade-offs. They are balancing decisions. If
basing rates on cost of service is one primary consideration,
another, at times leading to opposite pricing choices, is setting
prices to attain the social goal of universal service. Nevertheless
cost of service information must be the starting point, and, assuming
the costing information is good enough to permit it, the manner in
which prices deviate from cost of service will give some indication
of the policy decisions the Commission has made.
Circumstances facing the industry and the Company today have
both changed the priority of the ratemaking objectives and added
other considerations. The Company thus has argued that service
o
prices must be a function of two things, long-run incremental costs,
as a floor below which prices should not fall, and a market-
determined ceiling, above which prices would be self-defeating.
Market analyses, including demand elasticities, thus have a newly
acquired importance.
In the.long transition from value-of-service pricing to cost-
of-service pricing, concerning which the Commission has commented
previously, the type of. cost information to be employed, embedded or
incremental, has been disputed vigorously. As the preceding section
makes clear, embedded cost-of-service information, developed under
this Commission's careful guidance, continues to hold sway in this
jurisdiction. Moreover, it has an increasing importance for spread
decisions, for regulatory responses to anticipated tariff restructure
requests or new product filings, and as the means by which cross-
subsidization claims will be addressed.
The Company's long-run incremental cost information has not
been subject to the same sort of rigorous regulatory scrutiny, and
i JO
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has carried less weight in pricing decisions. In this docket, the
Company testified that only residential dial tone 1ine is priced
below long-run incremental cost. But given the Commission's decision
in Docket No. 88-049-07, that the dial tone line rate is designed to
recover only a portion, not all, of the non-traffic sensitive costs
of the local loop, such information is insufficient to effect a price
change in any event.
Parties have testified to the importance of market
relationships among various services, and these relationships mean,
in their view, that if the price of a particular service is changed,
other related service prices must change in proportion.
Relationships between business and residential, and among toll,
switched access, and extended area service, are principal among
these. There is on the record, however, scant evidence other than the
anecdotal, concerning market characteristics either in general or in
specific.
In sum, embedded and incremental costs, relationships among
services, market analyses, and social objectives such as universal
service, guide pricing decisions. The quality and reliability of
information on the record about each of these, however, is far from
being equal, as will become apparent in the following discussion of
individual pricing decisions.
USWC presented the testimony of Lloyd Tanner, Donald K. Mason,
Dr. H. Craig Petersen, Mary Ellen Young, Leslie D. Lanksbury, Dallas
R. Elder, Dan A. Purkey, Timothy F. Young, Robert H. Brigham, and
Steve L. Hill. Witnesses for the Division were Larry Fuller and
Lowell E. Alt; for the Committee, William Dunkel; and for MCI, Dr.
Nina Cornell.
; '•'• ;';7
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1. EXTENDED AREA SERVICE (EAS)
The Company testified that extended area service rates should
be reduced by 13.5 percent. Resulting rates would be in excess of
long-run incremental costs, as shown by Company studies. The Company
also asserted that such a reduction would not increase localized
pressures for this service since rates vary by area. According to
the Division, EAS charges for business customers are in some minor
respects inequitable, creating the need for adjustments that can and
should be made in this docket. The Committee's position is that EAS
charges should be reduced by the same percentage as the Commission
finds appropriate in this docket for residence and business basic
exchange service prices.
The Commission did not reduce EAS rates in the last rate case.
The Division' s DCOS model does not show EAS as a separate service
category. The embedded costs of EAS are not shown separately on the
record but are included in residence and business usage categories,
both of which show more than adequate returns. The Company's long-
run incremental costs have not been thoroughly analvzed by the
parties, though its testimony that proposed reductions would vie Id
prices above such costs was not disputed. Key to this pricing
decision is the long-standing relationship tying EAS prices to these
for toll and switched access services and the parties' testimony that
prices for each should be reduced by the same percentage. The
Commission has been concerned that EAS not be priced to encourage a
shift from toll. Testimony indicates this would not be expected to
occur should reductions be such as to preserve the relationship.
Though lacking both cost and market information of the desired
specificity, the Commission finds the weight of the evidence suooorts. -
i,3
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a reduction of EAS prices. Considering the magnitude of the
reduction in revenue requirement ordered in this docket and the
relationship among the services, the Commission finds a reduction of
fill EAS rates by 11.8 percent to be appropriate. The Commission
further finds the minor adjustments to remove EAS from certa in
business services, as proposed by the Division, to be appropriate.
2. TOLL SERVICES
Proposals to revise and restructure aspects of Message
Telecommunications Service (MTS), OutWATS, and 800 Service were
presented by the parties. The Company proposed to combine MTS
mileage bands and to reduce generally the rates for the first minute
and each additional minute of use. This would simplify the rate
structure and, by making proportionately greater rate reductions in
the longer mileage bands, bring rates closer to cost of service. It
would also reduce the disparity between intra- and interstate rates.
3ased on its cost-of-service and market analysis, the Division
supported a reduction in and restructure of these rates. According
to the Committee, its .cost-of-service analysis does not support a
reduction of MTS rates, which earn a return below the average for all
services and which are low relative to similar rates in other states.
Moreover the service is growing rapidly, stated the Committee. It
did not oppose the restructuring of mileage bands,- however.
The Company proposed to revise OutWATS usage rates and to
decrease the access line charges in response to what it styled as
competitive pressures. The Division was in agreement. The
Committee's cost analysis indicated no basis for rate reduction and
DOCK ET NO . <•<)- 0 4 9 - ^ 3 and 0 6
its witness testified that the decline in OutWATS volume owed partly
to USWC's toll volume discount services.
The Committee testified that the return shown by cost-of-
service analysis for 800 Service was much higher than that for either
OutWATS or MTS and therefore did not oppose the reduction and
restructure proposed by the Company and supported by the Division.
The Commission did not reduce toll rates in the last rate case
except as a consequence of the equal-percentage spread of the interim
rate reduction. There is an intuitive but not carefully examined
relationship among toll, switched access, and EAS. DCOS results
indicate that toll services are overcarning. These overearnings, as
indicated by the Division's DCOS Model, are derived from the usage
priced services. The flat access portions of these services are not
earning as much as most other services. The Commission finds that
preserving the relationship between toll, switched access, and EAS
requires a reduction in toll similar to that for EAS, that is, an
11.6 percent reduction. The Commission further finds the
restructuring of toll, proposed by the Division, and of OutWATS and
800 service (inward WATS usage) rates proposed by the Company, and
supported by the Division, and not contested by the Committee, to be
reasonable.
3. SWITCHED ACCESS
The Company proposed a number of changes in switched access
rates. In order to encourage carriers to seek customers more distant
from their points of presence, for example, rural customers, the
Company would reduce rates in the longer distance mileage bands while
increasing them in the four shortest ones. Because the difference
. •• :\
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between the local switching rate elements LSI and LS2 is being phased
out by the ECC, the Company argued for its elimination in this
jurisdiction as well. The intrastate Carrier Common Line Charge
(CCLC) should be reduced, accord!ng to the Company, as a movement
toward a target level, which is based on Subscriber Line Usage (SLU).
Moreover, the intrastate CCLC rates for the closed end of WATS and
800 usage should be removed, stated USWC, in order to discourage
switched access network bypass. In a move to bring installation
charges in line with costs, and to be consistent with interstate
tariffs, the Company proposed to restructure certain identified local
transport nonrecurring rates. The Division generally supported the
Company's proposals, with the caveat that usage rates should produce
returns consistent with toll services. The Committee argued that
prices should remain as set following the January 1, 1991 rate
reduction. If this were done, the CCLC could be removed from the
closed end of WATS and 800 services since CCLC revenues would be lost
m any event if large customers shifted to USWC private line service.
A revenue-neutral rate restructuring would also be acceptable, stated
the Committee.
The Commission accepts the relationship between toll, switched
access, and EAS as the rationale for reduction in switched access
rates, given the reduction in toll and EAS rates to be ordered
herein. The Commission finds the proposed restructuring of switched
access services to be reasonable, and further finds that switched
access rates should bo reduced by 11.7 percent.
3 3.: i i
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4. PUBLIC COMMUNICATION SERVICES
To cover what it termed direct and imputed costs, the Company
proposed an increase in the local coin message charge from $0.25 to
$0.35. Arguing that the Commission should give USWC's cost study no
weight because it is defective, the Committee would maintain the
$0.25 local payphone charge. According to the Committee, a large
proportion of payphone revenues are derived from toll, access, and
other non-local services which that study does not consider. The
Division also recommended against raising the coin rate, strongly
objecting to USWC's attempt to impute its competitors' rates as costs
of providing coin service, and arguing that its cost study failed to
include important categories of revenues.
The Commission finds that the cost-of-service analysis of coin
service presented by the Company is inadequate. There is no support
on the record for an increase in the rate for coin service.
Furthermore, there are public interest reasons why coin rates should
not be increased even if shown to be underearning. The Commission
finds that the $0.25 coin rate should be retained.
5. RESIDENCE LOCAL EXCHANGE
The Company emphasized that residence rates have been reduced,
on a percentage basis, considerably more than other services since
1987 and therefore recommended that dial tone line and usage rates be
returned (raised) to the levels in effect prior to the January 1,
1991 interim rate reduction in this docket. The universal service
goal cannot be used to rationalize further reductions, the Company
asserted, and called the Commission's attention to the fact that any
reduction in EAS rates would benefit residence subscribers. The
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Division's DCOS analysis provided support for maintaining these rates
at the January 1, 1991 level, it testified. The Committee argued for
further reduction in residence rates based on universal service
considerations, amplified by claimed linkage between such rates and
economic development and quality of life improvements. Local
exchange services are the foundation for most other services, the
Committee noted, and in general recommended further, equal percentage
reductions from January 1, 1991 levels for residence and business
local exchange and EAS rates.
The Commission is relying on the DCOS analysis presented by
the Division and the Committee in this docket to support reduction in
rates of various services. DCOS displays the results of past pricing
decisions, indicating earnings by service categories. On this basis
there is no showing that residence rates should be further reduced.
The Universal Service implications of reducing residence recurring
rates are ambiguous at best, and are therefore an insufficient
argument for further reduction. The Company argued that its long-
run incremental cost analysis shows that residence dial tone line
service is priced too low. The Commission notes, however, that this
cost analysis does not include an appropriate allocation of non-
traffic sensitive costs, as determined in Docket No. 88-049-07, and
has otherwise not been accepted by this Commission. On balance, the
Commission finds that further reduction of residence recurring rates
is not warranted at this time.
5- BUSINESS LOCAL EXCHANGE
USWC testified that the business dial tone line rate should be
reduced to $15.80 and argued that usage and related service rates
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should be returned to June, 1990 levels, in order to achieve better
alignment with residence rates. The Division testified that business
rates should bo reduced sufficiently to reduce the business-residence
ratio to 2:1. This would require a reduction in dial tone line rate
to $15.00, a movement justified by much higher than average earnings,
as shown by the DCOS results, and promotion of future business
service efficiencies. The Committee argued that basic exchange rates
should be maintained at January 1991 levels, then reduced a uniform
percentage, but yielding no change in the prevailing business-
residence ratio. That ratio can be justified on several grounds the
Committee stated.
As determined by the Division's DCOS analysis, business dial
tone line is earning substantially more than most other services.
There is no other evidence on the record to suggest that a reduction
in this rate would be inappropriate, and there is testimony from both
the Division and the Company that it should be reduced. In past
dockets the Commission has accepted a business-residence ratio
greater than two based on assumptions such as business drives
modernization of the network more than residential and business usage
comes at the peak and therefore drives costs. Evidence suggests that
this is still appropriate. The DCOS analysis does not indicate a
need to reduce the business usage rate, other than as will occur
owing to the EAS rate reduction to be ordered herein. The Commission
finds that business dial tone line rates should be reduced 11.8
percent.
,.t
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7 - OTHER BUSINESS AND RESIDENTIAL SERVICES
The Division recommended increasing the price of the hunting
charge to $4.00 per line in order to maintain a proper relationship
between business service and trunk service. The Company and the
Committee agreed with this recommendation.
Hunting Increment and Open Switch Protection rates have
recently been reduced as a result of the equal percentage spread of
interim rate decreases. The Commission finds that the Division's
recommendation should be adopted.
8. PBX TRUNK SERVICES
Both the Company and the Division recommend an unbundling of
the hunting element from the Companion Line trunk rate and pricing
this element equal to the hunting increment for business services.
The Committee did not object to this recommendation. The Commission
finds this is consistent with previous decisions which unbundle
elements of telecommunication services and is a step toward the
building-block approach recommended by MCI. The Commission further
finds that one-way-out trunks should be priced the same as two-way
trunks with hunting as the Division has proposed.
9. OBSOLETE EXCHANGE SERVICES
The record contains evidence that it is more costly to provide
multi-party service than to provide one-party service. One-party
service is a superior alternative, makes the network operate more
efficiently, and is a standard this Commission has established for
telephone service in Utah. Four- and eight-party service currently
receives a 20 percent discount from one-party service rates. No
A )
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party recommended changes in the rates for these services. The
Commission, however, desires to further examine the pricing rationale
for multi-party and other obsolete services, and encourages the
parties to address these issues.
10. NONRECURRING SERVICES
The Company, the Division, and the Committee offered similar
recommendations for pricing certain nonrecurring services, such as
assigning and changing numbers, installation charges, and temporary
suspension of service, with the exception that the Committee
recommended lower residential installation charges. The Committee
argued that installation charges have been a barrier to the
attainment of Universal Service and have prevented individuals who do
not qualify for Lifeline or Link Up America programs from receiving
telephone service.
One of this Commission's goals is promotion of Universal
Service. The only compelling testimony concerning price as a barrier
is that concerning the adverse effects of nonrecurring charges.
Therefore, the Commission finds that the Committee's recommendation
to reduce residence installation charges is reasonable and should be
adopted. The Commission finds that the remaining nonrecurring charge
recommendations of the parties are reasonable and should be adopted.
This concludes the Discussion, Findings and Conclusions
concerning rates for services for which the parties explicitly
recommended changes. The Commission is aware that the tariff rate
elements bear relationships such that these deliberate changes will
cause many other changes not addressed either in testimony or in this
^0
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section. All of these changes will be displayed in a final table to
be attached to this Report and Order.
IV. NETWORK MODERNIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In this case the Company has submitted a proposal for
modernization of its network in conjunction, with its incentive
regulation plan. According to Company witness Phillip S. Selander,
the proposed modernization investments will be "a beginning or seed
for the network of the future [and] they will give us the fiber optic
and digital building blocks from which we can expand." The
modernization plan would accelerate the installation of new central
office switching and interoffice facilities in order to support the
wide variety of capabilities and services that the network of the
future may require. Thus, Company witnesses testified that the
modernization plan is an important investment in Utah's future.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE PLAN
The modernization plan, as presented by the Company, is
primarily aimed at upgrading rural central offices'and laying a fiber
optic network to facilitate telecommunications for educational,
governmental and hospital use as well as for residential and business
customers. This would permit high-speed, high-capacity data transfer
and accommodate two-way video transmissions in support, for example,
of "distance learning." The upgrade would improve service for rural
customers, the Company stated.
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The modernization plan the Company originally filed on March 2,
1990, called for $103 million in additional capital to be invested in
Utah. $52.46 million of the investment is for the replacement of 46
electro-mechanical central office switching equipment with digital
switching equipment and the remaining $51.67 million is for new
interexchange fiber optic cable. When in place, according to the
Company, high capacity transmission would exist from Brigham City to
Cedar City, with digital radio extensions to Logan, Price, St. George
and Vernal. The plan also included the construction of local fiber
networks to connect central offices to universities, colleges and
high schools. The Company stated that all projects would be compl
eted within 54 months from the date of the Commission's order in this
docket.
The Company's proposed plan was revised in response to
testimony by the Division and the Committee, and by the Company's
conclusion that five of the central offices in the original plan and
transmission from Brigham City to Logan would hit "hard triggers",
i.e., growth would exhaust capacity, requiring an immediate upgrade
in order to maintain service. The Company's witnesses Robert C.
Fuehr, Kirk R. Nelson, and Phillip S. Selander, in later filings and
oral testimony, described the Company's revised modernization
proposal. The revised plan proposed an upgrade to digital technology
of the 41 remaining electro-mechanical central offices. The central
office upgrade and facility augmentations needed to support such
upgrades to digital technology were estimated to cost $36.35 million
on a total state basis and $25.76 million on an intrastate basis,
over a five-year period.
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The second part of the revised plan is an expansion of the
fiber optic and digital infrastructure "backbone" so that it runs
from Logan to St. George, with upgraded digital microwave extensions
to Vernal and Price. The Company consented to the Division's
recommendation that the fiber optic extensions in support of higher
education and distance learning, i.e. local fiber optic loops from
central offices to every college, university and high school, would
be installed only when economical. The estimated capital cost of the
fiber extension is $21.5 million. The commitment to lay fiber cable
to all colleges, universities and high schools and school district
offices when economical requires the investment of $33.88 million in
discretionary capital.
C. BENEFITS OF MODERNIZATION
All parties to this case agree that there are substantial
benefits to be gained from modernization in general and the Company's
proposed modernization plan in particular. Mr. Fuehr testified that
"communications will become an even more critical link than it is
today in the economic well-being and development of a highly mobile
and technical society.... Telecommunications will play [a role] in
enhancing the global competitiveness of Utah businesses." Company
witness Dr. Davidson testified that in order to remain economically
competitive, states would have to upgrade their telecommunication
networks. He alerted the Commission to the consequences of inade
quate investments in new technology: "Without modernization to
provide higher quality, lower 'cost and advanced services, the gap
between public and private offerings will, widen, sophisticated users
will shift increasingly to private networks and the remaining users
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will find it difficult to secure basic and enhanced services at
reasonable rates.... The ultimate impact of inadequate public
telecommunications capacity on local economic and social conditions
remains to be seen, but it could place selected regions and segments
of society at a distinct disadvantage."
Company witness Selander stated that educational needs alone
technically would justify the proposed enhancements, but when
combined with government and research needs, the modernization
project is even more economically feasible. The enhancements in the
digital infrastructure would allow the system to carry a wider
variety and greater quantity of traffic more economically. According
to the Company, its new capabilities would include distance learning,
a higher education library network, and a research network connecting
universities, colleges and businesses to a centrally-located super
computer. Utah State University's ComNet and the state government's
digital communications requirements could be met. The Company
testified that the increase in telecommunications services would
promote economic development in general and rural development in
particular.
A number of public witnesses testified in favor of fiber optic
extensions to colleges, universities and high schools in support of
distance learning. Mr. Steven Hess, Director of the Utah Educational
Network, testified that it was his organization's goal to extend its
distance learning service to every rural high school and applied
technology center in need of the service, within the next five years.
He further testified that the extension of fiber to those facilities
would provide the capacity needed for such expansion. Dr. Bartell C.
Jensen, Vice President for Research at Utah State University (USU)
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and Dr. Glenn R. Wilde, Executive Director of the Merrill Library and
Electron!c Distance Education at USU, testified that the communica
tions network proposed by U S WEST would provide the capabilities of
two-way interactive video at community sites, schools and colleges
and universities in the state. They further testified that the
proposed U S WEST network would provide a critical and needed
backbone service to make a statewide educational and training system
workable. Mr. Will Gardner of BYU, and Chairman of UTAHNET, a Task
force chartered by the Utah State Advisory Council for Science and
Technology to study the needs for high capacity telecommunications in
Utah, testified that upgrading the telecommunications infrastructure
to reach schools (especially in the rural areas) with interactive
television capabilities would be the single most effective way to
upgrade the educational posture of the entire state.
In addition, the Commission has received many letters from
educators, community leaders and concerned citizens in support of the
modernizati on proposal.
The Company, the Division and the Committee offered testimony
that the proposed central office upgrades would make enhanced
services and capabilities available to all USWC's customers, includ
ing rural customers presently unable to obtain such services as equal
access to interexchange carriers and such custom calling features as
call waiting, call forwarding, speed calling, and 3-way calling. In
addition, the upgrades will provide for more accurate and clearer
transmission of voice and data. Further, the upgrade will allow the
offering of additional CLASS services when the Company begins to
market thorn in the state.
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The Commission finds that the central office upgrades will
provide more accurate processing of dialed digits, faster touch tone
services, faster call completion, clearer conversations and more
accurate data transmissions. The Commission further finds that the
modernization plan will enable USWC to provide new services that are
not currently available in Utah. In addition, the Commission finds
that the proposed investments would be of benefit to and would meet
a wide variety of residential, business, educational, governmental
and research needs, and concludes that the Company's proposed moder
nization program is clearly in the public interest.
D. RISKS OF MODERNIZATION
The Company maintained that the proposed investments contained
in its modernization plan, and in particular the investments in
upgrading central offices, were discretionary and would not be made
in a business-as-usual environment. These investments, although
yielding benefits to the state and its citizens, might get
subordinated to other investment opportunities. The Company main
tained that modernization investments, while providing net benefits,
are riskier in that the expected earnings received by USWC are less
than the expected earnings on other possible investments. The
Company claimed that only the opportunity to earn higher profits
through a change in regulatory form would induce it to carry the
additional risks of modernization investments. USWC maintained that
the modernization plan is a good faith effort to demonstrate its
intent to further its investment in Utah. The Company believes that
by making investments that have high social benefits but low internal
"" 0
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rates of return to the Company, it demonstrates its commitment to the
public interest.
The Company also argued that discretionary modernization
investments can be risky in that they may not be incorporated into
rate base. If the regulatory body determines that an investment is
not prudent, then the shareholder must bear its cost. The Division
pointed out that in the recent past there has not been a case where
a major USWC investment had been excluded from rate base and, there
fore, the risk to the Company is minimal. It contended that an
understanding of this Commission's regulatory treatment of the
Company's past investments is necessary to any analysis of the
regulatory risk of a particular future investment.
The Company asserts that it may turn out that the demand for
high capacity transmission is limited at present causing the revenues
generated to be insufficient to fully cover costs. But the testimony
of the other major parties was to the effect that if the investment
is included in rate base, rates will be set to recover the costs, and
thus the Company will be protected.
Both the Division and the Committee testified that most of the
central offices included in the modernization plan are scheduled to
be replaced by 1996 in the Company's business-as-usual budget. Thus,
the plan would accelerate already planned investment by just a few
years.
The Commission finds there is substantial evidence on the
record that the modernization investments will benefit Utah in the
near and long term future and are, therefore, a prudent risk for
ratepayers.
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Therc was considerable testimony on the record by the Division
and the Committee asserting that depreciation policies adopted by the
Commission have provided the Company the opportunity for rapid
recovery of investment. The Company therefore has the ability to
respond to rapid changes in technological innovation and emerging
new, specialized customer demands without undue rate shocks to the
general body of ratepayers. The Commission finds that the Commission
has protected the Company's recovery of investment by adopting
liberal depreciation policies.
Company witness Dr. William H. Davidson warned the Commission
that it should not prescribe by order additional investment in the
state of Utah. Any such effort could be circumvented by a reduction
of investment elsewhere in the state. This could degenerate, he
argued, into a situation where the Commission is forced to micro-
manage the Company and thus assume responsibility for the investment
decisions of the Company. The Commission ought not to have any
desire for such a role. According to Dr. Davidson, the principal wav
to increase investment in Utah is to increase the rate cf return on
investments. He testified that the incentive plan is the most ef
ficient wiy to raise the rate of return.
The. Commission admonishes the Company aga inst compensator-/
decreases in investment in ether areas. There is evidence on the
record of the Company's planned investment for the state absent an
incentive plan. The Commission does not wish to see any gross
deviations from those plans. USWC's investments in the state must
insure a high quality of service as determined by this Commission.
Appropriate regulatory measures will be taken to insure such quality
of service. USWC possesses a certificate' of convenience and
.1
nc_Cjsj__']__Np_ _9 0- 04 9-0 3 _and_ o o
- 7 6 -
necessity and franchises to provide essential public services
throughout its service territory. The Commission finds that the
Company has the obligation to provide such services, determined by
this Commission, so long as it holds that authority.
The Company also contended that its modernization plan in
conjunction with the incentive plan increases its risk exposure.
Such risk raises shareholders' required rate of return and therefore
should be reflected in the incentive plan. Thus, the Company argued
in favor of a gap between the authorized rate of return and that
above which a sharing of earnings with ratepayers would commence.
The Company maintained that it is at risk if the cost of capital
increases. The Commission finds that such risk is attendant to the
incentive plan alone and should not affect any decision on moder
nization. The Commission finds that neither the Company nor the
ratepayer bears inordinate risk in modernizing the remaining electro
mechanical central offices, extending its digital "backbone"
infrastructure, or the fiber optic extensions as contemplated by the
Company's proposed modernization plan.
E. C_)MMISSION AUTHORITY
The Company has persuasively argued that the benefits of rural
upgrade and modernization are substantial and those benefits are
detailed herein and throughout this record. All parties are agreed
that the public interest would be served by the modernization program
proposed by the Company. At issue is the Company's insistence that
the program is uneconomical without a change in regulatory framework
as it has proposed in its incentive plan and that the Commission is
PP_C.h_L^_L_KO_, 90-o•; n-ii •> and o6
without authority to order modernization unless the Commission finds
that the upgrades will be economical.
As clearly stated above, we do not agree that we must make such
a finding. Nonetheless, we are of the view that the program may on
the whole be economical. The Company submitted three studies on the
economics of modernizing the central offices using its Capital
Utilization Criteria (CL'CRIT) model. The first study was submitted
in response to the Committee's interrogatories concerning moderniza
tion. This response used data from a 19 88 study on the then 54
remaining electro-mechanical central offices in the state. The study
narrowed its analysis to the originally proposed 46 offices and con
cluded that modernization of these offices as a whole was uneconomic.
However, as pointed out in the Committee's testimony, the study
excluded the additional revenues that would be generated by the new
services available from the upgraded offices. The Company updated
this study by including these additional revenues and excluding five
central offices that had reached "hard triggers". This study
indicated that three of the central office upgrades were economical,
19 were marginally economical and 19 were uneconomical. Taken as a
complete package, the investment was deemed by the Company to be mar
ginally ecencmi cal.
Mr. Fuehr ordered a new CUCRIT study in December of 1990 and
late-filed with the Commission on February 13, 1991. This study
examined the economics of the 41 central offices that were included
in the revised modernization plan. It concluded that such
modernization was uneconomic. Because this study was late filed,
however, the parties could not adequately assess it. Therefore, the
Commission cannot rely on it to make a finding. m addition, there
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is no formal analysis on the record concerning the economics of the
fiber optic backbone and central office interties.
In sum, the evidence purporting to show the Commission that the
modernization program is uneconomical is not persuasive. The
Commission finds that the Company"s studies are not conclusive and
may not include all of the benefits identified on the record, and
therefore the Commission cannot conclude that the proposed central
office modernization is uneconomical.
The Company cites two cases, the Mulcahv case (Mulcahv v. PSC.
117 P.2d 298, 1941) and the Lifeline case (M_gjjntain States Telephone
v- psc/ 1988) in support of its position that the Commission cannot
order the Company to make expenditures which are uneconomical.
Neither of those cases is convincing. The Mulcahy case is a trucking
case in which the Commission was required to determine whether or not
to grant a trucking company an operating certificate over opposition
from an already certificated carrier for the same territory. In
dictum the Court discusses the criteria for determining whether
public convenience dictates that a new carrier be certificated in the
territory and refers to the need to have the patronage for the
service to justify the expense of rendering the service. That fact
situation is completely different from the one facing the Commission
.nere. In this case the Commission is considering the advisability of
.aaving a regulated utility upgrade its service. There is no debating
whether or not another phone company should be granted a certificate
in USWC's existing service territory. Clearly, the criteria for the
entry of a competitor into an existing utility's service territory
would be different and more stringent than the criteria for requiring
an existing utility to upgrade its service. it is not unreasonable
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in the Muloahy case, as opposed to this one, that the Court should
require that the would-be competitor's rates be cost-justified so as
not to be predatory.
The Lifeline case stands for the proposition that the
Commission lacks a specific delegation of legislative authority to
have the customers of one utility in this state bear some of the cost
of a program for the customers of another utility in this state.
This present case is not dealing with separate utilities—it is
dealing only with USWC. The issue is whether or not the Company
should be required to provide upgraded service for its own customers,
not the customers of another utility. In the Li fel ine case the Court
determined that the Commission lacked a legislative delegation of
authority to direct the Company to surcharge its customers for a
statewide pool of Lifeline program funds that would be used for the
customers of all phone companies. That has nothing to do with the
Commission's authority to order an upgrade in the utility service
offered by a utility to its customers. These are apple and orange
issues.
There are multiple statutory references to the Commission's
authority to require adequate service which supplement the
Commission's general jurisdictional grant at 54-4-1:
The commission is hereby vested with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the
business of every such public utility in this state, and
to do all things, whether herein specifically designated
or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient
in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.
The first of these is 54-4-7, which is a clear and plain
statement of the Commission's authority to regulate and supervise the
j
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services and commodities provided by utilities and order changes
where present services are no longer adequate.
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that
the rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances,
facilities, or service of any public utility, or the
methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission,
storage or supply employed by it, are unjust,
unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inadequate or
insufficient, the commission shall determine the just,
reasonable, safe, proper, adequate or sufficient rules,
regulations, practices, equipment, appliances,
facilities, service or methods to be observed, furnished,
constructed, enforced or employed, and shall fix the same
by its order, rule or regulation.
Section 54-4-8 is in the same vein.
Whenever the commission shall find that additions,
extensions, repairs or improvements to or changes in the
existing plant, equipment, apparatus, facilities or other
physical property of any public utility or of any two or
more public utilities ought reasonably to be made, or
that a new structure or structures ought to be erected to
promote the security or convenience of its employees or
the public or in any way to secure adequate service or
facilities, the commission shall make and serve an order
directing that such additions, extensions, repairs,
improvements or changes be made or such structure or
structures be erected in the manner and within the time
specified in said order.
Section 54-Sb-ll charges the Commission with making available
to customers throughout the state high-quality, universal
telecommunications services. Section 54-3-1 requires that utilities
provide equipment and service which promotes the safety, health,
comfort and convenience of its customers.
The adequacy and convenience of service and equipment can
change over time. Operator-switched calls and multi-party lines were
once considered adequate; obviously, they no longer are. The Company
itself has admitted on this record that the simple ability to
complete a call in today's environment does not constitute adequate
service. The Commission finds that service to certain customer areas
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is not adequate by present day standards and that the modernization
program is necessary at this time to provide all customers in this
state with adequate and convenient service. It is, therefore, in the
public interest. We conclude that it is for this Commission to
determine what is necessary and convenient in the way of utility
services, require the utility to provide it and allow that provider
an opportunity to earn a fair return on its investment.
F. SUMMARY
The Commission recognizes that telecommunications provides
beneficial externalities. A modern telecommunications infrastructure
permits the efficient and economical flow of information, to the
benefit of consumers of all sorts. As a result, it also may promote
economic development.
Prudent and properly timed modernization is an important
requirement facing the telecommunications industry. Therefore, it is
a necessary element of good regulatory policy to promote economic and
timely modernization. This Commission will encourage timely,
socially beneficial investments, and will allocate corresponding
costs fairly and equitably.
The Commission has found that the public interest requires the
Company to undertake its modernization plan, whether or not its
proposed incentive plan is approved. USWC will have the opportunity
to earn its allowed rate of return on the proposed modernization
investments and, therefore, will be compensated for the risk of such
investment.
The Company must not provide discretionary modernization
investment at the expense of investments otherwise undertaken to
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maintain high quality service for the general body of ratepayers,
however. The Company's investments in the state must insure high
quality service, as determined by this Commission. Appropriate
regulatory measures will be taken to insure that this occurs.
The Commission finds that existing services are no longer
adequate and concludes that the modernization plan is justified in
that it brings telecommunications in Utah in lino with present day
service expectations. Therefore, it is appropriate to order the
Company to provide central office upgrades estimated to cost $36.35
million and fiber-optic extensions so that the fiber optic infra
structure extends from Logan to St. George, with digital microwave
extensions to Vernal and Price, at an estimated cost of $2.1.5
million. These figures are represented by the Company to be the
costs associated with these modernization investments. The
Commission is ordering the modernization of the network, not the
Company's estimated costs. The investments will be subject to the
normal prudence reviews in future rate cases. As previously noted,
the Commission, in the past, has not found the Company's investments
to be unreasonable or excluded, them from rate base.
The Division and the Company supported the proposed extension
of fiber to colleges, universities and high schools only where deemed
to be economically justified. As noted above, originally the Company
proposed that the estimated $33.88 million to extend fiber to such
institutions would be a part of the overall modernization plan. The
Commission is satisfied by the testimony on the record, including
that of the public witnesses, as to the benefits of such extension.
The Commission finds that fiber to the colleges, universities and
high schools in the Company's territory is in the public interest and
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ought not be purely discretionary. The Commission further finds that
the Company must work with the Division and the various interested
educational interests in the state to devise a program entailing the
investment for extending fiber to these institutions as part of the
total modernization plan. Such plan shall include details of the
rates to bo charged education for use of the network. Institutions
should be required to sign contracts, or otherwise demonstrate that
they will utilize the fiber optic service and pay the rates
determined, before construction is authorized. Such plan shall be
submitted to the Commission within three months of this Order. The
Commission further finds that all modernization investments must be
completed within 54 months of the Order, and booked as completed.
V. INCENTIVE REGUIATION PROPOSALS
In this proceeding, both USWC and the Division made proposals
for the adoption of so-called "Incentive Regulation" plans in this
jurisdiction. In essence, incentive regulation is based upon the
assumption that traditional regulation does' not provide sufficient
incentives for regulated utilities to operate as efficiently as
possible. Incentive regulation allows the utility to earn in excess
of the authorized rate of return on equity with the hope that such
overearnings will provide a greater incentive to management and
employees to undertake additional efficiencies.
A. DISCUSSION OF PLANS
1. USWC PLAN:
The term of USWC's plan is four years, commencing January 1,
1991 and terminating December 31, 1994. During the term of the plan,
")
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no increases in basic rates would be permitted except as a result of
changes in four "pass-through" categories: Commission-approved
accounting changes required or allowed by Generally Accepted Account
ing Principles (GAAP), changes in federal tax rates, FCC-mandated
separations changes and Commission ordered changes in depreciation
rates. Other rates would also be frozen, except for limited, revenue
neutral adjustments approved by the Commission. Services that have
been Commission approved as rate flexible or detariffed could be
changed without Commission approval. USWC would be precluded from
filing a rate case except where a full calendar year's earnings were
lower than a 10.5 percent return on equity. The Company would be
allowed to retain all earnings up to a 14.0 percent rate of return on
equity. All earnings above 14.0 percent would be shared with
customers on a 50-50 basis by annual credits on customer bills in the
year following that in which overearnings occurred.
2. DPU PTAN:
The Division's proposed plan differs from the USWC proposal in
several respects. The. Division wants the sharing point .to begin at
the same level as the authorized return on equity ordered by the
Commission in this proceeding, instead of the 14.0 percent level.
Under the Division proposal, no pass-through rate adjustments are
allowed. Instead of a firm, four-year term for the incentive
regulation plan, without regulatory review, the Division proposes a
five-year plan with a mid-point review and the option of an early
termination of the plan if it is found to not be in the public
interest. The Division's plan proposes a procedure for indexing the
authorized return on equity in order to minimize the risk to the
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Company of fluctuating capital costs during the term of the plan.
The remaining differences are minor.
B. POSIT TONS OF THE PARTIES
1. US__WEST COMMUNICATIONS
In its testimony in support of its plan, USWC attempted to
establish the weaknesses in traditional regulation which would
justify the adoption of a significant departure from the current
regulatory method. The perceived weaknesses can be grouped and
summarized as follows:
a. Traditional regulation does not provide sufficient incen
tives for efficient managerial and employee performance. Under
traditional regulation, management and employees do not share in the
rewards of increased efficiency since the resulting overearnings are
returned to ratepayers after a brief period of regulatory lag.
Evidence cited in support of this position is as follows:
(1) Common Sense - It is intuitively obvious that greater
financial rewards would motivate management and employees to increase
their efficiency and upgrade their performance.
(2) Traditional - Traditional regulation is essentially a
"cost-plus" arrangement between the utility and regulators, there-
tore, absent regulatory lag, overearnings resulting from efficiency
gains are passed on to ratepayers rather than used to reward manage
ment or employees for improvements in efficiencies.
(3) Regulatory Lag - Regulatory lag is an insufficient
incentive to undertake incremental increases in efficiency.
b. Traditional regulation retards the rate of technological
innovation, delaying both the adoption of new technologies and the
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introduction of new services. This is because incremental earnings
derived from such new technologies or services ultimately inure to
the benefit of ratepayers and not the shareholders. Furthermore, new
efficiencies derived from technological advances are also lost to the
shareholders, thus providing a disincentive to their introduction.
The evidence cited by the Company in support of this argument is as
follows:
(1) Common Sense - it is again intuitively obvious that the
loss of additional revenues from new offerings and new efficiencies
does not provide incentives to the Company to introduce them.
(2) Earnings/Risks - The opportunity for additional earnings
will compensate the Company for the additional risks that flow from
introducing new and untested technological changes and products.
c. Traditional regulation has an anti-investment bias. Since
the Company is not able to earn a sufficiently high return on
investment, it fails to invest in the basic infrastructure. The
evidence provided here is to the effect that if the Company had a
choice as to where to make "discretionary" investments, it would
surely make those investments in activities and jurisdictions where
the return was greater.
In addition to the criticism of traditional regulation
summarized above, USWC asserted that incentive regulation would have
the positive benefits that would accrue from reversing the negatives
of traditional regulation. There would be greater efficiency, more
rapid deployment of new technologies and services, and added
investment in this jurisdiction. Additionally, the Company argued
that incentive regulation protects customers from undue rate
~)
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increases during the term of the incentive regulation plan, because
of the freeze on rate increases.
USWC did not agree with major provisions of the Division's
incentive plan, specifically, the absence of a gap between the
authorized rate of return on equity and the sharing point, the
floating rate of return on equity, the absence of pass-throughs, and
the term of the plan.
2. DIVISTON OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
To one degree or another, the. Division agreed with many of the
justifications for incentive regulation put forth by the Company.
Specifically, Division witnesses asserted that there is always room
for improvement and additional efficiencies in the management
processes. in addition, the Division contended that potential
benefits might include additional sharable earnings to the ratepayers
from the annual credit procedure, instead of all of those earnings
above the authorized rate of return being lost by the ratepayers
through regulatory lag. Potential benefits might also include the
acceleration of new technologies and services, and regulatory costs
might be reduced as a result of incentive regulation.
The Division argued, however, that there is no way to
substantiate the likelihood of such benefits. Division witnesses
characterized their proposal as an experiment - one designed to
protect ratepayers from harm, and perhaps even benefit them, while
allowing the Company to prove the benefits of incentive regulation.
The Division, however, disputed certain portions of the
Company's plan, specifically, the gap between the authorized rate of
return on equity and the 14 percent sharing level, which the Division
; j
DOCKET NO. 90-049-03 and 0.6
-SO-
characterized as a Company windfall. In addition, the Division
criticized the pass-through provisions because they allow single-item
rate cases which are prohibited under Utah law. The absence of a
raid-plan review with the option of termination if it is not resulting
in benefits to the ratepayers is also a problem the Divis. on
identified.
3. COMMITTKE OF CONSUMER SERVICES
The Committee proposed elements of an incentive plan of its
own, pursuant to a request by the Commission. However, the bulk of
its testimony was in opposition to the plans of both the Company and
the Division. The Committee's arguments in opposition to the
implementation of an incentive plan are summarized as follows:
a. The Committee argued that prior to approving an incentive
regulation plan, Utah law requires a finding by the Commission that
rates under an incentive regulation plan would be "just and
reasonable," which they interpret to mean equal to or less than rates
under traditional regulation. The Committee contended that the
evidence clearly shows that rates under incentive regulation would be
higher than under traditional regulation, therefore the Commission
cannot approve any incentive regulation plan.
b. The Company plan violates Utah law because it limits the
right of the Division, the Committee or any other party from filing
a rate case or order to show cause during the pendency of the plan.
c. The provision calling for pass-throughs under the Company
plan is in violation of Utah law inasmuch as it would allow for
single item rate cases.
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d. The Division's mechanism for a floating rate of return on
equity may also be a prohibited single-item rate case.
e. There is insufficient evidence to justify even the
Division's "test" of an incentive regulation scheme.
f. Incentive regulation may create a disincentive on the part
of the Company to invest in the basic telecommunication's
infrastructure because it could earn a higher return on depreciated
plant than on new plant.
g. The proposed rate freeze would block potential, future
rate decreases
h. Employees and management have sufficient incentives under
existing regulation since their pay is based on comparable industry
standards and includes bonus and profit-sharing plans funded at
ratepayer expense.
4. MCI
MCI argued that the Commission should not approve the incentive
regulation plans of either the Company or the Division. However, if
the Commission were to adopt the changes to the plans proposed by MCI
witness Dr. Cornell, specifically, changes dealing with pass-
throughs, the starting point of sharing, the sharing method and a
ceiling, MCI would not oppose the plan. With respect to earnings
sharing, Dr. Cornell recommended an increasing percentage for the
Company as earnings grow to ensure that the Company is not rewarded
for the easy efficiencies that already should have been implemented.
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5. CONTEV,
Contel argued in favor of the theory of incentive regulation,
out did not address in detail the specifics of the USWC or the
Division plans. It encouraged the Commission to adopt a plan that
is, "A balanced plan, reasonably monitored to protect against the
adverse effects of possible mistake (by the utility or the
regulator)..." in the belief that such a plan, "...can bring results
beneficial to the customer, the investor, and the public." It
further argued that any finding for or against an incentive plan in
this docket ought not to dictate the application of incentive
regulation to other utilities.
C- DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
We are being asked to make a significant departure from the
current scheme of regulation in the state of Utah. As noted by
Committee witness Dunkel, traditional regulation is performing
relatively well in this jurisdiction. Ratepayers have received a
series of rate reductions over the past four years, the Company
continues to earn in excess of its authorized rate of return and the
telephone network appears to have met the basic needs of its
customers. In addition, telephone subscribership in the state is at
an all time high level (96.5 percent as of March, 1990) and is well
above the national average of 93.3 percent. No one argues that the
system is perfect, but concrete evidence that it is failing in any
major respect is absent from this record. On the other hand, the
record in this case shows that the promised benefits of the incentive
regulation proposals before the Commission are speculative and the
possibility exists that unless a specific incentive regulation plan
DOCKET NO .___9 0^04_9_- 0 3 and 06
-91-
is carefully crafted, there is risk of harm to the ratepayers. That
could occur in the form of higher rates than ratepayers would have
otherwise paid, or a windfall to shareholders in the form of higher
earnings than their investment risk would otherwise justify, as will
be discussed in more detail later. In light of this, the Commission
must approach the abandonment of traditional regulation and current
methods of balancing ratepayer and shareholder interests very
carefully. Accordingly, the Commission finds that there must be
evidence that a specific incentive regulation plan will be of benefit
to ratepayers and in the public interest before the Commission will
adopt such plan.
A review of the record shows that neither the Company nor the
Division plans, as currently constituted, fully meets this standard.
The evidence on the record does not substantially corroborate the
assertions made by proponents of incentive regulation either in their
attacks on traditional regulation or in support of the benefits of
incentive regulation:
1• Assertion that traditional regulation does not provide
sufficient incentives for efficient performance and that the proposed
incentive plans will result in increased efficiencies. Under Utah
law, public utilities have the clear responsibility to provide
service that is "...efficient, just and reasonable." U.C.A. Sec. 54-
3-1. It is therefore the obligation of the utility, in effect a
condition of its right to operate as a public utility, to be
efficient. Inefficiency, and particularly knowing inefficiency,
would result in unjust and unreasonable charges for the utility's
services which UCA 54-3-1 prohibits and deems unlawful. It is highly
questionable whether it should be necessary to reward shareholders
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with additional earnings in order to encourage the utility to be
efficient.
The Company stated in this docket that USWC is an efficient
operation, current service is adequate, and that it is more efficient
today than it was five years ago. In addition, it testified that its
Utah operations compare favorably with those of the other states it
serves. This is due to a number of factors, including technological
advances, existing incentive and bonus plans for management, and
employee access to a profit-sharing plan. The Company also testified
that competition has driven it to become more efficient.
The proponents of incentive regulation were not able to produce
concrete evidence that their incentive regulation plans would produce
the results promised. The Company indicated that the employee
compensation plans would not be modified in order to insure that the
rank and file employees would be allowed to share in the earnings to
be generated under the incentive plan.
They were not willing to guarantee that gains in efficiency
would result from the adoption of an incentive plan.
The Company could not specifically identify areas in which
efficiencies would result from their incentive regulation plan, nor
could they identify examples from other jurisdictions that have
adopted incentive regulation plans of efficiencies that resulted or
positive impacts upon ratepayers from sharing of revenues. In fact,
there was testimony on this record that at least one experiment
INYNEX) had produced just the opposite effect. The Company admitted
that there does not exist any quantifiable measure of efficiency
gains arising from incentive plans.
i 7" I
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One of the major witnesses sponsored by the Company in this
proceeding was Professor Davidson who spoke in favor of incentive
regulation as a means of addressing the emergence of competition on
the national and international scene. Yet other Company witnesses
testified that the Company's incentive regulation plan was not
designed to meet the concerns of competition.
The Company could not produce an analysis of the impacts upon
the ratepayers of incentive regulation. Company witnesses testified
that it is impossible to quantitatively demonstrate that rates under
an incentive plan will be equal to or lower than rates under
traditional regulation. There was, however, testimony by the Company
that adoption of an incentive regulation plan would increase the cost
of capital to the Company due to higher risks. In addition, Company
witnesses testified that one of the advantages of incentive
regulation is that it encourages "risk taking" by the Company but
that ratepayers would be exposed to the risk of Company failure since
investment made during the course of the incentive plan will be in
rate base at the end of the plan.
Of all of the •arguments put forth by the proponents of
incentive regulation, the one with the most appeal is the one with no
basis other than "intuition". If we make it possible for the Company
to increase its earnings by becoming more efficient through a
properly crafted incentive plan, including an assurance that the
rates that we begin with are such that the Company will not enjoy a
windfall, the promise of increased earnings is motivation enough that
efficiencies will probably result. Another argument in favor of a
carefully crafted plan is that the sharing of overearnings, the
annual accounting of earnings, and the allowance of a return of their
t73
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share of the earnings in some manner in the subsequent year, permits
the ratepayers to receive at least some benefit of overearnings. In
the past several years of consistent overearnings by the Company,
such overearnings have benefitted only the. shareholders. There is
also appeal in the argument of the Division that even though the
promised benefits of incentive regulation are speculative, if the
plan is crafted in such a way that the ratepayers are not harmed,
then it might be in the ratepayers' interest to try the "experiment"
for a few years in order to test the theory of incentive regulation.
The Commission finds that the record does not fully support the
arguments by proponents of incentive regulation that the Company
lacks incentives to be efficient under current regulation. It further
finds that the record is deficient in evidence that the incentive
regulation plans proposed in this proceeding will create the
incentives for efficiency promised. There is also an absence of
evidence to fully support the contention that ratepayers will benefit
from the adoption of the Company•s or the Division's proposed
incentive regulation plans.
2. Assertion that traditional regulation retards the rate of
technological innovation which will be corrected under an incentive
regulation plan. This argument flies in the face of a long-
established principle, that if the Company is allowed the opportunity
to earn the allowed rate of return (market cost of capital) on its
utility investment, and with rates linked to that investment in the
form of rate base, the utility has an incentive to increase
investment in order to increase the absolute level of its profits.
The Company offered no concrete evidence to counter this widely
accepted view. The Company did not offer any example of investments
•- "7 13
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not made, technologies withheld from Utah because of a lack of
incentive, or services not offered in Utah because the Company had no
incentive to earn additional revenues.
The Company has asserted in a number of proceedings before this
Commission, and in this proceeding, that it faces a serious threat
from competition. It is hard to accept the theory that the Company
would withhold introduction of new technologies or new services that
would help it meet that competition simply because an incentive
regulation plan did not exist in Utah. There is evidence, however,
that USWC has invested considerable sums in recent years in
introducing new technologies and improving the telecommunications
infrastructure generally. In addition, it appears that the
independent telephone companies that operate in the state have had
the incentive under traditional regulation to modernize their systems
to a maj or degree.
There is also evidence that liberal depreciation policies, such
as those adopted by this Commission since 1985, have a more direct
and substantial impact upon modernization decisions than would an
incentive regulation plan.
Some Company witnesses argued that under traditional regulation
the Company is put at risk in its modernization efforts by arguments
that certain investments are not prudent, yet the Company offered no
evidence that this Commission has ever declared any investment by the
Company to be imprudent and thus not allowable in rate base.
The Commission therefore finds that there is insufficient
evidence to justify the assertion that traditional regulation, as
implemented in this jurisdiction, discourages modernization or the
introduction of new technologies or services. Furthermore, the
' l"t74
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Commission does not find valid the evidence on this record which
purports to substantiate the assertion that adoption of incentive
regulation would lead to more rapid deployment of new services or
technologies.
3. The argument that traditional regulation has an anti-
investment bias. Much of the analysis set forth above under Section
b also applies to this assertion. It appears that the essence of
this argument is that the Company is discouraged from investing in
activities and jurisdictions where the return is not as high as other
jurisdictions or business opportunities. In fact, Company witnesses
asserted on the record that all the Company is really after is a
higher return on its investment. The Commission finds that a
commitment by the Company to the provision of public service and an
opportunity to earn the allowed rate of return equal to the market
cost of capital, as determined by this Commission, provides an
appropriate long-term basis upon which investment decisions should be
made by the Company.
4• The specific elements of the Companv Plan rejected by the
Division and the Committee.
a. The proposed gap between the authorized rate of return and
the sharing level of 14 percent.
We believe that the evidence on the record shows that such a gap
would result in a windfall to the Company at the expense of the
ratepayers. The studies of Division witnesses Compton and Henningsen
substantiate this conclusion. Testimony of MCI witness Cornell to
the effect that such a gap would reward the Company for "easy
efficiencies" is further evidence. The Commission therefore finds
that the record does not justify the existence of a gap between the
t •T J:)
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rate of return authorized by the Commission in this proceeding and
the point at which the ratepayers begin to share in the results of
Company efficiencies.
b. The proposed pass-through items proposed in the Company
plan. One of the more public assertions made by the Company both
before the proceeding began (as established in the numerous letters
received by the Commission in support of the proposed modernization
and incentive plans, which letters were apparently generated in large
part by the active lobbying of the Company) and during the course of
the proceeding, was that rates would be frozen during the duration of
the incentive regulation plan. Yet the Company has requested that
rates be allowed to increase in the event the four designated pass-
through items require it. The parties that argued against the
inclusion of pass-throughs contended that by selecting items that
would in all likelihood result in increases in rates, but excluding
factors that would in all likelihood result in additional revenues to
the Company is not fair to ratepayers. It was further argued that
such pass-throughs are single-item rate cases which have been
declared illegal in this jurisdiction. The Commission finds that the
arguments against pass-throughs are persuasive and we will not allow
them in any plan approved by the Commission.
c. The absence of a mid-term review of incentive regulation
and the absence of a means of bringing an action before the
Commission to consider termination of a plan.
The arguments are based in large part upon public policy, i.e.,
it is not wise to deprive the Commission and other regulators of a
mechanism for reviewing in detail and in public this significant
departure from the regulatory norm. There was also argument that
- r v o
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depriving regulators of this opportunity would be in violation of
Title 54 of the Utah Code provisions which set out the duties of the
Division and the Commission. We find that any restriction in an
incentive regulation plan on the right of the Commission, the
Division, the Committee or any other party to request a review of an
approved plan would not be in the public interest. We do, however,
note that in order for an incentive plan to succeed in the manner
contemplated, that there must be a presumption that it will be
allowed to proceed for a period of several years, absent a clear
showing that it is not in the public interest.
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission cannot adopt the
incentive plan of either the Company or the Division as presented to
the Commission. We find that the adoption of such plans in their
current forms would not result in the promised efficiencies or
investments nor would they be of benefit to the ratepayers of this
state.
This hearing is unique in the respect that we are proceeding
pursuant to a statute that allows the Company to opt out of a plan
approved by the Commission (54-4-4.1). We interpret this statute to
give us some discretion in crafting an alternative plan that we
believe would be in the public interest.
Based upon the record before us, and in conformance with the
findings heretofore entered by this Commission, we approve an
incentive regulation plan with the basic elements to be set forth
hereafter. It is our intention that the Company and the other
parties be given the opportunity to review these basic elements and
engage in discussions concerning them. If the Company chooses to
reject the plan as proposed, it may so notify the Commission pursuant
, t * t
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to the aforecited statute. If it chooses to accept the plan as
outlined, the Commission would order the parties to meet to draft the
details of such a plan and to submit them to the Commission for its
consideration and approval.
The Commission is approving the following plan based upon the
arguments already stated above that proper monetary incentives may
increase the efficiency of the Company, and as argued by the Divi
sion, that if carefully crafted to protect the interests of the
ratepayers, an experiment in incentive regulation may be in the
public interest. In addition, the Commission finds that the
following plan will allow the ratepayers to benefit by receiving a
share of overearnings of the Company that may result from the Company
earning in excess of its authorized rate of return.
The Commission finds that an incentive regulation plan based
upon the following general principles will protect the interests of
ratepayers, could produce a more efficient operation by USWC, will
allow a proper experiment in incentive regulation and is in the
public interest:
1. Rates will be frozen except as modified pursuant to item
6 hereafter and subject to revenue neutral changes in rates ordered
by the Commission as a result of contemplated cost-of-service
monitoring on a regular basis.
2. Regulation of the Company will continue in all respects as
with traditional regulation, except as modified by this Order.
3. The starting point for sharing between the ratepayers and
shareholders shall be at the authorized rate of return on equity set
by the Commission in this Order, 12.2 percent.
:t7.s
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4. Earnings by the Company between 12.2 percent and 13.2
percent on equity will be shared 80 percent to the ratepayers and 20
percent to the shareholders.
Earnings between 13.2 percent and 14.2 percent shall be shared
60 percent to the ratepayers and 40 percent to the shareholders.
Earnings between 14.2 percent and 17 percent shall be shared 50
percent to the ratepayers and 50 percent to the shareholder.
Earnings in excess of 17 percent shall all be returned to the
ratepayers.
5. There will be no pass-through adjustments.
6. The ratepayers' share of earnings in excess of 12.2
percent will be calculated as soon as possible in the next calendar
year. Disposition of such share will be determined by the
Commission, after hearing, in one or more of the following ways:
a. one-time credits against the customers' bills;
b. permanent rate reductions or restructuring;
c investment in the infrastructure in addition to that
ordered herein.
7. The term of. the plan is for five years. The Commission
can terminate the plan at any time if it is convinced that the public
interest justifies termination. At any time during the duration of
the plan the Company can request a rate case. In addition, at any
time the Division or the Committee can request the Commission to
undertake an investigation of the rates and charges of the Company.
However, the Company, the Division and the Committee will have t
overcome the presumption that it is in the public interest that th
plan be allowed to go the entire five-year experimental period.
o
o
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8. The plan will include the service performance standards
proposed by the Division in this proceeding. It is the Commission's
intention, however, to conduct a comprehensive examination of quality
of service and to assess the adequacy of these standards within six
months following adoption of the incentive plan.
9. The Company will devise and implement a method of sharing
a portion of the excess earnings earned under this plan with
employees of the Company. Such plan will be filed with the
Commission.
10. The Company will continue to file with the Commission
monthly reports as to its earnings. In addition, the Company will
file quarterly reports detailing efficiencies resulting from the
plan.
11. The Company will file with the Commission, and the
Division will evaluate, annual intrastate revenue requirement
determination on both an actual and a prospective test-year basis.
12. The Division will file with the Commission the results of
annual cost-of-service studies using the DCOS model. The cost-of-
service studies are also to be on an actual and prospective test-year
basis and to be consistent with the determination of revenue
requirement. The cost-of-service studies shall be performed
utilizing accounting information and special studies, such as access
lines and minutes of use, from the same time period.
By design, the above sets out the minimal details concerning
the Commission's ordered incentive plan. The Commission is convinced
that the details of the plan can be worked out by the parties within
a relatively short time period.
73 t80
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ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. USWC reduce its revenues by $19,799,000 in accordance with
the spread and rate design portions of this Order.
2. USWC incorporate the revenue reduction into its rates and
schedules in conformance with Attachment A hereto and file
appropriate revised tariffs with the Commission, which tariffs shall
take effect on July 1, 1991.
3. USWC implement the central office modernization and fiber
optic extensions described and set forth in this Order and devise a
program in consultation with the Division and potentially affected
educational institutions for fiber-optic extensions to those
institutions. The details of this program are to be reported to the
Commission within three months of this Order. The modernization and
extensions shall be completed within 54 months of the Order.
4. USWC file notice with the Commission as soon as possible,
but not later than 60 days following the date of this Order, of its
acceptance or rejection of the incentive plan detailed herein.
5. USWC undertake and report the following projects:
a. Develop a stimulation model for toll, 800, outWATS and
switched access services within one year of the date of this Order.
b. Track the growth and minutes of usage for the services
listed in paragraph (a) and report them quarterly beginning
October 1, 1991.
c Provide the Division with 1990 SLUS information and such
other information as is necessary to enable the Division to prepare
a DCOS study based on 1990 actual results of operations consistent
with Commission findings in this case by July 15, 1991.
•♦ V. i
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d. Provide, in conjunction with the Division, additional
information on separate identification and allocation of NTS costs
for local switching equipment.
6. The Division perform and report the results of the 1990
DCOS study to the Commission and make it available to the Committee
and other interested parties.
7. To the extent the Commission has inadvertently omitted
from the ordering provisions of this Order any duty or obligation
intended to be imposed upon USWC or the Division, which duty or
obligation is otherwise clear from the language of preceding portions
of this Order, it is hereby incorporated herein by this reference and
made a part hereof.
8. Within 30 days of the issuance of this Order, an aggrieved
party may file a written .request for review by the Commission. If
such request is denied in writing within 20 days or deemed denied by
Commission inaction after 20 days, the aggrieved party then has 30
days following such denial within which to petition the Supreme Court
for review.
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 19th day of June, 1991.
Stephen C. Hewlett
Commission Secretary
/I •<Th 1 U-L^ZkL.
irai^T. Stewart, Chairman
^9V
James wf Byrne, Commissioner"99--^.
Stephen /F. Mecham, Commissioner
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ADDENDUM C
U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
EXHIBIT NO. 10R.4
oCD
00
CO
O
APPROVED EARNINGS SHARING PLANS
STATE
(A)
FLOOR
ROE (%)
(B)
AUTHORIZED
ROE
(C)
TRIGGER
ROE Ci)1
CD)
ROE TRIGGER
GAP (%)
fD-C)
BANDWIDTH
SPREAD HO
( D - B )
ALABAMA 13.42 13.8 7 14 .50 0.63 1 0 8
oalifor:;ia 7.58 13.00 15.50 2.50 7 . f.»?
CONNECT!OIT n.no 13.00 13.50 0.50 2 . 50
FLORIDA 11.50 13.20 14.00 0.80 2.50
GEORGIA 12.00 13.00 14 .00 1.00 2 . 00
KENTUCKY 11.68 13.05 14.15 1.10 2.47
MARYLAND2 (3) 13.60 13,60 0 N /A
MIGHT CAN' 12.25 13.25 13.25 0 1 . 00
MINNESOTA 10.00 12.15' 13,50 1.35 3 . 50
MTSSISSIPRT 12.03 13.26 13.67 0.41 1 . 64
MISSOURI 11.61 12.61 14.10 1.49 9 /|0
NEW MEXICO5 (3) 13.75 13.75 0 N/A
RHODE ISLAND6 (3) 13.25 13.25 0 N/A
TENNESSEE7 12.50 13.40 14 .40 1.00 1 . 90
TEXAS 11.44 12.85A 14.20 1.35 2 . 76
WASHINGTON2 10.42 12.83' 13.72 0.89 3 .30
AVERAGE 11.34 13.138 13.94 0.819 2.70 j
' ROE at which sharing begins
'Maryland and VV.r.hingion have M>pctMe:ical capital structures Washington's trigger point based on an actual capilnl structure is 13.1 5 Maryland's information
J No floor specified. • •
* Derived based on settlement No actualauthorized ROE determined.
J Company may die for rate iei:t;f when determined that suoslaniial damage to earnings has occurred.
Come-any p'oh.b ted from d mq rate case.
I! company d:cps ne o.v tne FiOQ l.wc company o.n\ recovers 40 60% of tne difference between actual eamir, :sand '.'he floor.
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